
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A PECULIAR GIFT RECORDED IN THE *MATSYA-PURĀṆA* AND *DĀNASĀGARA**

By BHABATOSH BHATTACHARYA

THE just published *Dānasāgara* of Ballāla Sena[1] describes 1375 gifts in its 75 *āvartas* or chapters. Though its chapter 33, consisting of 20 pages,[2] contains an elaborate description of 37 kinds of gift of gold, collected from various authorities, yet its chapter 44, covering 3 pages only,[3] is concerned with the peculiar gift of 30 kinds of *Kalpas*, made of gold, the only authority being the *Matsyapurāṇa*. As we have not discussed the nature of this gift in our Introduction to the *Dānasāgara*, so we propose to do the same here.

"I shall now describe the gift of *Kalpas*, which not only destroys all kinds of sin but the recital of which also endows the reciter with the religious merit, resulting from the chanting of the Vedas. The first *Kalpa* is the *Śveta* (*i.e.* white), the second one is the *Nīlalohita* (*i.e.* partly blue and partly red, meaning 'Śiva'), the third one is *Vāma-*

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*Paper submitted to the Classical Sanskrit section of the 19th Session of the All-India Oriental Conference, Delhi, 1957.

[1] Edited by the present writer and published by the Asiatic Society, 1956, as work No. 274, Bibliotheca Indica.

[2] Pp. 415—434.

[3] Pp. 492—494.

[4] Chap. 290, vv. 2—12, 18-19.

deva (a name of Śiva), the fourth *Rāthantara*, the fifth *Raurava* (the name of Śiva's hell), the sixth *Prāṇa* (*i.e.* life), the seventh *Bṛhatkalpa* (*i.e.* Great *Kalpa*), the eighth *Kandarpa* (*i.e.* the God of Love), the ninth *Sadyaḥ* (*i.e.* fresh), the tenth *Īśāna* (*i.e.* Śiva), the eleventh *Tamas* (*i.e.* darkness), the twelfth *Sārasvata* (*i.e.* pertaining to Sarasvatī, the Goddess of Learning), the thirteenth *Udāna*, the fourteenth *Gāruḍa* (*i.e.* pertaining to Garuḍa, the carrier bird of Viṣṇu), the fifteenth *Kaurma* (*i.e.* pertaining to *Kūrma*, meaning 'tortoise', an incarnation of Viṣṇu, which was born on a full-moon day), the sixteenth *Nārsiṁha* (*i.e.* pertaining to *Narasiṁha*, *i.e.* half-man, half-lion, the second incarnation of Viṣṇu), the seventeenth *Vāmana* (*i.e.* dwarf, the third incarnation of Viṣṇu), the eighteenth *Āgneya* (*i.e.* pertaining to *Agni* or fire), the nineteenth *Soma* (*i.e.* the moon), the twentieth *Mānava* (*i.e.* man), the twenty-first *Pumas* (*i.e.* male human being), the twenty-second *Vaikuṇṭha* (the abode of Viṣṇu), the twenty-third *Lakṣmī* (the wife of Viṣṇu), the twenty-fourth *Sāvitrī* (the wife of Brahman), the twenty-fifth *Ghora* (*i.e.* terrible), the twenty-sixth Vārāha, (*i.e.* pertaining to *Varāha*, *i.e.* boar, the fourth incarnation of Viṣṇu), the twenty-seventh *Vairāja* (*i.e.* pertaining to *Virāja*, the Supreme Being), the twenty-eighth *Gaurī* (wife of Śiva,) the twenty-ninth *Māheśvara* (*i.e.* pertaining to *Maheśvara*, *i.e.* Śiva, when he killed the demon Tripura) and the thirtieth Kalpa is *Pitṛ*, which is called Kuhū (or the newmoon day, in which no moon is visible in the day-time). These thirty *Kalpas*, collectively known as the month of Brahman, clear away all the sins of the donor and have been formerly named by him after their respective attributes. He, who gives away the golden images of these *Kalpas* in auspicious days, is honoured in the heavenly abodes of Brahman and Viṣṇu by the sages for *Kalpas* (*i.e.* cyles of existence). As the gift of *Kalpas* causes the vanishing of all sins, so an intelligent man should

have them constructed in the shape of sages and then give them away".

The *Dānasāgara* adds in the accompanying prose comment that the donor should first make thirty *Kalpas* in the form of Brāhmaṇa sages, supposing them to have assumed the appearance of golden images, with the rosary in the right hand and the water-bowl in the left, worship them and then make gifts of them in their serial order on the full-moon day, the new-moon day, the two eighth *tithis*, the two fourteenth *tithis* and on the *saṅkrānti* day to the Brāhmaṇa, who has ceremonially purified himself and has been duly honoured by the donor.

It may be added here that the V. 8a of the *Matsya-purāṇa* quotation, corresponding to V. 9a of Chapter 290 of the same, which is wanting in the *Dānasāgara*, presumably owing to its utilisation of a defective *Matsyapurāṇa* Ms., is to the following effect :—

'*Caturviṁśatimaḥ proktaḥ sāvītrīkalpasaṁjñakaḥ*', *i.e.* the twenty-fourth Kalpa is said to be named Sāvitrī. So Ballāla Sena, being at a loss to find out the name of the twenty-fourth *Kalpa*, thought *Lakṣmī*, really the twenty-third *kalpa*, to be the twenty-fourth and suggested that the formula of giving away the twenty-third *Kalpa*, after the gift of *Vaikuṇṭha*, should contain the serial number only of the twenty-third one.

NATURE OF MEANING*

By DR. P. S. SASTRI

1. THE word is already in existence and human effort makes it manifest. After it is uttered, it is not the word that is destroyed, for the word once again assumes its original unmanifested or potential existence. People cannot therefore make the words but they can make the sounds that manifest them. The word resides in the mind, or is latent in the mind or conciousness. It gets itself articulated only when there is a felt need for expression, and soon after it assumes its original form. In this way a word may be repeated many times. Yet the repetitions do not imply the births and deaths of the word, but of the desires behind these. In this sense we are told that at the same time and at different places many people can utter the same word. This does not however make the word lose its real nature. Jaimini tells us that the case is similar to the sun who is one, but who can be perceived by many at different places at the same time. This argument denies the plurality of existence for the same word; and the word thus becomes single, unique,

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* *Abbreviations* used in this Article :

AKJ—Anekāntajayapatākā.
B—Bhāmatī.
MS—Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra.
NBV—Nyāya-Bhāṣya.
NV—Nyāya-Vārtika.
PKM—Prameya-Kamala-Mārtaṇḍa.
PPV—Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa.
PS—Pramāṇa-Samuccaya.
PV—Pramāṇa-Vārtika.
PVA—Pramāṇa-Vārtikālaṅkāra.
SB—Śābara-Bhāṣya.
SD—Śāstra-Dīpikā.
SVNR—Nyāyaratnākara.
TB—Tattva-Bindu.
TP—Tattva-Pradīpikā.
TS—Tattva-Saṅgraha.
V—Vākyapadīya.
VP—Vedānta-Paribhāṣā.
VPS—Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha.
VSB—Vedānta-Sūtra Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara.
YSB—Yoga—Sūtra-Bhāṣya.

and real. It is a unitary one without any separable or inseparable parts. The word being devoid of parts, it neither gains nor loses, and it is only the sound that acquires volume which we wrongly transfer to the word which does not undergo modifications, for it is only the manifesting medium that changes. The word is real since its utterance gives rise to the knowledge of the meaning; but if it perishes with its utterance, it ceases to convey any meaning. It is uncaused, since the vocal apparatus only manifests it, and the uncaused is not liable to be destroyed.[1] Hence, the word is not only real but is an existent; and if it is nonexistent no one can bring it forth into existence, for nothing can never afford to become something.

Yet the word is not purely subjective; it is not the expression of an ego-centric predicament, since it is called forth as a response to the external world. The word springs into existence from some positive object which is presentable to consciousness. The object must have positive character of its own. The word which refers to such an object constitutes the element of significant speech. One group of these elements signifies, means, or names, actions or inactiveness; while another signifies, means or names, agents or patients. Thus, we get verbs and nouns; and the combination of these two units of significant utterance gives rise to a sentence. Every statement is about something or somebody, and it has a certain character. This character belongs to the objects and to the words. The words are constituted by certain primary unanalysable elements. Those first elements or simple reals, are the letters of the alphabet; and no account can be given of them. Things too are composed of simple unanalysable elements. The simple element has only a name with which we refer to it. We

[1] See MS. 1.1.14—21.

cannot make any statement about it, except refer to it by name. But as the element is unanalysable, the name of the element is indefinable. The name is a word, and a word is not a whole composed of parts. It is an aggregate of syllables, placed in a certain order. The syllable is devoid of parts, pervasive and real; and hence, it is capable of signifying something. But the full denotation becomes explicit only when the ,syllables adopt a specific sequence. This sequence is not inspired by a conventional association, whence the name or word is not a symbol of some mental mood, but a vocal sign. It is manifested through the vocal organs signifying something. It stands for something and means it. It refers to the existence of some object and therefore it is itself existent. It signifies or means the nature or the character of an object; and at the same time it stands for or refers to an existent. The word by its very nature becomes denotative of the meaning and the meaning is the denoted and this itself constitutes the relation. Since the word expresses the meaning without depending upon anything else, it is said to possess the primary significative force. The relation between the word and its meaning thus comes out to be that between a designation and the thing designated.[2] The very fact that the knowledge of the meaning arises immediately from the cognition of the word, shows that the word expresses the meaning. We may come to acquire this meaning through convention and other processes which are only accessory, and not fundamental, aids.

If a word remains unconnected with its meaning, we cannot fix a relation between the word and the object. Thus one cannot point to an object and call it a cow; and even if he uses this term, he has to describe the object. In so doing he will refer to the dewlap, and the word 'dewlap' will not convey any meaning unless 'it stands

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[2] SD 90.

for the object. It can stand for it not as a symbol, since human beings do not normally succeed in changing the words. Human machinery works in enabling us to know the meanings of the words and the names of the objects. But the part played by convention in linguistic matters nowhere tells us that human beings have created languages and established words.

Scientists have given new names to their discoveries, navigators to the lands, and expeditioners to the peaks. Here the names are symbols and the meanings are only associated with the words. We find that numeral notation too is employed to denote the objects. Whenever words can be substituted by numerals and other symbols, they stand for things, not for events involving consciousness.

2. Ordinary experience accepts some sort of a relation between a word and the object; for, in the absence of such a relation, there can be no thinking, no understanding, no experience. But the essential nature of a word lies in its meaning which is comprehended by the understanding. This meaning consists in the relation of the word to the object it refers to or signifies. Thus the very nature of the word brings about the unity of sound with two other significant factors. The cognition of a word results in the understanding of the object concerned. The word or sign refers to and conveys the idea of the object referred to. This is assumed in popular usage too, and it goes to confirm an integral relation between the two. It is the nature of the word to denote or convey the idea embodied in it, and this nature is inherent to it[4]. The meaning of a word, therefore, is precisely presented to us when we hear it. It is, moreover, the relevant words that are involed in knowledge.[5]

[3] See V. I. 125 ff.
[4] V. I.6.
[5] V. I. 124.

This relevancy is only regulated by convention; for the nature of the object is centralised in the word. And with the advance in the comprehension of the nature of the object, the word also acquires changes of meaning. But these changes are to be relevant to the nature of the object and to that of the word. Hence every word communicates its own specific meaning, and it is through a word that we cognize an object.[6] Every object has accordingly a corresponding competent word to denote it. A word therefore plays a dual role; it reveals its own form and also the object comprehended. The moment we hear a word, that very moment we comprehend the word, the object referred to, and the speaker's intention.[7] Just as fire possesses the power of burning, the words also have a power of their own according to which they mean certain objects irrespective of any one's volitions. There is the general awareness of objects presented by words. In other words, in language we have words embodying intelligence and thought, and these words deal with things other than the symbols themselves.

If the meaning of such a word is said to be an acquired character of the objects, it is a relation between an object and the image of the object.[8] But "meaning is to some extent subject to the will." This picture raises two questions of great importance. On the one hand, meaning is not purely volitional or intellectual affair; for, it is relative to the whole personality. On the other hand, the mental image cannot explain the nature of meaning because an image can be made to mean anything we like.[9] Further imagery cannot be discovered in the utterances of many and yet they talk sense; for, the meaning becomes

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[6] V. III. 7. [7] V. II.329.

[8] See Russell : *On propositions—What they are and How they Mean* (*Arist. Soc.* 1919, pages 7, 19, 24).

[9] See Schiller : *Meaning of Meaning.* (*Mind*, No. 116.393).

clearer and clearer as the vividness of imagery recedes step by step. Different images can evoke the same meaning, and different meanings can give rise to the same image. Meaning then does not and need not depend upon the images.

It has been said by some that images mediate thereby leading us to a meaning. The image or picture is visualised; but the visual picture cannot be divorced from the act of visualising. Isolating these two, they observe that meaning is an observable property of observable entities.[10] Such a meaning is also said to be a "relation"; a relation "constitutes" meaning, and a word not only "has" a meaning but is related "to its meaning"[11].

Meaning, here is a "relation" and an "observable property." But a relation is not an observable property, in which case meaning cannot afford to be a relation. Further, it is a word that has a meaning. If meaning is a relation, is the word related to a relation?

Meaning is said to be an observable property of observable entities called images. When it is said that a visual image "resembles" or "copies" sensations[12] by meaning is not meant a subjective or introspective phenomenon; for, we seek the meaning of the signs or symbols. Recognising this difficulty, one may say that the "visual image" is associated with the past "visual sensations." When the "visual image" causes actions appropriate to the "visual sensations", then it is said to "mean" them. That is, the image need not resemble the sensations in order to "mean" them, but it must only cause actions "appropriate" to the associated sensations. Sensations and images are dissimilar, while the objects and sensations too are dissimilar. And yet the image is made effective to give rise to meaning. This is the Yogācāra position.

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[10] *Russell in Mind*, 116.402.

[11] *Russell in Arist. Soc.* 1919, Pages 7, 19.

[12] *Ibid.* Pages 22-23.

A word does not denote the different features of the various objects that form the particulars of a class. It denotes the distinctive features alone, and these features are objective. And if the word simply refers to the mental image and not to the objects outside, words as expressive of our experiences would be futile, unpurposive, and insignificant.[13]

Let us take three sentences speaking about the same object. "Theophilus is Greek", "Theophilus is dear to God', "Theophilus has measles." The last one tells us of a disease of a man; the second gives the meaning of a name; and the first uses the word as a sign or symbol without telling us what it stands for, what it means. If the word as a sign has a *definite* signification, then the sentences are meaningless since not all the words are signs. Even a sign must stand for something definite, and it must mean. This the sign cannot do.[14] A word, therefore, is not a mere sign or symbol.

The theory of the image appears among the Yogācāra Buddhists, according to whom a cognition free from conceptual constructions is valid. A word refers to a particular object. Yet it generates a conceptual image which is distinct from other concepts. The denotation of a word lies in the evocation of this conceptional image. The mental image indirectly reflects the directly reflected reality.[15] The image constitutes the concept from which is derived the name. Diṅnāga, however, said, name and concepts originate in one another. The name functions as the middle term which enables us to cognise the object. It is an indirect mark of reality.

But if the word gives rise to a conceptual image, then the cognitive act can tell us nothing about the objects

[13] *Cf. PKM* 136.

[14] *Cf.* Bradley : *Principles*, 157.

[15] See *SVNR* 559.

and the words. It will tell us only something about the image. The verbal relation does not comprehend the particulars; for the Buddhists argue that if words refer to objective entities there would be no difference between a verbal cognition and sense-perception. But if words do not convey a definite meaning which is objectively held to be true, and if this meaning does not involve a reference to the object as such,[16] then there is no need of language. Moreover, the word need not evoke a conceptual image,[17] for its purpose is to make us understand that for which it stands.[18] If it is not the word that enables us to understand the object, but only the conceptual image, then either we have to assume a close connection between the image and the word, or we have to admit of an inseparable relation between the object and the image. Otherwise any word may have to denote any meaning.

Now the conceptual image, we are told, is distinct from other images, and hence it implies 'the negation of what it is not.'[19] "Knowledge derived from words does not differ in principle from inference. Indeed the name can express its own meaning only by repudiating the opposite meaning."[20] Thus the words 'to have an origin' express their own meaning only through a contrast with those that have no origin. This exclusion is a necessity of thought or reason which is essentially dialectical and which operates with concepts. While the direct knowledge given by the senses is an affirmation, the indirect knowledge arising from the analytical or dialectical intellect is primarily negative. The pure affirmation being only the pure

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16 *Cf. Acintyastava*, 33.
17 See Stout : *Analytic Psychology*, I. 83 ff.
18 *Apohasiddhi*, 13.
19 PVA 262.5—10.
20 PS V.1; *Cf.* NV 332.

sensation, it is unutterable. When we come to the understanding, we find a new creation of the real 'through a negation of its contrary.'[21] Only because the red, just as red, is at the same time not-blue, not yellow etc., only (through these negations) is it that definite colour which we call red.[22] This differentiation is possible, as Sigwart said,[23] only between already existing differentiated presentations.[24] Thus the meaning of the word 'cow' is said to depend to a certain extent on the 'non-cow'. The 'non-cow' is a different object from the cow, and this different one has to be negated.[25] If the word 'cow' has fulfilled its meaning by negating the 'non-cow', what is the other word on which the positive meaning of the 'cow' has to depend? Words are always positive entities. They cannot affirm something and deny something else at the same time, for a word can have only one meaning; and if this meaning is negative we can never arrive at the positive one. The 'non-cow' is negated not by the word 'cow' but by the absence of the utterance of the 'non-cow'.[26] But the affirmation and the negation is one inseparable thought.[27] Later day Buddhist thinkers have modified their views on this question; and Śāntarakṣita observes that a word first and foremost denotes a concept, and that the negative import is only a resultant cognition.[28]

3. The syllables placed in a certain order are denotative. In the word 'cow' is it the syllables alone that constitute the word, or is it some sphoṭa which is different from them? The word here consists of three letters

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[21] See Herbart: *Metaphysik*, II. Section 202. *Cf. NV* 331.

[22] Ulrici: *Compendium der Logik*, 60.

[23] Sigwart: *Logic*, I. 333 note.

[24] *Cf. AKJ* I.333-4.

[25] *PV* and *PVA* II.170.

[26] *Cf. AKJ* I. 348—350.

[27] See Lotze: *Logic*, I. Section 11.

[28] *TS* 1017 ff.

placed in a certain order. Apart from that order it is not this word. These letters are grouped together into a word. But the letters themselves are not parts of the word in any organic sense; for a succession of sounds employed in a certain order does not constitute an integral whole.[29] We derive no idea of the meaning from the individual letters; and yet the meaning is apprehended only after listening to all the letters that constitute the word. It is only the combination of the letters that could yield the meaning; and we apprehend this combination through the impressions, since the apprehention of the meaning demands a single agency and a specific order in the utterance of the letters. This single agency working through the mental impressions enables one to recollect the past sounds and hold them together.[30] The mental impressions, instead of manifesting the sphoṭa, reveal the word and its meaning.

A syllable by itself is not denotative, since it requires other syllables also to articulate the sense. Nor can we say that a combination of syllables has the power to signify sense, since the same syllables can be combined in as many ways as there are syllables.[31] And yet if it is said that each syllable produces a mental impression, what is the nature of this impression? If we are ignorant of the syllables and of the way in which they are combined, we cannot apprehend the sense; and no mental impression can alter this state. If we admit that the syllable produces a mental impression, that these impressions are remembered till we come to the last syllable, and that we apprehend the meaning only then, we are pursuing an illogical method. The syllable has to produce a memory impression, and this memory impression produces the meaning. The

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[29] *SD* 94.

[30] *TB* 6—10.

[31] *B* 323.2—4.

memory impression is that evoked by the power of the syllable; and to this impression we attribute the ability to denote a meaning. One ability cannot produce another ability, since all abilities are related to a distinct individual. For instance, fire burns and illumines; here illumining is not the effect of burning, nor is burning a latent capacity for illumination, for these are two aspects of the same fire.[32] And if we are to rely on memory impressions produced by the syllables, then if the syllables are uttered or cognised in the reverse order, we have to get at the same meaning since the syllables are the same.[33] But this is a blatent absurdity. Thus we have to admit that the letters alone constitute a word, that they follow a specific order in constituting it, that the letters in a certain sequence give rise to the meaning, and that the meaning is presented to us through the word.[34]

Our cognition does not give the clue to the existence of 'sphoṭa'[35], for we cognise the syllables only. Speech is significant or meaningful only in its syllables or letters;[36] and the letters form into a unity only because of the meaning conveyed by this unity. The rejection of the sphoṭa, therefore, makes the word and its meaning significant. In popular usage we use the words to mean something and we convey our meanings by the words we employ. Throughout we recognise the necessity of the word, for the word cannot be bypassed or ignored in any theory of meaning. The apprehension of the meaning does not fall outside that of the syllables that compose the word; and if a word has any meaning, this meaning must have a close relation with the sounds produced by the word. In a

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[32] *B* 323.7—13.

[33] *B* 323.13-14; *TB* 14.1-2.

[34] *TB* 12. 14 ff.

[35] See *Sāṅkhya-Sutra*, 5.17.

[36] *YSB* 3.17.

sound like 'cow' the word and the meaning as well reside in the syllables that follow a specific sequence. This is the view of Upavarṣa endorsed by both Śabara and Śaṅkara.[37]

Letters alone constitute the word. But each letter by itself is not denotative; nor can the socalled unity of the letters be significative if the letters are removed from this unity. The word is a combination of the letters; and this combination is distinct from each individual letter, but it is the same as the letters that comprise it. The letters, we have to remember, constitute the unity of the word; and it is this unity that embodies the meaning. Bhartṛhari might treat the meaning as a transformation of the word. But as Durgācārya observed, the word is the cognisable aspect, or the finite embodiment, of meaning.[38]

4. Has a word one meaning? Can it convey many meanings? Some thinkers have gone to the extent of saying that we arrive at the meaning of a word only through implication. There are others who contend that we immediately apprehend the meaning of a word, and this immediate apprehension is based on 'suggestion.' A word can express a meaning, convey an import, and imply inferentially an idea; and yet it may not be intelligible in the given propositional form. In other words, a word is sometimes capable of yielding many possible meanings; and since each meaning is the expression of one function of the word, we have to postulate many functions for each word. A philosophic approach to the problem of meaning demands an examination of the nature of each function, and an investigation into the interrelations of these functions.

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[37] See *SB* on 1.1.5; *VSB* 324.12—325.1

[38] On *Nirukta*, 3.

First, we have words whose meanings are settled by convention or by etymology.[39] The conventional meaning has a priority over the etymological. A word like "gauḥ" means etymologically "a moving being", but its meaning is settled and fixed as "cow". Such words are treated as signs or symbols. Etymology fixes the meanings when this meaning is derived from the parts of the words. Next, we have words whose meaning is in-separable from the primary denotation. The expression 'hamlet on the Ganges', is interpreted as 'the hamlet on the banks of the Ganges'. When we say that x is a lion we are by implication referring or transferring the quality of a lion to x. All possible meanings can be brought under these divisions.[40]

Then again, we have denotative words and also those that convey an implied meaning. Finally, there are those that suggest a meaning. These changes or differences are due to the contextual variations and the needs and demands of propriety.

5. What is expressed in the propositional form is a meaning. The meaning denoted by the word varies with the context and with the intention of the speaker or listener. A word can have only meaning and that meaning is not exhausted by its significance because it comprehends the nature of the object inadequately. But can a word suggest a meaning over and above its primary significance?

A word is denotative of a meaning, and this meaning is the essential feature comprehended by the word. If so, the word cannot possibly suggest any other meaning. The beauty of the word and its meaning in a poem is said to be highly suggestive; but this suggestive quality is seen to arise not from the word but from the background of the imagery and the figures of speech in which

[39] *Śabdaśakti*. 16.

[40] *Cf. PPV* 132,22 ff; VPS 134-5.

it is placed. This back-ground constitutes the beauty of expression and it gives rise to varied suggestions; and if we were to speak of the suggestive nature of a word, we have to look for this element of suggestion also in this background. But if it is said that the word by itself is capable of suggesting a meaning over and above its primary denotation, then this is a feature which we have to excavate; and this might turn out to be a fiction. If this suggestive nature brings forth the beauty of a composition, one might reply that this beauty emanates from the imagery and the figures. There is then no need to postulate a new capacity for the words, when this capacity to suggest actually arises from the imagery and the like.

Ideas are embodied in words and the words denote these ideas. This is the denotation of the word. This primary denotation takes cognisance of the nature of words in terms of etymology and convention; and the necessary connection between a word and its denotation distinguishes one statement from another. This primary meaning is determined by various factors. The relation which a word has with other words, its nature in isolation, its coexistence with other words, its homonyms, its purpose, the intention of the speaker, the context, its juxtaposition, its capacity, propriety, the place and time when it is used, its gender, its accent—these are some of the principles that determine the meaning of the word precisely and accurately. In spite of this complexity in the meaning of a word, we have various thinkers who have oversimplified the matter. Thus primary denotation is the unalterable symbolic presentation of a meaning according to the Nyāya thinkers; it is just suggestive or indicative of the subject according to the grammarians; it is the principle of relation between the expressive word and its expressed sense, according to the author of the Mañjūṣā; and to the Mīmāṁsakas it is a power. All these explana-

tions do not carry us farther in the understanding of the word.

6. Words are classified into various groups with reference to their meanings. We have words that denote classes, particulars, qualities, relations, and actions. This division is arbitrary. The word embodies a concept in ordinary usage. Whatever meaning is presented by the word, that meaning is organically related to the word, and it presents only one aspect of the embodied thought-content. Thus when we speak of a plurality of meanings for the same word, we are only stating that the embodied thought content which is in the word can be comprehended in many ways. Those ways constitute its various aspects: and the meaning of a word is a significant coherence of all these possible meanings. Which meaning is primary and which is not, is dependent on other factors like the context and the intention of the speaker.

On the one hand, we have a meaning which in current usage is said to be primary. On the other hand, we have a meaning given by the context and other factors, and this too can be said to be the primary meaning of a word. The word "cow" and the object "cow" are related directly, and this power is said to be latent in the word. A word signifies or means something; it has a meaning, and it refers to something. This can be further established by asking whether another word which is said to mean the same can be substituted in its place. In other words, the primary meaning of a word is that for which it alone stands as a sign. It is the nature of the word, to reveal that meaning which is the proper one. A word does not fulfil its function until it expresses that meaning which the context demands. This meaning may be the suggested one; and yet it is expressed by the word. And as such one need not feel worried in accepting a suggestive function for the word.

Let us consider some instances before we arrive at an understanding of the meaning. 'The hamlet on the Ganges' means the hamlet *on the banks of* the Ganges; and it can also mean that the hamlet is cool and sacred. By implication we are able to arrive at the idea of the banks of the river only. The word by itself is unable to mean the coolness or the sanctity of the hamlet; and yet the expression gives rise to these ideas. In such a case the words are only functioning as mere indicators or sign-posts. Words here become symbolic values, comparable to gestures and signs. They give rise to an intuition which is associated with the objective entities. Thus, words cannot present any idea or thought by themselves, but only suggest vaguely or dimly the facts referred to. The intuition that arises from the words is purely subjective; and hence, we find different people interpreting the same texts differently.

The objective fact referred to is the same for all minds; and yet various minds intuit varied meanings. How can a particular word evoke these varied suggestions? If it is said that the verbal suggestions have no relation with an objective fact, the words will become figments of imagination and therefore meaningless. But if an objective fact is denoted by a word, then the varied suggestions or intuitions will turn out to be individual or subjective reactions or responses to given situations. These responses lack objective validity and value. To escape from such a position we should hold that the suggested sense emanated not from the subjective response but from the object itself. The object, being a complex entity, can and does give rise to varied meanings to various minds.

7. In ordinary usage words are employed by the cultured with a specific meaning. Such words are used not merely with reference to their meanings, for words

are capable of uniting themselves with one another through their significant meanings[41]. They are governed by choice, intention, context and the like. If the speaker has not intended a meaning and still the unintended import is apprehended, then the sentence fails in its purpose. A good deal of what we mean falls within the scope of intention; and it is conditioned and determined by the intention of the speaker. The word comes to embody the thoughts of the speaker and it is influenced by this thought as such.

In those places where an implied meaning is apprehended immediately, there it is also the context that determines the sense. The expressed sense, being the medium for the suggested, is conditioned and influenced by the context a good deal.[42] The elements of a sentence are continually combined in all possible ways in spoken or written discourse and they mutually modify each other[43]. The circumstances under which a word is employed also bring about changes in its meanings. Thus, intention, context, and circumstance attempt at the specification of the sense.

8. According to the grammarians, the knowledge of the meaning of a word is unreal, for the word is an unreal abstraction. It has no individual existence of its own. The import of a word depends upon the import of a sentence, which in its turn is said to depend upon sphoṭa. This view deprives the importance of the word. In literature as in language we are primarily concerned with words and their meanings and functions. Any theory that minimises the value and the reality of words is inadequate.

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[41] See *TP* 153.11—13.

[42] *Cf. Vyakti-Viveka*, 10; *Dhvanyāloka*, 405.

[43] See Stout : *Manual of Psychology*, 538.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas argue that the meaning of the word is not unreal, since the word is as much real as the sentence. It is through the knowledge of the words that we arrive at the understanding of the sentence. The words are the parts, and the parts lose their separate existence in the whole called the sentence. In interpreting the relation of words, their meanings, the sentence, and its meaning to one another, we are asked to accept implication as one of the functions of a word. Here, we are not allowed to attach any power to the expressed sense of the word; this is the other extreme.

But in the case of a word which has a primary expressed meaning and which also suggests another meaning, we have to presume that both these meanings are related to each other. What the nature of this relation is, we have to examine carefully.

Suggestion is said to arise from the primary meaning. Is this suggestion different from the primary denotation or not? If it is different, does it spring into existence of its own accord as an independent entity being manifested by another entity which is closer to it or even identical with it called suggestion? The suggested meaning springs into existence from the same word which gives rise to the primary sense. It is the manifestation of the power to suggest which is one aspect of the word; and this manifestation is aided by the primary sense.

In the expression, 'the hamlet on the Ganges', the primary denotation of the words is incapable of meaning the sanctity of the hamlet. Implication too cannot give rise to the meaning, for implication is based upon the primary meaning which meaning does not provide any scope for this interpretation. The expression can imply the bank, but the bank is not what we mean here; nor can the bank imply the idea of sanctity. If it can, we have to presume that a meaning 'M' is derived from a

word 'W' through an implication 'I' which again is said to imply 'M'. That is, an implication cannot be said to imply something else. But if it is said that the expression implies a sanctified bank, we are taking the implication along with its consequences. A word implies something, and the consequences arise from this implied something. In other words, it is not the implied sense that gives rise to the idea of sanctity, but a new power altogether.

Thus, a word expresses a primary meaning and also reveals suggestion. These two meanings are not identical but two distinct entities since they refer to two distinct objects. This implies that they emanate from two different functions of the word.

Suggestion has been distinguished from the primary meaning, the total import and implication of which are presumed to follow one another. First there appears the primary meaning which makes us apprehend the sense expressed by the word which is only a sign for it. Next comes the import which is taken to be the apprehension of the meaning of the syntactically related group of words. If this too does not help us, we have to take up implication which comes when the primary meaning is incompatible. In the expression, 'the hamlet on the Ganges' the primary denotation of the words tells us of a house on a certain river and nothing more, because it cannot give rise both to a general and to a specific sense. The total import being a mere syntactical relation it can only relate the primary meanings of the words to one another: and this too does not explain the matter. Since the primary meaning of the sentence makes no sense, we look for its implication which can take us only to that to which the meaning of the expression is related unalterably by convention and popular usage; for the properties of the related thing or object are attri-

buted to it. Thus we get at the banks of the river. Yet we mean the coolness and sanctity of the hamlet. This meaning is not arrived from perception since it is apprehended from the word. It is not arrived through inference since the idea of the proximity of the waters to the banks can in no way imply coolness or sanctity. Nor is it a case of memory explaining the sentence, for memory is based on a prior experience and we have had no such prior experience.[44] Consequently we have to admit that this meaning arises from some other function of the word; and this function is the suggestive one which is not comprehended in any of the other functions.

But what is the import of a word? The realistic Nyāya gives a narrow meaning to the term.

9. A word is an expressive sign which is distinct from a suggestive sign. We associate A with B, or relate A to B; and this A may remind us of B, or may indicate the presence of B. Here, A is used not to express a meaning, but to aid our memory; and the moment we remember B, we reject A as of no use. This A has functioned then as a suggestive sign. An expressive sign then makes us attend to its significance, while a suggestive sign draws our attention away from it.[45] In so doing an element of abstraction seems to enter into all suggestion.

But abstraction from personal meaning appears to be an indispensable element in all expression.[46] Interruptions of a psychical nature attempt to strangle the smooth course of thought, while thinking endeavours to effect a sudden break in the continuity of feeling or experience. The narration of these obstacles is not the task of metaphysics, nor that of aesthetics; and they have

[44] See *Locana*, 60.

[45] See Stout: *Analytic Psychology*, II.193.

[46] *Cf.* Haldane: *Pathway to Reality*, I.80.

to avoid the representation of these in the interests of the consistency of the argument and unity of feeling respectively.

10. A word is a complex whole capable of unfolding a plurality. The whole is a class of things, qualities or actions. Further, the various particulars that are comprehended by one word are themselves related to one another; and these relations or connections too are contained in the meaning of the word. Thus every word presents a synthesis. When we understand the meaning of the word we do not make any distinction of the multiplicity of the parts or particulars involved therein. It is after we have an understanding that we begin to analyse our apprehension into its constituent parts in order to communicate it to others.[47]

A word sums up the nature of the object to which it is said to refer. Yet a word cannot fully comprehend the entire nature of the object. Language designates objects in an inaccurate way. It is incomplete because the word sun, for example, does not exhaust all that can be said of it when we assert it to the shining. It is inaccurate because we cannot speak of the sun as shining when it has set.[48] Language is thus in its very nature delimited and finite. Since it has to embody thought, and since thought is always struggling after its emancipation from the embodied state, language is primarily suggestive. It is not at all possible for a word to express all the ideas which an object awakens in the mind.[49] Sometimes the word may not represent even the most prominent aspect of the object; for the words depend a good deal on the attitude, intention, reaction, and outlook of the individual. This is the principle which has given rise to the synonyms, and

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[47] See Lotze: *Nicrocosmus*, I.536.

[48] *Cf. Sāhityadarpaṇa*, 73; Breal: *Semantics*, 170.

[49] See *Breal*, 171.

this explains clearly that meaning is not entirely dependent upon expression. There are states of experience where the mind is full of meaning, and expression is obstructed as in aphasia and the like. In such cases meaning is very intensely felt; and the clue to the nature of the meaning revealed by the word lies in this felt background.

There are also cases where the mind does not make any reference to any object and yet is full of content. There may not be any images present; and yet the felt content is the most positive one.[50] Our thought is not yet articulate and yet we feel intuitively what we are going to say. Such an experience is there even when we read a poem for the first time. We modulate our voice in such a way that we are able to anticipate the rhythm and the thought because of our implicit apprehension of the whole.

This intuition of the whole is the complete meaning of the word or of the sentence. But it is a meaning which is only felt intensely and deeply. Similarly there is the intensely active gap which fills consciousness when we endeavour to recollect a forgotten name. We struggle to express it, we come across a variety of words, and we often reject them. We feel our closeness to the forgotten name and then sink back. A wrong name is rejected at once since it does not fit into the gap. These gaps reveal that a great part of language functions by presenting the signs of direction in thought.[51]

11. The purpose of language is to express thought; and thought is expressed primarily in sentences. Sentences are the basic units of language; for, we do not think in insolated words, but in relevant combinations of words, called sentences or propositions. Every sentence is made up of some significant (sārthaka) words

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[50] See James: *Principles of Psychology*, I.253.

[51] *Ibid.* I.252-3.

which are related to one another through expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) and compatibility (yogyatā), so that they may give rise to a coherent and logical verbal cognition ('śābdabodha').[52] The meaning of a sentence, however, is different from and greater than the meanings of its component parts called words. In other words, the meaning of a word and the verbal cognition are two different things. The former conveys the meanings of the words employed, while the latter communicates a unified idea as such.[53] The principles of proximity, expectancy, compatibility and import govern the logical aspect in the correlation of the meaning.[54] These principles, however, govern our construction of an intelligible sentence.[55]

Language, the vesture or embodiment of thought, is a powerful instrument of communication. In the first place, it crystallises and embodies thought, for it expresses what we feel or think. A significant sound, called word, is at the basis of language. It has neither life nor reality apart from the mind. The language of a community represents the ideas, beliefs, aims and struggles of that community; and with this real human life commences, and human values are developed and cherished.

But a single word can, at times express a complete idea and function like a sentence, as the verb in the imperative mood, or as the word emanating from an emotional excitement. Vyāsa goes to the extent of saying that every word has the force of a sentence, and that some words at least retain the meaning of a sentence.[56] But by a word he does not mean a word taken by itself in isolation; for he states that the simple utterance of the

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[52] *SS* 1. 97; *Śabdaśakti*, 12.

[53] *VP* 239.

[54] See *Laghumañjūṣā*, 497, 503-4; *cf. VP* 241.

[55] *TP* 261.7-8.

[56] *YSB* 3.17.

word 'tree' means for us the sentence 'the tree is'. That is, a word does not exist as significant and communicative, apart from a sentence. It is only in and through a sentence that a word acquires its power to convey or communicate an idea. Thus, the denotative and connotative powers of words depend upon sentences. The problem of the import of a word therefore, is the same as that of the import of a sentence.

This raises important and interesting problems. Is a sentence the unit of linguistic expression of thought? Or is it the word? In the Vedic texts we come across passages which speak of sentences as though they are originally divided into parts.[57] Durgācārya observes that the seers beheld the Saṁhitā as a coherent whole and not as isolated words.[58] In this wise, the grammarians treat the 'Vākyasphoṭa' as the only significant and real one. Consequently, the splitting of a sentence into its units is an unnatural fiction sanctioned not by any rational necessity but by mere convenience. It is for purposes of instructing the under-developed minds that a sentence is split into so many words.[59] The sentences, as complete expressions or utterances of the ideas, thoughts, and feelings of the individuals, are natural. They emanate from the nature of a situation or mood. This characteristic feature condemns all divisions and analysis of sentences as artificial and untrue to experience. The verbal congnition of the words severally is not true to experience.[60] A word appears to differ from the others and seems to stand in isolation mainly because of the difference in the determining sounds. Thus, we can analyse a word into its components, but these units cannot be further analysed.

[57] See *Taittirīya -Saṁhitā*, 6.4.7; Ṛ K *Prātiśākhya*, 2.1.

[58] On *Nirukta*, I.17.

[59] See *Mahābhāṣya*, VI. 1.207; V. II.240.

[60] See *TB* 2.9-10. *Cf.* Puṇyarāja on II.22,129.

With reference to the sentence too, the words stand in the same predicament.[61] Just as we analyse a word into its root and suffix, we can handle the sentence too.[62]

Verbal cognition arises from words that are logically and significantly related to one another in a sentence.[63] The sentence thus is the significant and relevant unit of speech, and this presupposes the inherent relatedness of words.[64] This requires the correlation of a group of words and of a system of meanings.[65] That is, the process of thought manifests itself in the syntax. Thus, for example, in a compound different words are combined, and their meanings are so related to one another that they yield one specific idea. Two different concepts are made to evolve a synthesis at the bidding of the mind and of reality. They have a reciprocal competency (sāmarthya), and they together form into a single inflected word. This feature is reflected in the sentence, for the sentence is the expansion or widening of the same principle. The sentence is an indivisible unit expressive of sense; and its meaning is indivisable.[66] To understand the sense we have to take the sentence as a whole. In such a case, words lose their identity and individuality as they enter the sentence and occupy their proper stations.[67]

12. What is the import of a sentence which is a unity or a system of many words, where the many are to serve the interests of the whole? Here we have a variety of answers offered by the ancient thinkers. The force of a sentence is sometimes said to be gathered in

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[61] *Cf.* V I. 73.
[62] *V* I.77; II.10.
[63] *Śabdaśakti*, 12.
[64] *NBV* 2.1.55.
[65] *Cf. Bhāṣāpariccheda*, 91.
[66] *Cf.* V II.13.
[67] *Cf.* TB 3.13-4.6.

the verb; the essence of a sentence lies in action, in conation. In association with an indeclinable, case or adjective, a verb can be the nucleus of a sentence. If these associates only qualify the verb, then such a united or qualified predicate can make a sentence.[68] From this position one can push forward to say that a verbal form itself is a sentence. But if there are two finite verbs in a sentence, one of them is to be taken as qualifying the other, since a sentence can express one and only one idea. In every sentence, therefore, we face a verb, and a verb refers to or implies a noun.

A verb denotes an action, and a noun denotes a subject or thing. On the activistic theory, activity is said to be latent in all things. In sentences where the verb is not explicitly expressed, action is to be understood. This action gets itself transformed into a subject or substance.[69] In other words, substance and being are not different from each other.[70] The difference between the two is only one of emphasis; and it depends on the intention of the speaker.[71] This points to the conclusion that the differences between those who emphasise the noun and those who insist on the verb, are not fundamental. These differences do not alter the nature of the meaning which a sentence offers. At times we do think simultaneously of both the subject and the predicate, presumably because they are not mutually exclusive. There is an intimate relation of interdependence between noun and verb; and the Āryan verb was originally a noun, as much as the Āryan noun was originally a verb. We have the verbal roots, 'dhana', 'jana', 'vadha', 'gaveṣa', which appear to be substantives. The Kabojas, says

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[68] See *Vārtika* 9 on *Pāṇini*, 2.1.1.

[69] *Mahābhāṣya*, 5.4.19. *Cf. Bṛhad-devatā*, I.44.

[70] See Durgācārya *Nirukta*, I.9.

[71] See *Bṛhad-devatā*, I.42; ṚK Prātiśākhya, 22.5.

Yāska, took 'śava' to be a verb, while the Āryans accepted it as a noun.[72] And we have a series of denominative roots too.

According to Śākaṭāyana, all words are derived from verbal roots.[73] If so, we have to call every passerby as 'aśva' or horse, for the word 'aśva' etymologically refers to walking. If etymology were at work, it would have corrected the words "puruṣa", "aśva", and "tṛṇa", into "puriśaya", "aṣṭa", and "tardana", respectively. If the verbal root preceded the noun in order of existence, and if action determines a noun, how is the earth called 'pṛthivī' before it was extended in space? Gārgya and the grammarians therefore refused to accept this principle as universally applicable and valuable.

13. The verb is an important element in the sentence, and the meaning of a sentence depends on the meaning of the verb. Maṇḍana held that the verbal root conveys the idea of the result of an action, for the verbal terminations denote action proper. Some others reverse this process, since a result generally follows an action. But if the root denotes action, the verbal terminations are meaningless and superfluous. The root must therefore be taken to denote some qualified action.[74] In the realist systems the verb originally served the function of a noun and gradually came to serve the function of an adjective, while in the grammatical systems the verb became more and more comprehensive. A verb like 'pacati' presents in itself a synthesis of pot, fire, fuel, cook and the rest.

But the apprehension of the meaning of a sentence is not necessarily dependent upon an action. In the sentence 'he cooks rice in the vessel with faggots', we have

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72 *Nirukta*, II.2.

73 *Nirukta*, I.12; See *Mahābhāṣya* 3.2.115; 3.3.1.

74 See *Vyutpatti-vāda*, 37.

an action no doubt; but there are sentences referring to existing things. When I ask, 'who is this king?', and when I am told that he is Pāñcāla, all reference to action is absent. When they are first used some words may refer to action, but they are subsequently seen to refer to existing things. Further, when a sentence communicates pleasant news, we find that the words denote an existing something which is the cause of joy. There is then no invariable rule that words should signify action[75].

In Mīmāṁsā, the verb is a combination of many words; and action is inherent in every noun. Action demands effort which unites action with the goal or result. Koṇḍabhaṭṭa observed that a root denotes action and result as well, while the verbal termination refers to the substratum[76]. Thus the root refers to the time, mood, and action; while the termination involves action, time, number and the like.

The meaning of a sentence depends upon and involves a reference to the consequences that can be derived from it in action or otherwise. It is here that insight and understanding work together in close cooperation. The consequences depend not on one word or two, but on the system of words called the sentence. This system is a unity. The words denote only one un-differentiated meaning, by surrendering their individual meanings; for, even the union of the words in a compound gives rise to a new meaning[77]. And this same principle is found in a sentence too.

14. There are eight views in the interpretation of the import of a sentence.[78] All those who speak of it

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[75] B 70.6—71.1; SD 16-17. See *NMA* 165.

[76] See *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, 2.

[77] See *Śabdaśakti* 33.

[78] See V. II.1,2.

in terms of a verb, a significant word, and a series of related words, hold that the import of a sentence centres round a significant word or round the related words. Those who emphasize the combination of words and on the sequence of words adopt the principle that the words unite with one another to give rise to the ideal content. There are others who insist on the nature of words as universals, on their unity, and on the intellectual awareness; and according to these thinkers the sentence is an indivisible unit. All these views once again presuppose propriety, expectancy, and proximity amongst the words as aiding the syntactical relation which alone is taken to have a meaning. The factors like expectancy and proximity are said to be merely the cooperative factors. Hence, it is said that expectancy depends on the word, while propriety thrives on the meanings of the words,[79] though they do overlap. As regards the proximity of words, we are told that this feature is of no importance at all, since the slow-witted understands the words violating proximity, while the quick-witted does not require it.

15. The meaning of a sentence is immediately apprehended by the mind. The mind recalls the deep-rooted impressions which enter into our understanding of a sentence, idea, or fact.[80] A sentence, therefore, signifies the meaning that abides in intelligence, and this meaning is treated as intuition by the grammarians.[81] This meaning is manifested through the words that are related to one another in the form of a sentence. According to Bhartṛhari, it is an intuition that reveals the

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[79] See *Śabdaśakti*, 4.

[80] See *YS* and *YSB* I.25,47, III.49.

[81] *Cf. Bodhicaryāvatāra-Pañjikā*, 348.

[82] V II. 147—9. See, however, *VSB* on 1.1.5; 2.1.14; and *Taittirīya Vārtika*, Anuvāka 9.160.

meaning. It reveals itself through words, and is expressed by the intellect that is aided by experience and memory; it determines the ultimate reason for all inclination or activity, since it is an innate function of the mind, an intellectual heritage. This meaning is at the basis of all instinctive and well-thought-out activities; and words stimulate this intelligence.[83]

According to the Indian grammarians, the words that constitute a sentence have no separate meanings at all. They are meant to convey the united or synthetic meaning of the sentence as a whole. But the meaning of a sentence is not merely an aggregate of the meanings of its words; nor does it repudiate the meanings of the words entirely. In the sentence we find the words combined in a specific way, and therefore the sentence comes to possess a new meaning. If the meaning of a sentence is totally different from that of the words, we can never understand it. And if the sentence can offer nothing but the aggregate of the meanings of the words, it can never be new. On the contrary, we do experience a new unity or a new synthesis in every new sentence. This unity is a special feature of a sentence; and it is a unity based upon the relation between the parts and the whole. The parts are integral to the composition of the whole; and yet the whole is always greater than the sum of its parts. It is this strange feature that makes the whole unique and one. The meaning of a sentence, therefore, runs through the meanings of the words; for, as the grammarians have correctly observed, we always begin with sentences and arrive at words through analysis. Consequently the separate words do really breathe the spirit of the whole sentence and are determined and conditioned by it. This spirit of the whole sentence is the ideal content expressed by the judgment.

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[83] See V II.53. *Cf. VVN* 248—253.

16. We find ourselves in the midst of two views, one emphasizing the ideal content or the whole, and the other insisting on the import of the parts only. To resolve the entire problem we have to examine closely the nature of the ideal content of a sentence. Some thinkers hold that a definite knowledge of the ideal content is essential for the understanding of a sentence. Some others observe that this content should be known only when the words are ambiguously employed. Others consider that it is necessary for verbal knowledge, though it is comprehended in the mutual expectancy of words. The mutual expectancy is a demand born out of the need to convey the intention of the speaker[84].

But is the ideal content nothing but the intended meaning? The parrot and the child imitate the sentences of the elders. They have no intention to convey, and yet we understand those sentences. There are people who chant Vedic hymns without knowing what they mean, and yet the hearer can and does make out the meaning. That is, we have to distinguish between the personal meaning or the intention of the speaker, and the objective meaning. The objective meaning is conveyed by the fitness of the words of a sentence. In other words, the ideal content refers to the ability to give rise to the apprehension of the true meaning.[85]

Language makes us know things and also experience them. It shows the facts and states them in a way that evokes and organises our moods and emotions with the result that the words employed vivify our experiences. In this process the words that refer to facts are united with and synthesised in an experience, for the words induce in us a vision of those mysteries and secrets that are seen in a new light. This dual function arises from the two-

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[8] See *Muktāvalī*, 390.

[85] *PPV* 235.3—7; *VPS* 228.

fold nature of the word, its sound and its sense. On the one hand, language defines or describes reality, and expresses the intelligence or thought, on the other. Things like theories, systems and words, things which no sense-perception can comprehend, are brought, to our attention because of the intellectual function of language.

Meaning is a function of the context or situation, for the verbal meaning is to some extent controlled by intention. The meaning of an object or word is no other than the value it has for us, and it is from the standpoint of value that we cognise and experience. Thus the meaning of a word might appear to be the meaning of those who use it. Thus, the three words, 'I love you' may mean a declaration of love; but we can know their meaning fully only when we know the specific meaning of 'I' and 'you'[86]. That is, we have to take into consideration the context in which the words are uttered along with the attitude or outlook colouring this utterance. The real meaning of a man cannot be understood, however, apart from the words he employs. And these words must have agreed meanings, meanings that are accepted by the speaker and the listener as well. Without this agreement, the speaker cannot convey his real meaning even. As such the distinction which a personalist effects between verbal meaning and personal meaning is rather futile.[87] When it is said that personal meaning is the primary and important meaning, and that the verbal meaning is secondary and derivative, the ideal content refers to the intention. We move from the meaning of the word to the meaning intended by the speaker.[88] Such an argument refuses to recognise the fact that the meanings of the pronouns, relative words, and demonstrative words,

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[86] See *Schiller in Arist. Soc. Suppl.* Volume 7, Page 101.

[87] See *Ewing in Arist.* Soc. Suppl. Vol. 7; Pages 108 ff.

[88] See *Schiller*, Ibid. 104.

are determined by the context in which they are employed. By language we do not mean a system of personal meanings, since language by its very nature is a social activity. What language offers to us is a system of meanings mainly objective and impersonal, and therfore concrete. This is the major contribution of the context; and as the context is classified and defined more and more sharply, the reader or listener comes to apprehend the same objective system as the author or speaker. Thus, two laymen might talk about motor cars, each meaning all the while a thing different from that of the other. But when two mathematicians begin studying the works of each other, their personal meanings disappear and they are at home in an objective system of meanings. This objectivity eliminates the possibility of misunderstanding.[89]

The sentence, 'the sun is setting' is fit to convey the relation of the sun to the act of setting, and not to the act of rising. It refers to the evening, to night-fall, whatever may be the intentions of the speakers. In the context of time it denotes the onset of the night. But if two robbers are talking it will assume a special context and hasten to denote their intention to steal that night. But if it is a mendicant speaking, the context will focuss our attention on his evening prayers. And if a lover is the speaker, it expresses a gesture of love. In all these cases we find that the meaning determined by the context is to some extent personal, relative to the speaker's intention.[90] But this meaning is only an extension of the primary meaning which is objective and which dces not involve the intrusion of one's intentions into the understanding of the sentence. This is the direct consequence of the view that the primary meaning is inherent in the word, and not something imported into it.

[89] See *Hardie in Arist.* Soc. Suppl. Vol. 7, Page 119.

[90] See, however, *Dharmakīrti* quoted in *Nyāyāvatāra*, 2.

Consider those instances where we do have knowledge of the meaning of words used by one who is ignorant of their sense, or who being in a state of sleep has no control over his will.[91] Here the personal meaning has little to modify the actual meanings of the words. Further, the meaning of the important word determines the import of the proposition. In the sentence, 'bring the cow', it is bringing that is emphasized and the other words qualify or condition it. They are adjectival and as such give rise to a particularised meaning of the word 'bring'. This particularised meaning is not personal but relational and specific. This idea is expressed through the denotation of the word. Here we notice how the meaning of a word ets itself modified in a context as it gets related to other words.[92]

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[91] *SD* 91.
[92] *SD* 154.

ŚARVILAKA—NOT A RESIDENT OF UJJAINĪ*

By PROF. SADASHIV A. DANGE

Mṛcchakaṭika has been and even now is one of the most enchanting dramas in the Sanskrit Literature. There have been discussions as to whether it is an enlarged edition of the *Cārudatta* or whether *Cārudatta* is itself a shortened *Mṛcchakaṭika*. Then again, opinions differ on the point of the main theme of the drama—whether the love episode is the main current or the Political plot is the back-bone!

Without commenting on any of the debatable points, the motive of this article is to turn the focus on only one character—that of Śarvilaka and to see whether from the drama we can take him to be a resident of Ujjainī or not. First of all it is necessary to see in exactly what capacity he figures in the Prakaraṇa. As we know, the Prakaraṇa is an inter-mixture of two things—love on the one hand and the political plot on the other. Both these get fused into each other and in a way, help each other. The Prakaraṇa begins in an atmosphere of love giving no hint whatsoever to the future political shuffling, the first hint coming only from the mouth of Darduraka[1], who cleverly saves the Samvāhaka from the hands of his creditors. It is here that we have the first mention of Śarvilaka as a dear friend (Priyavayasyaḥ) of Darduraka. Love between Vasantasenā and Cārudatta being well established, and Śakāra being fixed as the cruel villain in the garb of his crooked humour, Śarvilaka, being casually introduced by the minor Darduraka, suddenly

+ (Article read at the All-India Oriental Conference, 19th Session at Delhi, December, 1957).

[1] कथितं च मम प्रियवयस्येन शर्विलकेन यथा किल आर्यकनामा गोपालदारकः सिद्धादेशेन समादिष्टो राजा भविष्यतीति। (p. 55).

arrives on the scene as a wayward brāhmaṇa youth, well versed in the art of house-breaking, a regular disciple of the worthy master whose name he utters with due reverence! And all this for Love! He wants to win Madanikā's freedom. That is in the third Act. Here he does not strike us as anything of an important personality. The remark about him by Darduraka (Act II) has been completely washed away from our minds. The 4th Act shows Śarvilaka as an ardent lover, happy in union with his beloved, jealous and foamy in suspicion, cooling off into a guileless child as truth dawns upon him and as he feels sure about Madanikā's fixation in himself alone! He gets Madanikā and in the happiest moment of his life there is a turn of events which throws full light upon his personality and we know him as a heroic youth ready to save his friend Āryaka, the Gopāladāraka who has been imprisoned by King Pālaka in wicked jealousy!, at any cost. He is gone and we meet him only in the 10th Act as the victorious one who set free his friend and thus helped him to become the king. That is all the part played by Śarvilaka. His love for Madanikā does not strike us as being important as far as his own character goes. The stern and dutiful soldier in him is what we see and hear in the most part of the play, wherever the attention is focussed on him. He comes before our eyes more as the whip of the political plot than as a tender lover. This leadership is nowhere smoothly brought about; but is referred to more than once. We have referred to speech of Darduraka in the 2nd Act. Candanaka also refers to Śarvilaka as—'My dear friend'[2] and goes after him. The Viṭa also joins Śarvilaka, saying —'I shall go where Śarvilaka and Candanaka etc. are'[3].

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[2] अरे निष्क्रमतो मम प्रियवयस्यः शर्विलकः पृष्ठत एवानुलग्नो गतः। (Act. VI. p. 153).

[3] यत्रार्यशर्विलकचन्दनकप्रभृतयः सन्ति तत्र गच्छामि। (Act. VIII. p. 188).

Thus, we clearly see that Śarvilaka is the pivot of the plot for the release of Āryaka, the Gopāladāraka. Śarvilaka is, as a matter of fact, the 2nd hero of this Prakaraṇa; for, in the absence of Śarvilaka, though Cārudatta possibly would have been set free, the evil-doer Śakāra might not have been punished or at least might have been humiliated. It is clear from his behaviour in the court scene (Act IX), where he asserts that he would replace even the judge.[4] It is Śarvilaka, who, as the Savior of Āryaka has a profitable position and utilizes it to the full as we see in the prakaraṇa. But this key-holder of the plot does not seem to be a resident of Ujjainī, at least at the time and a considerable length of time before the events described in the play. Why?

Well, we shall see presently! He does not know Cārudatta at all, and Cārudatta is a permanent resident of Ujjainī for more than a generation.

We will examine the situation gradually.

(1) There are clear references in the Prakaraṇa to the benevolence of Cārudatta which makes him popular and sufficiently a known figure in Ujjainī.
Maitreya refers to his benevolence in the ninth act in the court of justice.[5]

(2) He is very well known to all from the Adhikaraṇika[6] to Madanikā.[7]

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[4] आः किं न दृश्यते मम व्यवहारः। यदि न दृश्यते तदाऽऽवुत्तं राजानं पालकं भगिनीपतिं विज्ञाप्य भगिनीं मातरं च विज्ञाप्यैतमधिकरणिकं दूरीकृत्यात्रान्यमधिकरणिकं स्थापयिष्यामि। (Act. IX.p. 197).

[5] भो भो आर्याः येन तावत्पुरस्थापनविहारारामदेवालयतडागकूपयूपैरलंकृता नगर्युज्जयिनी ......। (Act. IX. p. 215).

[6] तुलनं चाद्रिराजस्य समुद्रस्य च तारणम्।
ग्रहणं चानिलस्येव चारुदत्तस्य दूषणम्॥ (IX—20) and
आर्यचारुदत्तः खल्वसौ कथमिदमकार्यं करिष्यति।

[7] स खलु श्रेष्ठिचत्वरे प्रतिवसति। And स खल्वार्ये सुगृहीतनामधेय आर्यचारुदत्तो नाम। (Act. II. p. 44) and also the speech of Samvāhaka p. 58.
'आर्ये क इंदानीं तस्यं भूतंलमृगाङ्कस्य नाम न जानाति।'

(3) Even the ordinary policemen know him.[8]

(4) The Cāṇḍālas also know him to be the leading man of Ujjainī,[9] nay, an ornament of the city. The tender sentiment shown by the Cāṇḍālas to this special guest of their trade is self-eloquent of his popularity.[10]

(5) The ladies in the city also shed tears for him. To command such gushes of feellings Cārudatta must have a tremendous amount of popularity in the city.

Here, on the one hand, Cārudatta enjoys this popularity. Everybody seems to know him by virtue of his qualities; and on the other, Śarvilaka does not seem to know him at all!

(1) He does not know the house, where he commits the theft, to be that of Cārudatta. Had he been staying in Ujjainī permanently, he would have been surely in the know of the condition of Cārudatta. He would have had good chances to see the house of such a worthy one as Cārudatta. Not only this, but

(2) he has not ever seen Cārudatta previously; for, when he breaks the house of Cārudatta, he is clearly analysing the facial expression of Cārudatta and Maitreya (for they are sleeping close to each other, as can be seen form the action of Maitreya in offering the bundle of ornaments to Cārudatta just with a stretch of his hand!) (See Act III). This clearly shows that Śarvilaka has had no occasion to see Cārudatta previously, though the latter is staying in Ujjainī as the scion of a well-set family!

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[8] *Cf.* VI—13, 14 and 15.

[9] *Cf.* X—8. नगरीप्रधानभूते वध्यमाने कृतान्ताज्ञया । etc. also X—14
एष गुणरत्ननिधिः सज्जनदुःखानामुत्तरणसेतुः ।
असुवर्णं मण्डनकमपनीयतेऽद्य नगरीतः ॥

[10] *Cf.* भगवति सह्यवासिनि ! प्रसीद प्रसीद। अपि नाम चारुदत्तस्य मोक्षो भंवेत्, तदानुगृहीतं त्वया चाण्डालकुलं भवेत्। Act. X. p. 241.

(3) He tells Madanikā that it is only the next morning (after the theft) that he heard[11] that the house in which theft had taken place belonged to Cārudatta. That shows his complete ignorance about Cārudatta's house. The way he speaks of Cārudatta, as Sārthavāha Cārudatta and not as 'Ārya', shows he was totally ignorant as to the latter's eminence! His vehement emotional out-burst in '*Āḥ Durātman Cārudatta! Ayam na bhavasi*' just after IV-17, leaves no doubt of his being completely oblivious of the merits of Cārudatta who has won the heart of Ujjainī by his virtues!

(4) There is another very important point to be noted in this connection and it is the mention of Rebhila who is mentioned by Cārudatta as Bhāva-Rebhila.[12]

Even Maitreya refers to him only as Bhāva Rebhila in the court scene, act IX.

(5) He is once more referred to in the 4th Act and there by Śarvilaka in the tense situation arisen out of the capture of his friend Āryaka. It is interesting to note, however, that Śarvilaka thinks only of him to keep his wife with and that he refers to him only as 'Rebhila Sārthavāha' without the pre-fix 'Bhāva.' Thus, it seems Rebhila was a close friend of Śarvilaka.[13]

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[11] अयि प्रभाते मया श्रुतं श्रेष्ठिचत्वरे यथा सार्थवाहस्य चारुदत्तस्येति। (Act. IV. p. 90).

[12] अहो साधु साधु रेभिलेन गीतम्। and वयस्य सुष्ठु खल्वद्य गीतं भावरेभिलेन। (Act. III pp. 67 and 68).

[13] Ryder is rightly criticised by M. R. Kāle and Dr. V. G. Parāñjape for his contention that Śarvilaka was the son of Rebhila—see Kāle notes—p. 79; and Parñjape—notes, p. 48.

But Kāle is doubtful about Śarvilaka's relationship with Rebhila; for, he contradicts himself—(Cf. notes page 58) where he remarks about Rebhila as—'See page 97 (text) where *he is spoken of as a friend of Śarvilaka* also—since the latter sends his wife to his house.' and further after criticising Ryder's statement, remarks—'Rebhila, it appears, was *some distant relation of Śarvilaka*!'

(6) From Śarvilaka, again, we know that Rebhila is a 'Sārthavāha' having the same profession as Cārudatta has. Cārudatta must often be visiting Rebhila's house for musical entertainment, for Cārudatta is very fond of music. In the third act, when Śarvilaka scrutinizes the house of Cārudatta, he cannot fail to see the various musical instruments and concludes that it must be the house of a music-master.[14]

Thus, it is also possible that Rebhila might have often visited the house of Cārudatta for musical performance and hence, they must be known to eaeh other. How can a 'rasika' like the benevolent and virtuous Cārudatta exclude Rebhila from his company! Two points are common between them. Both are of the same profession and have the same urge for music. We can go still further and see the possibility of Rebhila being residing in the same *Śreṣṭhi-Catvara* where Cārudatta lived, as it is probable that all Sārthavāhas might be living in one part of the city!

Kāle is again, far from being correct in his (or may we remove this contradiction by saying that a relative can also be a friend!!) remark on p. 58 notes; for Rebhila is *never 'spoken as a friend of Śarvilaka'* in act IV (text page 97 Kāle's Edition) as is clear from Śarvilaka's speech to the ceṭa qouted above.[12] 'Bhadra, Jāniṣe etc.' It is Kāle's own inference! Rebhila can only be a close friend of Śarvilaka. Close because he sends his wife to him; and only a friend, because there seems to be no expression of reverence whatsoever in his reference to Rebhila. Ryder is obviously misled by the words of Madanikā. 'Tat param nayatu mām Ārya-putraḥ *Samīpam Gurujanānām.*' and the very words might mislead us to think that Rebhila was at least an elderly relative of Śarvilaka. But we can very well understand that Śarvilaka need not take Madanikā's words in their exact sense and at that moment of tension (for his utmost thought is setting his friend Āryaka free at any cost!) he wants to keep Madanikā in a place of safety—and not exactly with the 'Gurujana'. For Madanikā it is all the same, for she seems to have no knowledge of Śarvilaka's 'Gurujana' and moreover, has no reason to contradict him. The unreverential way of reference to Rebhila goes well with this explanation. This Rebhila might or might not be in Sarvilaka's plot, but must have been a very faithful friend of Śarvilaka.

It is surprisingly pleasant to note how Rebhila is made a living and important character without actually being present on the stage.

[14] *Cf.* कथं नाटयाचार्यस्य गृहमिदम्। (Act. III—p. 75).

Now, from Śarvilaka's close friendship with Rebhila who was in close relation with Cārudatta, we naturally expect Śarvilaka to know Cārudatta and his house; but we have already seen that he does not know Cārudatta, nor does he seem to have seen or heard about him at all! This cannot happen if Śarvilaka is a resident of Ujjainī; for, in that case, Rebhila's not mentioning Cārudatta to him even once does not seem probable or natural.

Śarvilaka's total absence of knowledge in the case of Cārudatta can only be explained by stating that—

(1) He was *not* a permanent resident of Ujjainī; or was only a new-comer.

(2) He might not also be a frequent visitor at Rebhila's; but had old friendship with Rebhila, probably before the latter had settled in Ujjainī and might have renewed his touch with him, meeting him only once or twice casually;[15] and in this city of uncertain stability at that particular time, he might have suddenly remembered his faithful old friend Rebhila alone to be of any help! Thus Śarvilaka's visits to Ujjainī might have been very recent and only a few and even these must have been only for political purposes: and he found little time to spend at Rebhila's.

Coming now to this conclusion that Śarvilaka was a new-comer to Ujjainī only for political purposes, another delicate question that crops up in the mind is–How could he have become intimate with Madanikā in such short visits? Well, this also can be explained easily. In act III, Śarvilaka's

[15] We have no definite mention of Rebhila being in the conspiracy. Paranjape's suggestion that 'probably Rebhila' was in the conspiracy does not seem to be correct, for, then as a leader of the conspiracy there is a possibility of Śarvilaka's meeting with Rebhila on many more occasions and then even casually, the mention of a famous and great man like Cārudatta is not impossible.

remorse for such an act for a 'gaṇikā' (and not Priyā)[16], that too on the part of the son of a high-born brāhmaṇa[17], strikes a clear contrast and a bit of censure of the beloved lady. This tends to show that Madanikā was not of deep acquaintance with him; but was probably a recent find whose charms turned him mad and goaded him to this evil act. The evil act (Akāryam) is not the theft (for he is adept in it); but it is *the theft in the house of a poor man.* He clearly gives vent to this feeling of his after seeing the soiled and tattered bundle of ornaments, wishing to take it yet hesitating with the words—'It is not fair to wrong a high-born man who is (in difficulty) just as I am'.[18] It is only the fear of a curse from the dozing Maitreya that urges him to accept the bundle! This pricks Śarvilaka as the 'Akāryam'. The theft *as such* was not a throb of pain for him who had taken to it with quite a study![19] Thus, to rob a poor man for *only a courtesan*, he himself being a high-born man! is the cause for pang. The word, 'gaṇikā' betrays his lack of seasoned love for Madanikā.

(2) Śarvilaka does not seem to have visited Vasantasenā's house many times. It was just possible that he never visited it before. Probably that is why Madanikā, on seeing Śarvilaka in Vasantasenā's house, is surprised and exclaims—'Āścaryam! katham Śarvilakaḥ! Śarvilaka, svāgatam te. *Kutra tvam*?' This clearly shows that she never expected Śarvilaka to go to Vasantasenā's house. It also shows that he had never before visited the house of Vasantasenā (Cf. *Kutra tvam*?), though it could entertain any visitor! Vasant-

[16]—[17] अहं हि चतुर्वेदविदोऽप्रतिग्राहकस्य पुत्रः शर्विलको नाम ब्राह्मणो गणिकामदनिकार्थमकार्यमनुतिष्ठामि। (Act. III—p. 76).

[18] अथवा न युक्तं तुल्यावस्थं कुलपुत्रजनं पीडयितुम्। (Act. III. p. 75).

[19] Mark the various authorities mentioned by him on pages 72 and 73, Act. III.

asenā's remark that Madanikā is talking with some stranger, is meaningful[20].

(3) The speech of Madanikā and her sorrow that Śarvilaka should have committed this act of theft only for an ordinary woman (*Strī kalyavartasya kāraṇāt*) shows that their love was just beginning and that she is trying to dissuade him from it ! Madanikā's epithet 'strīkalyavarta' for herself tends to bring out the rashness of the deed on her account on the part of Śarvilaka who even did not care for his noble birth ! It has a feeling of recognised obligation also.

All this goes to point out that the acquaintance of Śarvilaka and Madanikā was not very old. It is possible, that on his political errands Śarvilaka might have chanced to see her sometimes and knowing her to be a courtesan might have expressed his desire. But Madanikā might have laid down her setting free as a condition precedent which led Śarvilaka to go a bit away from his political errand and manage to collect money for buying Madanikā's freedom; and, *being quite new to Ujjainī*, broke the house of Cārudatta, being deceived by its outer apperance !

There is another point though not very important. How is it that Darduraka and Candanaka refer to Śarvilaka as a 'beloved friend' (Priya-Vayasyaḥ) if he was a newcomer to Ujjainī ? It is simple to cast this doubt away. In the first place this term need not be taken very seriously. It is used in a general sense. It is possible that Śarvilaka might have asked his friend Candanaka to enter the Royal guard some how at Ujjainī deeming the uprise that was to come forth. Candanaka accepted the duty as Śarvilaka had once *saved his life*.[21] The rest of it upto the escape of Āryaka

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20 *Cf.* p. 87 Act IV.

21 ...प्राणप्रदस्य मे आर्यशर्विलकस्य मित्रम्। (Act. VI. p. 149).
This, however, is not an event in the play.

might have been arranged by Candanaka, though to all practical purposes he successfully wore the mask of loyalty to Pālaka and discarded it when he could no longer wear it after his skirmish with Vīraka. That Candanaka also might have been active in the plot can be seen from the words of the Viṭa who wants to join 'Śarvilaka-*candanaka* thus, showing Candanaka also to be an important figure. Thus, Candanaka can be taken to be the active member of the plot while Śarvilaka as the actual whip and the brain behind it.

Thus, it is clear from what has been seen that Śarvilaka was not a permanent resident of Ujjainī; his acquaintance with Ujjainī was quite new. He might have been visiting it formerly just for political purposes only and now he was awaiting to deal the final blow, everything else being arranged by Candanaka whom he kept on purpose to soften the opinion of the people, towards Āryaka who was to dethrone Pālaka. Meantime Āryaka, who took shelter in the cowherd-hamlets was *accidentally* arrested and kept in prison by Pālaka, the king. The Siddhādeśa was purposely rumoured to give the whole plot a divine shade.

Āryaka also in all probability took shelter in the 'ghoṣa' at the time of this final blow and was not much acquainted with Ujjainī for, he also like Śarvilaka did not recognise Cārudatta even seeing him face to face at the 'Pravahaṇa-Viparyaya' incident.[22]

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[22] Cf. Act. VI. 1.

ASPECTS OF ANCIENT INDIAN SOCIETY AS REVEALED IN THE DHARMASŪTRAS*

By Dr. Sures Chandra Banerji

The Dharmasūtras constitute one of the most valuable literary sources for the reconstruction of the social history of ancient India. Prof. P. V. Kane is inclined to place the period of composition of the principal works on Dharmasūtra between 600 and 100 B. C. There may be differences of opinion about the period of their composition. But, their high antiquity admits of no doubt whatsoever.

From a study of the major Dharmasūtra treatises, hitherto available in print, we propose herein to deal with the following aspects of Indian society reflected in them :—

(1) Varṇāśrama-dharma,

(2) Administration of secular Law and royal duties,

(3) Manners, morals and customs,

(4) Superstitions,

(5) Āpaddharma.

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* The following abbreviations have been used in this paper :—

A—Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra, Banaras, 1932.

B—Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra, Banaras, 1934.

DS.—Dharmasūtras.

G—Gautama-dharmasūtra, Mysore, 1917.

HG.—Haradalla's Com. (Mitākṣarā) on Gautama-dharmasūtra, Poona, 1931.

MB.—Maskari-bhāṣya, Com. on *G*. above.

U—Ujjvalā, Haradalla's Com. on *A*. above.

V—Vaśiṣṭha-dharmaśāstra, Bombay, 1883.

Vai.—Vaijayantī (See Nand., above).

Vi.—Viṣṇu-smṛti, Calcutta, 1881.

VK.—Vaikhānasa-smārta-sūtra, Calcutta, 1927.

Vna.—Vivaraṇa, Com. of Govindasvāmin, on *B* above.

1. VARṆĀŚRAMA-DHARMA

Introductory remarks

The DS. literature deals with the rights and duties of men belonging to the four castes and four stages of life. We propose here to systematise the information, scattered all over the works, in a critical manner, making, at the same time, a comparative study of the contents of the different works on particular topics. Such a survey will enable us to have glimpses of the social, cultural and religious outlook of the people of those remote times, if not of the actual conditions prevailing in those far-off ages.

Different castes

The four principal castes, viz., Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra, constitute the social set-up. The mixed castes owe their origin to the intermixture of these castes either in the regular (*anuloma*) or in the reverse order (*pratiloma*). All people, outside the pale of the caste-system, are regarded as casteless and impure with whom association of those belonging to one or other of the castes is condemned. A place, where the rules of castes and of the four stages of life are not observed, is branded as '*mleccha-deśa*' a sojourn to which renders a member of any of the castes liable to expiation.

According to *A*[1], in the list of castes enumerated above, each preceding is superior to each succeeding one. Besides the four principal castes which may be called pure, the DS. mention a number of sub-castes or rather mixed castes. The various castes originating from all kinds of permutation and combination of castes may be classified as follows :—

Anuloma—One begotten by a man of the higher caste from a female of the lower caste.

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[1] I.1.5.

Antarāla—Begotten by an *anulomaja* man on an *anulomaja* woman.

Pratiloma—The reverse of *anuloma*.

Vrātya—Begotten by a *pratilomaja* male upon a *pratilomaja* female.

We name the various mixed castes below, and describe them according to the different works on DS.

Abhiṣikta[2]: Son of a Brāhmaṇa father begotten secretly upon a Kṣatriya maiden.

Adhonāpita[3] : Son of an Ambaṣṭha by a Kṣatriyā. (Ambaṣṭha defined below)

Ambaṣṭha[4] : Born of the union of Kṣatriya and Vaiśyā[5]. Issue of a Brāhmaṇa and a Vaiśyā[6].

Āyogava[7] : According to *MB.*, born of a Śūdra male and Vaiśya female (*G.*). Issue of a Vaiśya by a Kṣatriyā[8].

Bhṛjyakaṇṭha[9] : Issue of a Brāhmaṇa by a Vaiśyā wife.

Bhoja[10] : Son of a Kṣatriya by a Kṣatriyā, born secretly, the sacred rites not having been performed.

Cakrin[11] : Son of a Vaiśya paramour by a Brāhmaṇa girl.

Caṇḍāla[12] : Born of a Śūdra and a Brāhmaṇī.

Carmakāra[13] : Son of a Vaidehaka and a Brāhmaṇī. (For Vaidehaka, see *infra.*)

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[2] *VK.*X.12.

[3] *VK.*X.15.

[4] *G.*IV.16; *B.*I.16.7; I.17.2; *VK.*X.12, 15.

[5] *M.B.* on *G.*

[6] *B,VK.*

[7] *G.*IV.17; *B.*I.16.8; *VK.*X.14, 15.

[8] *B,VK.*

[9] *G.*IV.20.

[10] *VK.*X.11.

[11] *VK.*X.13

[12] *G.*IV.17; *B.*I.16.8; *VK.*X.14,15.

[13] *VK.*X.15.

Cūcuka[14] : Son of a Vaiśya and a Śūdrā.

Dauṣyanta[15] : Issue of a Kṣatriya and a Śūdrā.

Dhīvara[16] : Born to a Vaiśya by a Kṣatriya wife.

Karaṇa[17] : Issue of a Vaiśya by a Śūdrā.

Karmakāra[18] : Son of a Madgu and a Kṣatriyā.

Kṣattā[19] : Born of a Vaiśya and a Brāhmaṇī.[20]
Born of a Śūdra and a Niṣādī (*B*).
(For Niṣādī, see *infra.*)

Maṇikāra[21] : Son of a Vaiśya by Vaiśyā wife, the marriage rite not having been performed.

Matsyabandhu[22] : Son of a Cūcuka by a girl of the Kṣatriya caste.

Māgadha[23] : Born of the union of a Vaiśya and a Kṣatriyā (*MB.*). *G.*[24] defines this as an issue of a Brāhmaṇī and a Vaiśya.
Born to a Śūdra by a Vaiśyā (*B.*).
Son of a Vaiśya father and a Brāhmaṇa mother (*VK*).

Mālavaka[25] : Son of a Śūdra paramour by a Śūdrā female.

Māhiṣya[26] : Issue of a Kṣatriya by a Vaiśyā wife.

Mūrdhābhiṣikta[27] : Born of the union of a Brāhmaṇa and a Kṣatriyā.

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[14] *VK*.X.13, 14.
[15] *G*.IV.17.
[16] *G*.IV.19.
[17] *G*.IV.21.
[18] *VK*.X.15.
[19] *G*.IV.17; *B*.I.16.8.12; I.17.14.
[20] *MB*. on *G*.
[21] *VK*.X.11.
[22] *VK*.X.14.
[23] *G*.IV.17; *B*.I.16.8; I.17.6; *VK*.X.13.
[24] *G*.IV.18.
[25] *VK*.X.12.
[26] *G*.IV.20.
[27] *G*.IV.19.

Nāvika[28] : Son of an Ambaṣṭha father and a Brāhmaṇa mother.

Niṣāda[29] : Born of a Brāhmaṇa and a Vaiśyā[30].
Born of the union of a Brāhmaṇa and a Śūdrā (*B.*)

Pāraśava[31] : Issue of a Brāhmaṇa and a Śūdrā[32],

Pulinda[33] : Begotten by a Vaiśya paramour on a Kṣatriyā.

Pulkasa[34] : Born of the union of a Śūdra and a Kṣatriyā[35].
Issue of a Niṣāda by a Śūdrā (*B.*)

Rajaka[36] : Born of the union of a Pulkasa and a Brāhmaṇa woman.
(for *Pulkasa*, see above.)

Rathakāra[37] : Son of a Kṣatriya paramour by a Brāhmaṇī (*VK.*)
Born of the union of a Vaiśya and a Śūdrā (*B.*)

Savarṇa[38] : Son of a Brāhmaṇa father and a Kṣatriyā mother.

Sūcika[39] : Son of a Vaidehaka by a Kṣatriyā woman.

Śulika[40] : Begotten by a Kṣatriya paramour of a Śūdra girl.

Sūta[41] : Born of a Kṣatriya and a Brāhmaṇī[42].
Son of a Kṣatriya father and a Brāhmaṇī mother.

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28 *VK.*X.15.
29 *G.*IV.17; *B.*I.16.7.
30 *MB.* on *G.*
31 *G.*IV.17.21; *B.*I.17.3; *VK.*X.13; II.3.30.
32 *MB.* on *G.*
33 *VK.*X.14.
34 *G.*IV.19; *B.*I.16.8; 11, I.17.13; *VK.*X.14, 15.
35 *G.*, *VK.*
36 *VK.*X.15.
37 *VK.*X.13; *B.*I.17.5.
38 *VK.*X.12.
39 *VK.*X.15.
40 *VK.*X.13.
41 *G.*IV.17; *B.*I.17.8; *VK.*X.13.
42 *MB.* on *G.B.*

Śvapāka[43] : Issue of an Ugra by a Kṣattā wife.
(For *Ugra*, see *infra*.)

Śvapaca[44] : Son of a Caṇḍāla by a Brāhmaṇī girl.

Taskara[45] : Son of a Cūcuka and a Brāhmaṇa maiden.
(For *Cūcuka*, see *supra*.)

Tāmra[46] : Begotten by an Āyogava on a Brāhmaṇī maiden.
(For *Āyogava*, see *supra*.)

Udbandhaka[47] : Son of a Khanaka and a Brāhmaṇī maiden.

Ugra[48] : Issue of a Kṣatriya and a Śūdrā[49].
Issue of a Vaiśya and a Śūdrā (*G*.)

Vaidehaka[50] : Born to a Vaiśya by a Brāhmaṇī woman (*B*.)
Born of a Śūdra and a Vaiśyā woman[51].

Vaiṇa[52] : Born to a Vaidehaka by an Ambaṣṭha wife.

Velava[53] : Begotten secretly by a Śūdra on a Kṣatriyā woman.

Veṇuka[54] : Son of a Madgu and a Brāhmaṇī maiden.

Yavana[55] : Born to a Kṣatriya by a Śūdrā.

Duties of castes :

The general duties of the four castes are clearly laid down by *V*[56]. Those of a Brāhmaṇa are :—

(i) Vedic study, (ii) Teaching, (iii) Performance of sacrifice for ownself as well as for others, (iv) Making gifts, and (v) Acceptance of gifts.

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43 *B*.I.16.9, I.17.11.
44 *VK*.X.15.
45 *VK*.X.14.
46 *VK*.X.15.
47 *VK*.X.15.
48 *B*.I.16.7, I.17.4; *G*.IV.17; *VK*.X.13.
49 *B*, *VK*.
50 *B*.I.16.8, I.17.7; *G*.IV.17,20.
51 *G*, *VK*.
52 *B*.I.16.8, 10; I.17.12.
53 *VK*.X.14.
54 *VK*.X.15.
55 *G*.IV.21.
56 II.14—20.

The duties of a Kṣatriya consist in (i) Study, (ii) Sacrifice, and (iii) Making gifts.

Protection of people by weapons is the means of livelihood of Kṣatriyas.

Besides the above, a Vaiśya has the following to do :—

(i) Agriculture, (ii) Commerce, (iii) Rearing of cattle, and (iv) Lending money at interest (*Kusīda*).

For the Śūdra, the only duty is the service of the higher castes.

V. lays down that a member of a particular caste, when unable to maintain himself by his own avocation, may take to the occupation of the next inferior caste, but never to that of the higher one. But a Brāhmaṇa or a Kṣatriya, if compelled to adopt the occupation of a Vaiśya, is debarred from dealing in the following commodities :—

Stones, salt, jewels, hempen cloth (*śaṇa*), silk (*Kauśeya*) linen cloth (*kṣauma*) and skins, dyed cloth of all kinds (*tāntavam, raktam*), prepared food (*Kṛtānna*), flowers, fruits, roots, perfumes for flavouring food, water, juice extracted from plants, *soma*, weapons, poison, flesh, milk and its preparations, iron, tin (*trapu*), lac (*jatu*), lead, tame animals with uncloven hoofs and having an abundance of hair, wild animals, birds, beasts having tusks, sesamum produced by others.

The practice of lending money at interest is also condemned for Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas.

Vi. points out that the three regenerate classes (*dvija*) are distinguished from the other caste by this that the rites, connected with the former from *niṣeka* (impregnation) down to funeral practices, are accompanied by the recitation of incantations (*mantravat*).

But for certain minor differences, *Vi.* generally agrees with the previous works on the occupation to be followed by the different castes. The innovations, introduced by

Vi., are as follows : '*Yonipoṣaṇa*', i.e., storing seeds,[57] has been mentioned as an additional duty of the Vaiśya. Another thing that deserves mention is that *Vi.* allows a Śūdra to resort to all kinds of art (*Sarva*[58]-*śilpāni*)[59]; besides the service of the higher castes.

Besides the specific occupations of the particular castes, the following are mentioned by *Vi.* as duties common to all the castes :—

forbearance, truthfulness, restraint (*dama*), purity, liberality, self-control, non-violence (*ahiṁsā*), service of Guru (*guru-śuśrūṣā*), visiting places of pilgrimage, kindness, straightforwardness (*ārjava*), freedom from covetousness, reverence towards gods and Brāhmaṇas, freedom from jealousy (*anabhyasūyā*).

As regards the duties and occupations of the castes, VK. agrees substantially with the previous works. In the case of Śūdras, it adds agriculture only besides the usual service of the three superior castes.

Stages of life :

The four well-known stages of life are recognised. It must, however, be pointed out that there is no agreement among the works with regard to the name and order of the four stages. The number and order of the stages, according to *G*[60]. are :

(i) that of the student (*brahmacārī*), (ii) that of the house-holder (*gṛhastha*), (iii) that of the ascetic (*bhikṣu*), and (iv) that of the hermit (*vaikhānasa*).

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[57] Jolly's rendering as "growing seeds" appears to be inaccurate, in view of the fact that Nand. explains the word as '*rakṣaṇam*'. Nand. explains the seeds as those of barley and paddy.

[58] Sarva-śabdena vaiśya-vṛttīnāṁ kṛṣyādīnāmapī grahaṇam. Nand-that is to say, *sarva* (all) implies the occupations of the Vaiśya also, e.g., tillage, etc.

[59] 'Śilpāni citra-karaṇādini'—*Nand.* '*Śilpa*' means painting, etc.

[60] III.2.

B[61] agrees with *V*. in designating a person in the third and the fourth stage as *vānaprastha* and *parivrājāka* respectively.

A[62] enumerates the stages in the following order :—

(i) Gārhasthya, (ii) Ācārya-kula, (iii) Mauna, and (iv) Vānaprastha.

A prescribes duties for a *parivrājaka*, i.e., one who renounces the world in quest of the soul (*ātman*). This, however, does not appear to have been a compulsory stage of life to be resorted to by all, but one that might be adopted by one at one's option, because *A* provides that one can take recourse to this life just after studenthood[63]. A man, resorting to this mode of livelihood, shall forsake all kinds of *agnikārya* (rites to be performed in fire), renounce home (*aniketa*), and give up all desires for worldly pleasures (*aśarma*), shall not seek anybody's shelter (*aśaraṇa*), shall observe silence except while performing Vedic studies, beg in villages only as much food as is necessary for keeping alive (*prāṇavṛtti*)[64]. He shall abandon all things conducive to material welfare or to benefit in the life hereafter (*aniho' mutra*). He shall wear things thrown away by others[65] or go naked[66].

From the trend of *A's* discussion on the different stages of life, it appears that, according to him, it was not compulsory for one to go through all the stages in succession. In other words, *A*. does not seem to have divided the life of a *dvija* into these stages. What *A*. appears to mean is that one might choose any one of these modes of life; *brahmacarya*, however, was the basis of all of them[67]. Thus,

[61] II.11.14.

[62] II.21.1.

[63] II.21.8.

[64] Haradatta comments (on II.21.10) that such a man will enter the village only for the sake of alms, but usually live outside.

[65] II.21.11.

[66] II.21.12.

[67] II.21.3-4.

F. 8

directly from *brahmacarya* one might proceed to the life of *parivrājaka*[68] or of a *vānaprastha*[69].

The order of the last two stages in *G's* list is reversed by *VK.* which also replaces the designation *vaikhānasa* by *vānaprastha*.

Duties in different stages

The general rules to be observed in the stages irrespective of caste, are as follows :—

Brahmacarya

The entrance to this stage is marked by the ceremony of initiation to Vedic studies (*upanayana*, lit. "taking near", i.e , near the preceptor)[70]. The chief rules, to be observed by a student, consist in regular Vedic study, implicit obedience to the preceptor, begging alms[71], and strict discipline in daily life[72]. The great importance, attached to *upanayana* by the DS., can be gauged from the restrictions imposed on an uninitiated person who is debarred from offering oblations to the fire (*agni-havana*) and from giving offerings (*balikaraṇa*). Such a person is not allowed to recite most of the Vedic texts.

Rules of rigid self-control are to be strictly observed by a student. He must abstain from rich and intoxicating food such as *māṁsa*, *madhu*, articles of luxury like perfumes,

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[68] II.21.8. [69] II.21.19.

[70] He is usually called *ācārya* the etymology of which word has been given in *A*.I.1.14 thus :—

Yasmāddharmānācinoti, i.e., one from whom a person 'gathers' the knowledge of religious duties.

[71] *G.* allows begging from all castes excepting *abhiśastas* and *patitas*. The former is explained by *HG.* and *MB.* as one who has committed a sin technically known as *upa-pātaka*. But, *U.* on *A* I.21.8, in conformity with *A* I.24.7, interprets it as one who has committed brahma-hatyā.

[72] We refrain from recording the minutiae of the manner of saluting the preceptor, the mode of sitting near him, the rules about begging alms, etc., but indicate the broad rules only which are important for the purpose of drawing the picture of the society of those times.

garlands, etc. He is debarred from participating in amusements of all kinds including dancing, music, etc. He cannot sleep by day, must avoid conveyances, umbrellas and footwears. Association with women, nay, even gazing at them, must be shunned by all means. *G*[73] sums up the rules of self-control by saying that the student should keep in subjection his speech, arms and stomach.

It is interesting to add that, as a rule, corporal punishment is prohibited for a pupil[74]. When no other course is possible (*aśaktau*), he may be punished with a thin rope or cane[75]. Teachers are forbidden from striking their pupils with any other thing on pain of punishment to be inflicted by the king[76].

As regards the period of stay at the preceptor's house, *G*. does not appear to have fixed any limit[77], although it prescribes twelve years' stay for one Veda or twelve years each for the other Vedas. From *G*. it appears that, for a person, the study of one of the Vedas only was required and that of the others was optional. A fee was to be paid to the teacher on the completion of instructions. Then the pupil was to perform ablution marking the completion of the period of his studenthood.

The teacher, according to some, or, the mother, according to others, is regarded as the chief among all the *gurus*.

B. declares that one is on a level with the Śūdrā before one's *upanayana*.

With regard to the period of studentship, *B*. says that it is forty-eight years according to the ancients[78]. *B*.

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[73] II.28. [74] *Cf*. Śiṣya-śiṣṭir-avadhena—*G*. II.49.

[75] *G*.II.50. [76] *Cf*. anyena ghnan rājñā śāsyaḥ—*G*. II.51.

[77] *Cf*. sarveṣu grahaṇāntaṃ vā—*G*.II.54.

[78] "paurāṇam" (*B*.I.3.1).

This word has been interpreted by Vna. as follows :—

(i) Practised in the golden age (kṛta-yuga).

(ii) Ordained and practised by the ancients like Manu, etc.

appears to have allowed the following alternatives in the matter :—

(i) Twenty-four or twelve years for each Veda.
(ii) At least one year (*saṁvatsarāvama*) for each *kāṇḍa*.
(iii) Until the Veda has been learnt.

According to *B.*, the persons fit to be approached by a student for alms are the Brāhmaṇas and so forth (*brāhmaṇādyāḥ*) who follow their own occupations (*svakarmasthāḥ*).

B., like *G.*, ordains strict obedience on the part of the student to his teacher. But the former, unlike the latter, does not assume a teacher to be above all faults, and provides for the impunity of a student transgressing such order of the teacher as, if followed, will cause loss of his caste.

As a measure of self-control, the student, after reaching puberty, is debarred even from saluting the young wives of brothers and of teachers.

The rule that one may study under a non-Brāhmaṇa teacher in times of distress[79] implies that normally one was required to study under a Brāhmaṇa.

A. clearly explains the significance of the term '*dvija.*' *A.*[80] declares that a teacher gives the student his intellectual birth which is far superior to the physical birth given by his parents. The initiation to Vedic studies was regarded as indispensable, so much so that all kinds of social intercourse was prohibited with a man whose two immediate ancestors remained uninitiated or the initiation of whose ancestors up to the great-grand father and of one's own-self was not remembered.

According to *A*, the shortest period of a student's residence at his teacher's house is twelve years (*dvādaśāvarārdhyam*). But, the following alternatives are also allowed :—

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[79] *B.*I.3.42.
[80] I.1.16.

(i) Forty-eight years, (ii) Thirty-six years, and (iii) Twenty-four years.

As regards the rules to be observed by a student, *VK.* generally agrees with the other works. Of the *brahmacārins*, *VK.* distinguishes four kinds[81], viz.,

(1) Gāyatra, (2) Brāhma, (3) Prājāpatya, and (4) Naiṣṭhika.

Gārhasthya :

This stage of life has been described by *G.* as the source (*yoni*) of the other stages, because others do not produce any offspring. *V.*[82] holds that this stage of life excels all others. *V.*[83] gives a very happy analogy. It compares a gṛhastha to a sea. Just as all rivers flow into the ocean, so also people in all other stages of life resort to the *gṛhastha*. *V.*[84] further says that, as all creatures live by resorting to their mother, so also all those who live by begging (*bhikṣukāḥ*) live by resorting to the *gṛhastha*. The life of a householder, as described in DS., does not appear to be one of ease and luxury. The householder is required to spend his days through a round of duties prescribed by the *śāstras*. Of his various daily duties, the most importtant are the following :—

(1) Performance of the sacrifices in honour of gods, Manes and human beings,[85] and Vedic study. Of these sacrifices, the first is the performance of the rite, known as Vaiśvadeva[86]. The second, the *pitṛyajña* as it is called, consists in feeding Brāhmaṇas for the benefit of the Manes. The third, the *manuṣya-yajña* or *nṛ-yajña*, means the

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[81] For duties of each kind, see Caland's Eng. tr. of *VK.* pp.185-186.

[82] VIII.14.

[83] VIII.15.

[84] VIII.16.

[85] *G.*V.9.

[86] Name of a particular religious ceremony performed morning and evening, and especially before the midday meal.

performance of the rites of hospitality towards guests. Vedic study is called *ṛṣi-pūjā* or *brahma-yajña*.

(2) *Bali-karma* also called *bhūta-yajña*.

This consists in offerings to the presiding deities of the different directions after the performance of the rite known as Vaiśvadeva.

(3) Giving water to the gods, the Manes and the *ṛṣis*.

All domestic rites (*gṛhyāṇi*) are to be performed in the sacred fire which must be preserved either from the time of one's marriage, or from the partition of one's family property.

While making gifts is generally commended by *G.*, for a householder it has been said to be particularly meritorious when made to a Brāhmaṇa who has mastered all the Vedas (*veda-pāragaḥ*). The following classes of people have been especially recommended as deserving gifts :—

(1) Persons begging for their preceptors, (2) Those who are in need of money for defraying expenses of wedding, (3) The sick requiring medicine, (4) Destitute, (5) Those who want to perform a sacrifice, (6) Those engaged in study, (7) Travellers, and (8) Those who have performed the *Viśvajit*[87] sacrifice.

But, gifts for an unlawful purpose have been expressly condemned even though one may have promised to make such a gift[88].

The householder is required to lead a life of self-restraint. Besides being abstemious in his food and drink, he must be restrained in enjoying his wife. He must meet his wife after her monthly illness[89] and must avoid sexual intercourse on festive occasions[90].

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[87] This is the name of a sacrifice in which one has to give away one's all as sacrificial fee.

[88] *G.*V.24. [89] *G.*V.1.

[90] *G.*V.2.

Besides showing due consideration to all the members of his family, particularly the females and the children, the householder is to accord cordial reception to his guests. A guest is described by *G.*[91] as one who, belonging to a different village and intending to stay for one night only, arrives when the sun's rays pass over the trees (*adhivṛkṣa-sūryo-pasthāyī*)[92]. The status of the guests and their castes and relationship with the *gṛhastha* are factors which determine the manner of reception deserved by them. *Madhuparka*[93] should be used in welcoming one's priest, teacher, father-in-law, paternal or maternal uncles and in entertaining them in a sacrifice or wedding ceremony. A Brāhmaṇa guest is to be especially honoured. Among other things, he must be given water for washing his feet (*pādya*), special offerings (*arghya*) and food of a superior quality (*anna-viśeṣa*).

With regard to the duties of a householder, B. substantially agrees with *G*. Unlike *G*, *B*. ordains that the sacred fire, in which all the religious ceremonies are to be performed, must be kindled at the wedding[94] ceremony.

A. gives very elaborate rules about the life of a householder. We note below only the chief rules in which it differs from *G*. *A*. prohibits connubial intercourse in the day-time. It allows this act subject to the restrictions imposed by the *śāstras*, but allows it in the interval also provided the wife's consent is obtained.

The slave of a Brāhmaṇa householder should fetch rice from the royal store, and honour a Śūdra guest. *A*.

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[91] V.41.

[92] This time has been said to be '*madhyāhna*' (midday) by *MB*. Haradatta, however, suggests that the word of the text may mean either midday or evening.

[93] A mixture of curd and honey or of milk and honey. In some Purāṇas and works on Smṛti, it has been described as an admixture of curd, ghee, water, honey and sugar.

[94] II.4.22.

also lays great stress on the proper reception of guests[95]. But, according to *A*., a guest is one who approaches a *gṛhastha* for the fulfilment of religious duties and not for any other purpose[96]. The prevalence of beef-eating, at the time of the composition of Āpastamba's work, is clearly proved by the rules[97] which provide for the offering of cows to distinguished guests, e.g., one who has mastered the Veda, preceptor, the priest known as *ṛtvik*, a *snātaka*, a king, father-in-law.

V. does not add materially to the above rules. It however, defines a guest as 'a Brāhmaṇa who stays for one night only[98].'

Vi. classifies the property, acquired by a householder of any caste, into[99].—

(1) White—what has been acquired by the mode of livelihood prescribed for his caste, (2) Mottled—what has been acquired by a man by the mode of livelihood of the caste next inferior to his own, (3) Black—what has been acquired by the mode of livelihood of the caste lower, by two or three degrees, than his own.

Each preceding in the above list is better than the succeeding one.

Vi. gives elaborate rules to be observed by the householder in his daily life. An important rule deserving

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[95] *A*.II.4.21. While commenting on this, Haradatta sayst hat this *sūtra* implies that a king should set up stores of paddy, etc., in the villages for honouring the Śūdra guests.

[96] *A*.II.6.5. The "religious duties" (dharmapuraskāraḥ) have been explained by Haradatta as begging for the preceptor, etc.

[97] *A*. II.8. 5—7. Haradatta, in his U., takes the word '*go*' in these rules as dakṣiṇā or fee. But, his interpretation is not plausible in view of the fact that 'goghna' (lit. meaning one in whose honour a cow is killed) is found in the sense of 'guest' in many branches of ancient Indian literature. Cf., for instance, *Pāṇini*, III.4.73; commenting on this Bhaṭṭoji explains '*goghna*' as '*gām hanti tasmai goghno'tithiḥ*'. The practice of beef-eating presumably became obsolete in Haradatta's time.

[98] VIII.7.

[99] LVIII. 2—8.

mention is that he must not converse with *mlecchas*, *antyajas* and *patitas*[100].

Vi. agrees with *V.* in the definition of '*atithi*' or guest, and, like the other works, dwells, at considerable length, on the mode of reception to be accorded to various kinds of guests.

The duties, prescribed by *VK.* for a householder, are substantially the same as those found in the other works. But, *VK.* introduces an innovation by classifying householders into four kinds[101], viz., (1) *Vārtā-vṛtti*, (2) *Śālīna-vṛtti*, (3) *Yāyāvara*, *and* (4) *Ghorācārika*.

Bhaikṣya[102]*:* Life of an ascetic—

The rules, to be observed by a man in this stage of life, are not so elaborate as those prescribed for the preceding stages. The chief rules are that an ascetic cannot possess any store. Living at one place during the rainy season, he will enter a village only in order to beg. He will live a life of strict discipline and self-restraint, and be kind and sympathetic to all creatures.

V., the '*parivrājaka*' of which corresponds to this stage, allows an ascetic to live in a village at his option[103].

Vānaprastha: Life of a hermit—

The chief rules to be observed by a hermit are as follows :—

Dressed in bark, he will dwell at a place outside the village, and sustain himself by roots, fruits, leaves and grass and by gleaned corns.

B. classifies *Vānaprasthas* in the following manner :—

A. *Pacamānakas*—those who cook their food—

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100 *Vi.* LXIV.15. '*Mleccha*' is generally used to denote those who do not follow the *varṇāśramadharma*. '*Antyaja*' means low-born people and '*patitas*' outcaste.

101 For the description of each kind, see Caland's Eng. tr. of *VK.*, p. 187.

102 This corresponds to '*pravrajyā*' mentioned by *B.* as the last stage.

103 X.26.

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(1) *Sarvāraṇyakas*—those who eat everything available in the forest, (i) *indrāvasiktas*—those subsisting on forest produce generated by Indra, e.g., lianas, shrubs, creepers, (ii) *retovasiktas*—those subsisting on forest produce generated from semen, e.g., flesh of animals slain by tigers, wolves, and other carnivorous beasts. (b) *Vaituṣikas*—those who live upon unhusked grains, (c) *Kanda-mūla-bhakṣāḥ*—those who live upon bulbs and roots, (d) *Phala-bhakṣāḥ*—those who eat pot-herbs and fruits.

B. *Apacamānakas*—those who do not cook their food.

(a) Unmajjakas—those who avoid the use of instruments made of iron and stone, (b) Pravṛttāśins—those who eat their food with their hands, (c) Mukhenādāyins—those who take their food with the mouth only (like beasts), (d) Toyāhāras—those who subsist on water only, (e) Vāyubhakṣas—those who eat nothing.

VK, however, gives the following classifications of *Vānaprasthas*[104] :—

(1) Sapatnīka—with wife, (i) Audumbara, (ii) Vairiñca, (iii) Bālakhilya, (iv) Phenapa. (2) Apatnīka—without wife.

Of this class there are numerous sub-divisions[105] which are as follows :—

Kālāśika, uddata-saṁvṛtta, aśmakuṭṭa, udagraphalī, dantolūkhala, uñchavṛttika, saṁdarśana-vṛttika, kapota-vṛttika, mṛga-cārika, hastādāyī, śaila-phalakādi, arka-dagdhāśī, baivāśī, kusumāśī, pāṇḍu-patrāśī, kālāntara-bhojī, eka-kālika, catuṣ-kālika, kaṇṭaka-śāyī, vīrāsana-śāyī, pañcāgni-madhya-śāyī, dhūmāśī, pāṣāṇa-śāyī, abhyavagāhī, udakumbha-vāsī, maunī, avāk-śiras, sūrya-pratimukha, ūrddhva-vāhuka, eka-pāda-sthita.

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104 For details about each class, see Caland's Eng. tr. of *VK.*, pp. 189—190.

105 For descriptions of the sub-divisions, see Caland's Eng. tr. of the *VK.*, p. 191—

2. Administration of Secular Law and Royal Duties

Administration of justice :

G. lays down that the administration of justice shall be regulated by the Veda, the Institutes of the sacred law, the Aṅgas and the Purāṇs.

The king is advised to come to a decision regarding a matter concerning a class of people after consulting those who have authority over that particular class. Of such classes of people are mentioned cultivators, traders, herdsmen, money-lenders, artisans, etc.

In the cases of conflicting evidence, the king will have to arrive at a decision after consulting Brāhmaṇas versed in the Vedas.

Rural administration :

Vi. lays down a very interesting system of administration. A village has been taken as the unit of administration. A man will be appointed at the head of each village. Ten villages together will have one chief. Every hundred villages will have one, and a whole district will have a lord. A wrong done in a village will be righted by the village-chief. On his failure, he will bring it to the notice of the chief of ten villages. Each succeeding chief in the above order will have higher authority.

Departmental officials :

The king should appoint able officials to look after his various departments, viz., Mines, Taxes, Fares to be paid at ferries, Elephants, Forests, etc. Persons, placed in charge of different departments, must be endowed with requisite qualities. Thus, for financial business, skilled men will be appointed; for fighting brave men, and so on. It is interesting to note that eunuchs are recommended for protecting the harem of the king.

Taxation :

The rates of tax, to be levied by the king, should be as follows :—

1. Sixth part of the annual produce in the case of grains and seeds, 2. Two per cent, in the cases of cattle, gold and clothes, 3. Sixth part of flesh, honey, clarified butter, herbs, perfumes, flowers, roots, fruits, liquids, condiments, wood, skins, earthen pots, stone vessels, things made of split bamboo.

A tenth part of the marketable commodities, sold within the country of the king, shall have to be paid as duty. A twentieth part is fixed on exported commodities. The goods of a man, fraudulently avoiding the toll-house, are to be forfeited.

Subversive activities :

Proper punishment is ordained for those who try to subvert the constituent elements of a state, viz., Monarch, Council, his Fortress, Treasury, Army, Realm, King's ally.

Espionage :

Vi. provides for the appointment of spies to secure information both in the king's realm as well as in that of his enemy.

Political expedients :

Towards his neighbouring kings, who may be allied to him, neutral or inimically disposed, the king should adopt, according to the exigencies of the situation, the four modes of obtaining success, viz., negotiation (*sāma*), division (*bheda*), presents (*dāna*) and force of arms (*daṇḍa*).

According to the exigencies of the situation, the king should have resort to the six measures, viz., alliance (*sandhi*), war (*vigraha*), marching to battle (*yāna*), sitting encamped (*āsana*), seeking the protection of a more powerful king (*saṁśraya*), and distributing his forces (*dvaidhībhāva*).

Conquered territory:

A very practical piece of advice has been given by *Vi.* to the king by holding that, after conquering the country of his foe, he should not abolish all the laws prevailing there.

Treasure-trove:

Of a treasure-trove, the king should give one half to the Brāhmaṇas, and take the other half himself. A Brāhmaṇa, coming across a treasure-trove, may keep the whole of it.

Minor's property:

The king is required to protect the properties of minors, of helpless persons having no guide and of women having no guardians.

Recovered stolen goods:

Regarding recovered stolen goods, *Vi.* ordains that the king must restore the entire propetty to the owner. That the recovery of a stolen thing was regarded as a bounden duty of the king is clearly proved by *Vi's* rule that a king, failing to recover such a property, must make good the loss sustained by the owner.

3. Manners, morals and customs[166]

The DS. yield a good deal of information on the manners and morals of the society which they represent. We propose herein to note the salient features in their practices and moral outlook. For the sake of convenience, we shall deal with the subject under each of the four stages of life.

The stage of a *Brahmacārin.*[167]

The *ācārya* is held in high esteem. He is to be saluted every morning. Before proceeding to study, the student

[166] Care has been taken to avoid repetition of the above rules dealt with under *varṇāśrama-dharma.*

[167] *Gautama*

is to request the teacher to begin his lecture. This request is to be made by the pupil after touching one foot[168] of the preceptor. The pupil, seated on the *darbha* grass, to the right of the teacher, facing east or south, shall proceed to study only when asked by the teacher to do so. If anybody passes between the teacher and the taught, the student has to follow anew the procedure necessary for commencing his study. The names of the preceptor, his son and his wife must not be uttered by the pupil. The bed or seat of the pupil must be lower than those of the preceptor.

The student should retire to bed after his preceptor, but get up before him.

The reply to a question, asked by the preceptor, must be given by the pupil after rising from his seat. He should alwaye engage himself in doing what is pleasant and beneficial not only to the preceptor but also to the preceptor's wife and sons. But he must not eat the leavings of the food of the preceptor's wife and son, nor should he bathe them or help them in toilet, nor wash their feet and salute them by touching their feet.[169]

Daily prayers are to be said at both junctures of the day, in the standing posture in the morning and sitting till stars are visible in the evening.

In the presence of superiors, he should avoid the following practices :—

Putting a piece of cloth on the neck, placing a foot on the knee (avasakthikā), sitting on a raised spot, stretching the feet.

The following are to be avoided in the presence of all :—spitting, laughing, yawning, cracking the fingers (avasphoṭana).

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[168] See Haradatta on *G.* (*A. A.* ed., I. 1. 49). But, *MB.*, on the same *sūtra*, appears to mean that the preceptor's hand should be touched.

[169] *G.* II. 39. Both Haradatta and *MB.* point out that this rule, by implication, provides for these things to be done by a pupil for the teacher.

A student is forbidden to use harsh words to anybody, and is required to practise control over his speech, arms and the stomach.

A brahmacārin may beg food of members of "all the castes" (*sārva-varṇika*) excepting those who are known as abhiśasta[170] and *patita* (degraded or apostate). It is not very clear as to whether by 'all castes' *G.* includes Śūdras also. The following sūtra[171] provides that, in begging, the word 'bhavat' should be used at the beginning, in the middle and at the end (of the address at the time of begging) by the members of the three castes in order. If alms be not obtained from the persons noted above, a brahmacārin should approach the following persons in the order in which they are mentioned[172] preceptor, *jñāti* (sapiṇḍa, according to commentators), guru (= mātula, etc.). The food, obtained by alms, must at first be given to the preceptor and then taken for himself with his permission. In the absence of the preceptor, such food should be made over to the preceptor's wife, son or fellow-students. The brahmacārin shall drink water before eating, keep silent throughout the process of eating, and avoid over-eating.

The preceptor should refrain from inflicting corporal punishment on his students. In exceptional cases, however, where the student proves extremely unruly, and otherwise unmanageable, he may be given slight physical punish-

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170 The word has been explained by both *HG.* and *MB.* (on *G.* II. 43) as one who has committed a sin technically known as *upa-pātaka*. On *G.* XVII. 15, *MB.* explains it as one who is declared as having committed a fault. In this context, *HG.* explains it as one who is declared either rightly or wrongly, to be a wrong-doer. But, *A.* (I. 24-6-7) clearly defines *abhiśasta* as one who has killed either a Brāhmaṇa or a man of either the Kṣatriya or the Vaiśya caste who has completed Vedic studies (*Vedādhyāya*) or is engaged in performing *Savana* (=*soma-yāga*, acc. to *U.*) *A.* (I. 28. 17,) however, describes such a sinner as one who kills one's ownself or any other person. On *A.* (I. 29. 8), U. explains the word as *patita*; on *A.* (II. 2. 6), *U.* says that the word means 'murderer of a Brāhmaṇa'. The word also occurs in *A.* I. 3. 25 and I. 24. 15; in the latter case, *U.* explains it as *brahmahā*.

171 II. 43. 172 II. 44-45.

ment[173]. Heavy physical punishment for a student has been condemned as a crime[174].

At the conclusion of Vedic studies, the student should ask his preceptor what he should do for him (preceptor). Having acted up to his order, the student should, with his permission, take the ablution marking the completion of Vedic studies.

B.[175] gives us the additional information that, in begging, the word '*Bhavat*' should be used in the beginning, 'bhikṣā' in the middle and a word indicating 'prayer' at the end[176]. This, together with the subsequent sūtra, appears to have been meant for the Brāhmaṇa alone. In the case of Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas, the word 'bhavat' should be used in the middle and at the end respectively. *B.*[177] clearly provides that members of all the castes (sarveṣu varṇeṣu) may be approached for begging. The immediately following sūtra requires that the persons, to be approached for the purpose, must be Brāhmaṇas, etc., following their own occupations[178]. Govindasvāmin, presumably in consonance with the practice prevelent in his time, says that here Śūdras are excluded; what is meant is that the members of the regenerate classes alone are to be approached, and among them those who follow their own avocations (sva-karma) are to be preferred to others.

B. does not push devotion to one's preceptor too far. *B.*[179] requires the student to obey the preceptor, but not as implicity as G. appears to ordain. The same sūtra of *B.* allows the student to transgress his preceptor's order when, if carried out, this may lead to the student's degradation. According to *B.*[180] while saluting the teacher, the student is

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[173] II. 50. [174] II. 51.

[175] *Baudhāyana.* [176] I. 3. 17.

[177] I. 3.18.

[178] Cf. brāhmaṇādayaḥ svakarmasthāḥ, I. 3. 19.

[179] I. 3. 23. [180] I. 3. 27.

to announce his own name besides touching the ears. Another person, of pure conduct, shall also be saluted at the order of the preceptor. With sacrificial wood, a pitcher of water, flowers and rice in hand, one should neither salute others nor be saluted by others.

A student should hold the umbrella on his teacher, help him in toilet, bath, etc., and eat the leavings of his food[181]. For the teacher's son also he should do all these things except eating the remnants of his food. For the vife of the preceptor, however, he shall do none of these.

In times of emergency (āpat), when Brāhmaṇas are not available (brāhmaṇābhāvaḥ-*Vna.*), one can study with a person 'other than a Brāhmaṇa'. Govindaśvāmin explains *abrāhmaṇa* a as a member of any of the two other higher castes but not Śūdras. Such a teacher shall be served and obeyed like the regular teacher.

The[182] additional information that *A.* gives us is that a brahmacārin should not partake of what has been offered in a Śrāddha or to a deity. He should avoid day-sleep.

The student is required by *A.* not to be angry with or jealous of anybody.

A. also provides for the pupil's eating the leaving of such food of his preceptor as is not condemned by Śruti[183]. He can also take the leavings of the food of his father and elder brother.

A. gives an additional rule that a pupil should carry a pitcher of water in the morning and evening[184]. Blind obedience to the preceptor is forbidden by *A*[185] who allows a student to point out to him, in private, any breach of rule that may have been committed by the latter either inadvertently or wilfully. The next two sūtras ordain that, if the

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[181] I. 3. 36. [182] *Āpastamba.*

[183] I. 4. 1. 5.

[184] For the preceptor's drink and bath-*Vna.*

[185] I. 4. 25.

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preceptor does not desist even after that, the student himself shall perform the duty neglected by the former, or dissuade him[186].

Strict discipline on the part of the student is very strongly advocated in *A*.[187]

Regarding the castes, from which food can be begged, *A*.[188] is absolutely clear. It allows a *brahmacārin* always to beg food, for his *Ācārya*, of not only Śūdras but also of Ugras[189]. This is the opinion of others (*eke*) cited, apparently with the approval by *A*. In the previous rule, *A*. provides for such a measure in times of emergency.

A.[190] forbids a student to indulge in self-applause and censure of others.

A. requires a student to treat his preceptor's wife just like the preceptor himself subject to the restriction that the former should not be saluted, and that the leavings of her food must not be taken. Apart from the remnants of food, the rules of a student's conduct towards his preceptor's son are exactly like those towards the preceptor. The same rules to be observed by a student towards his preceptor's wife should also be observed by him with respect to one who teaches him at the direction of the preceptor, and to a fellow-student who is superior to him in age and learning.

They[191] hardly prescribe any noteworthy additional rules. Of them, Viṣṇu adds one noticeable innovation. He maintains that, for purposes of begging, a brahmacārin shall approach qualified persons (guṇavatsu) excepting those

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186 Either directly or through the student's superior, like father, etc.

187 I. 5. 2.

188 I. 7. 21.

189 Cf. Sarvadā śūdrata ugrato vācāryārthasyāharaṇam dharmyam (*Vna.*) *B* (I. 17. 4) defines Ugra as one born of a Kṣatriya father and Śudrā mother.

190 I. 7. 24.

191 *Vaśiṣṭha*, *Viṣṇu* and *Vaikhānasa*.

who belong to the family of the guru[192]. It should be noted that none of these writers imposes any restriction on the caste of the person to be approached for begging.

The Stage of a Gṛhastha

General rules, especially with regard to guests.

G.[193] ordains that one should feed the following persons, first of all :—guest, a child, diseased person, a pregnant woman, daughter and sister[194] The proper reception and entertainment of guests is regarded by the authors of DS. as a bounden duty of a house-holder. For example, *A.*[195] maintains that the honouring of guests leads to peace on the part of the host in this life, and to the attainment of heaven after death. There is some divergence of opinion among the authors about the technical meaning of the term 'atithi.' The definition given by *V.* is very clear. According to this work, an *atithi* (< na tithi) is so called because of his not staying permanently (anitya). *V.*[196] defines *atithi* as a Brāhmaṇa who stays for one night. This definition does not take non-Brāhmaṇas into account. It may be that *V.* defines an atithi in relation to Brāhmaṇas alone. The next verse of *V.* excludes a co-villager from this category. *G's* definition of atithi[197] substantially agrees with that of *V.* with this difference that the former does not specify the caste of the atithi.

If the preceptor, father or friend comes to the house, the householder should offer him food and follow his bidding. According to *G.*, such distinguished guests as ṛtvik, ācārya,

[192] What precisely is meant by this word is not clear. From the trend of the discussion, however, it seems to mean the preceptor. *Vai.* adds that, for this purpose, one's own family is excluded.

[193] V. 26.

[194] Sva-vāsinī (V. L. Su-vāsinī, according to *G.* On this *MB.* comments— garbhayuktā duhitā).

[195] II. 6. 6.

[196] VIII. 7.

[197] V. 41.

śvaśura, pitṛvya (uncle), mātula, etc. must be welcomed with madhuparka. A king, who is a *śrotriya* (lit. a Brāhmaṇa versed in the Vedas), is entitled to the same honour. A king of other castes shall be offered a seat and water. A śrotriya Brāhmaṇa must be offered water for washing feet, (arghya) and special kinds of food (anna-viśeṣa). A householder, who is unable to receive a guest in the manner described above, hall welcome him with sweet words[198]. To guests, who are either superior or equal to the host, the latter must offer bed, seat, place in the house (āvasatha), etc., which should be like those used by the latter himself[199]. Besides, the host shall move behind such a guest and honour him in other ways.

A guest of the Brāhmaṇa or the Kṣatriya caste is to be welcomed with the words *kuśala* and *anāmaya* respectively. A Vaiśya and a Śūdra are to be addressed with the word 'ārogya'.[200] *A.*[201] provides that a Brāhmaṇa guest, who has not studied the Vedas, should not be welcomed by rising from the seat. He should, however, be offered a seat, water, food, etc. If he is otherwise worthy of this honour,[202] he should be welcomed in this manner. Guests of the Kṣatriya and Vaiśya castes also are to be treated similarly.[203]

G.[204] appears to mean that, of a Brāhmaṇa, no other person than a Brāhmaṇa can be an atithi in the technical sense of the term, except when the non-Brāhmaṇa guests are invited to a sacrifice. Of the non-Brāhmaṇa guests, who are not entitled to as respectful a reception as the Brāhmaṇa guests, the Kṣatriya is to be fed after the Brāhmaṇa guest. The guests of the other castes are to be

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198 G. V, 37.

199 G. V. 34.

200 This is Haradatta's interpretation. But, according to *MB.* on *G. V.* 42, this sūtra does not relate to Śūdra guests the mode of addressing whom is to be learnt from other works.

201 II. 4. 16-18.

202 See *A.* I. 14. 12.

203 These rules must be taken to apply to a Brāhmaṇahost.

204 V. 43-45.

fed along with the servants. *A.*[205] ordains that a Śūdra guest should be engaged (in drawing water, etc.) and then fed. *A.*[206] refers to the interesting custom that the servants of the host used to bring food from the king's house (rāja-kula) for the entertainment of Śūdra guests[207].

G.[208] hints at the fact that the guests of the castes other than Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya are to be entertained merely from the point of view of humanity, because these people, not being atithis properly speaking, are not legitimately entitled to such reception.

Manner of Salutation

After returning from abroad, one should salute, by touching the feet, of the parents, their bandhus[209] who are older in age, teacher and the teacher of the father, etc.[210] When these superiors are present together, the one who is the most revered should be saluted first. In saluting, one should, first of all, announce one's own name. Superior women, excepting mother, aunt and sister, should not be saluted on any occasion other than on returning from abroad[211]. *G.*[212] prohibits the salutation, by touching fee t, of elder brother's wife and mother in-law[213]. The ṛtvik priest, father-in-law, uncle maternal and paternal—these persons, if younger in age, should be respected merely by rising from the seat.

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205 II 4. 19-20. 206 II. 4. 21.

207 Haradatta comments that this hints at the prevalence of the system of the king's keeping stores of paddy, etc., in every village for the entertainment of Sūdra guests.

208 V. 45.

209 Mātula-mātāmaha-pitṛvya-pitāmahādayaḥ-MB. mātula-mātṛsvasṛ-pitṛ-svasrādayaḥ-HG.

210 *G.* VI. 3. 211 *G.* VI. 7.

212 *G.* VI. 8.

213 *Śvaśrū*—this prohibition does not carry conviction unless we take the word to mean 'mother-in-law who is younger in age.' The Ānandāśrama ed. of the *Gautama-dharmasūtra* reads *Svasṛṇām* which again contradicts *G.* VI. 7; the latter provides for constant salutation of the sister.

The stage of a Vānaprastha

General Rules.

The movements of a vānaprastha are restricted within the forest. He cannot live on a piece of cultivated land, nor can he enter the village.[214] He will wear matted locks, cira (i.e., made of darbha grass, etc.) and ajina (i.e., carma or skin). *A.*[215] informe us that a man, intending to resort to this mode of life, may go to the forest either alone or with his wife and children. *Vi.* attempts to fix a particular time in the life of a gṛhastha for his taking to this stage of life, although it does not specify the age. *Vi.*[216] lays down that a gṛhastha should enter the third stage of life when wrinkles and grey hair are visible on his person. Or he may do so after the birth of a grandson.

Food, habits and manners.

A.[217] ordains that a vānaprastha shall not only subsist on forest-produce but shall also entertain guests, and perform religious observances with those things. He will offer caru (i.e., preparation of rice, barley and pulse boiled with milk). *G.*, while allowing a vānaprastha to live on roots and fruits alone, definitely forbids him[218] to take anything grown in a village. He has to perform the five great sacrifices (mahā-yajña) prescribed for the householder. He has to entertain all[219] the guests excepting those who are expressly prohibited.[220]

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[214] *G.* III. 32-33.

[215] II. 22. 8-9.

[216] 94. 1-2.

[217] II. 22. 17.

[218] III. 28.

[219] The commentators point out that the restrictions of caste, etc. with regard to guests, imposed on a *gṛhastha*, e.g., a non-Brāhmaṇa, cannot be the guest of a Brāhmaṇa, do not apply to a *vānaprastha*.

[220] *E.g.*, thieves and people born in the reverse order of castes (pratilomaja).

A man, in this stage of life, is not debarred from eating the flesh of animals killed by wild animals, such as tiger, etc. It is interesting to note that *Vi*[221] allows a vānaprastha to gather his food from a village even an entrance to which is forbidden by some of the authorities.[222]

B.[223] adds that a vānaprastha should abstain from injury even to insects, and be capable of enduring cold. *A.*[224] prohibits the acceptance of gifts for a vānarpastha. *A.*[225] ordains that he shall lie and sit on bare ground. *A.*[226] further provides that a vānaprastha, desiring to observe greater discipline, should beg only as much food as is necessary for bare maintenance.[227]

From *V.*[228] we learn that a vānaprastha should practise continence. *V.*[229] provides that he shall live at the roots of trees after six months.[230] It is interesting to note that *V.*[231] appears to enjoin upon a vānaprastha the performance of only three yajñas, viz. deva, pitṛ and manuṣya-yajña out of the usual five.

Vi. lays stress on the extreme self-mortification of the vānaprastha.[232] As an example of the severe austerities prescribed by *Vi.*, we may cite the practice of the 'five austerities',[233] in summer, lying under the sky in the rainy season and putting on wet clothes in the dewy season (hemanta).

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221 94-94.

222 *E.g. G.* III. 33.

223 III. 3. 19.

224 II. 22.11.

225 II. 22. 23.

226 II. 23. 1.

227 U explains that begging should be resorted to instead of gleaning corns. It further points out that a vānaprastha should beg of other vānaprasthas.

228 IX. 5.

229 IX. 11.

230 The meaning of the passage is not very clear. Does it provide for his living in the open after six months from his entrance to this order of life?

231 IX. 12.

232 Vide Chap. 95.

233 Sitting in the midst of fire on four sides with the sun overhead.

THE STAGE OF A PARIVRĀJAKA OR BHIKṢU

General rules

G.[234] lays down that a man, in this stage of life, should not accumulate anything. Practising self-restraint, he shall fix his abode at one paticular spot (dhruva-śīla) during the rains. He shall enter the village for begging. *B.*[235] fixes afternoon as the proper time for begging. After the expiry of the rainy season, he is not to stay for more than one day in a village. *V.* ordains that he shall not live permanently at any place; he may fix his abode at any one of the following paces :—outskirts of village, temple, empty house (śūnyāgāra) and foot of a tree.

A.[236] adds that he shall renounce all worldly pleasures, shall not take recourse to any body's help or perform any act conducive to temporal well-being (aniha) and spiritual benefit derivable in the other world (anamutra).[237] This work further provides that such a person shall renounce even all that is ordained in the śāstras, not to speak of what is prohibited, shall keep above pleasure and pain, and meditate upon the Soul (ātman), such meditation being conducive to happiness.[238] *V.* does not lay so much stress on the renunciation of all work both ordained and prohibited—as *A.* does. But it agrees with the latter in holding the acquisition of knowledge of the Supreme Soul as a bounden duty of a parivrājaka. The subjects to be meditated upon, according to *Vi*,[239] are chiefly these :—transitoriness of life, impure character of the body (aśuci-bhāva), the effect of old age on appearance, distress in the shape of diseases—

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[234] III. 11 ff.

[235] II. 11. 24.

[236] II. 21. 10.

[237] Cf., ihārthāḥ kṛṣyādayaḥ paralokārthāśca japahomādāyo yasya na santi so'nihonamutra ityuktaḥ *U.*

[238] Cf., ātmani buddhe.... tadeva jñānaṃ sarvamaśubhaṁ prakṣālya kṣemam prāpayati—*U.* on *A.* II. 21. 14.

[239] Chap. 96.

physical, mental and extraneous (āgantuka), the woeful condition in the mother's womb, the various miseries of the mundane existence and its worthlessness, the lamentable stage of rebirth as lower animals, etc.

V.[240] lays down that a man, in this order of life, shall renounce all work excepting the study of the Vedas the giving up of which reduces him to the status of a Śūdra. With regard to begging, *V.*[241] appears to imply that he should go to seven such houses as may come on his way and not selected previously. *V.* expressly prohibits begging as a profession. *V.*[242] appears to imply that begging at the houses of Brāhmaṇas alone, is allowed. The vessels, to be carried while begging, are, according to *V i.*[243], to be made of earth, wood or pumpkin.

Food, habits and manners

He is debarred from eating fruits and leaves not falling down spontaneously from trees.

He shall wear as much of clothes as is necessary to cover his nakedness. *A.*[244] cites the opinion of 'some' who advocate nakedness. *G.*[245] refers to the view of 'some' according to which he should wear a piece of cloth, forsaken by others, after washing it[246]. *V.* appears to differ, to a great extent, from other writers in allowing a parivrājaka to wear a single piece of cloth[247]. As an alternative, it prescribes ajina or grass (?).

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240 Chap. X. 241 X. 7.
242 X. 24. 243 96. 7.
244 II. 21. 12.
245 III. 19.

246 The commentators point out that this provision is necessary for obviating the fault that may be committed by the acceptance of gifts. This, however, seems incompatible with G. III. 14 which allows such a person to beg. The conflict may, perhaps, be reconciled by taking this rule as a manner of self-mortification on the part of the person taking to pravrajyā.

247 Perhaps excluding the upper garment which is to be worn by other people.

He may either have a shaven head or keep the śikhā.[248]

The parivrājaka will have equanimity towards all creatures. *A*[249]. prescribes silence (mauna) except when studying the Vedas. According to *V*., he should avoid the following :—

> Wickedness, jealousy, pride or vanity, egotism, faithlessness, crookedness (anārjava), self-applause, censure of others, boasting, greed, delusion (moha), anger, envy.

Vi.[250] lays down that such a person should not bow down[251] to anybody.

Morals.

Although the DS. do not teach moral principles as a separate topic, yet we can have an idea of the moral outlook of their authors, and, for the matter of that, of the then society, from a critical study of the contents of these works.

From what we have said above about the life of a brahmacārin, it is clear that the formulalors of the Śāstras were quite alive to the fact that the life of the student was the foundation of the life of the man in making. In course of the rules and regulations regarding the training of a student, the authors of DS. lay great stress on the principles of morality to be inculcated into him. The chief features of the moral training of a student consist in his relation to women. He is forbidden to touch or even look at such a woman with whom his sexual intercourse may be suspected

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[248] *B*. II. 11. 20, provides for the shaving of all the hair excepting the śikhā. *V*. X. 6, advocates complete shaving of the hair.

[249] II. 21. 10.

[250] 96. 22.

[251] *Vai*. construes it to mean that, though greeted with namaskāra by others, he should not return the namaskāra, but should simply remember Nārāyaṇa. According to others, referred to in *Vai*., he should not bow down to anybody for alms.

by others.[252] Although the wife of the preceptor must be saluted after returning from abroad, yet such salutation is prohibited if she is younger than the pupil.[253] The same prohibition applies, according to *B.*, to the wife of a brother also. B. further adds that he should speak with women only as much as is necessary.[254] Besides these restrictions, the student is debarred from indulging in gambling, and falsehood on his part is strongly deprecated.

Implicit obedience to the teacher, as we have seen above, is a bounden duty of the student according to most of the authorities.

Coming to the second stage of life, we find that a gṛhastha has to perform a series of duties not only towards the members of his family, viz. the women and children, but also towards others, particularly guests.

The general position of the woman in the society was exalted no doubt, but certain passages bear testimony to the fact that lasciviousness of men, in their enjoyment of women, was not only condoned but also indirectly encouraged by the formulation of social law. For example, among the various kinds of sons, having a legal status, we find Gūḍhaja, Sahoḍha, Kānīna, etc. The description of the origin of these kinds of sons betrays very loose morals of the society.

Clear evidences of the existence of the institution of levirate, contained in the DS., testify to the fact that the moral outlook of the society was not very high, at least judging by modern standards. That men were allowed great licence, in their enjoyment of women, is sufficiently proved by such remarks as—na stṛī duṣyati jāreṇa, i.e., a woman is not defiled by a paramour.

There may be some who would try to find out a deeper significance underlying these practices; but one,

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[252] *G.* II. 22. [253] *G.* II. 41.
[254] I, 3. 24.

going through the pages of the DS. with the spirit of a historian, feels constrained to brand them as moral laxities prevalent in the society of India at a time when civilisation did not reach a high degree of refinemcnt.

4. Superstitions[255]

Preliminary remarks

The DS. contain references to certain practices, presumably prevalent in the society reflected in them, which appear to us to be based on sheer prejudice or superstitious ideas. The most prominent and interesting of them are noted below.

Classification of Superstitions

References to these practices are scattered all over the leterature. For the sake of convenience, we broadly classify them as follows :—

(1) Superstitions relating to study, (2) those connected with food, (3) those concerning sins and their expiation, (4) miscellaneous superstitions.

(1) Superstitions relating to study. The following are some of the occasions when study had to be suspended :—

> Passing of a dog, an ichneumon, a snake, a frog or cat between the teacher and his pupil, blowing of dust-carrying wind, sound of certain musical instruments, cries of dogs, jackals and asses, sight of unseasonal cloud surchaged with water, incessant downpour, falling of a thunderbolt or a meteor, eclipse and so on.

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[255] Some people, who look upon DS. with a spirit of reverence, may take exception to this word. They may argue that, though seemingly superstitious, these ideas are based on scientific principles. To assess their scientific basis, if any, is the work of specialists. It is, therefore, our concern here to note such of the practices as appear to be based on prejudice or superstitious belief according to modern outlook. (The references to Gautama in this section are taken from the Ānandāśrama ed. of this work, unless otherwise stated).

It will be seen that most of these rules are based on superstitious ideas.

An interesting rule is that the learning of the language of Mlecchas is forbidden.[256]

(2) Superstitions about food.

One should not eat, at night, anything brought by a servant (preṣya).[257]

B.[258] mentions, *inter alia*, the custom of eating with women prevalent in the southern regions. *B.*[259] says that this practice is reprehensible to the northerners. It is not clear whether *B's* strıyā saha bhojanaṃ means eating in the company of women or eating from the same vessel with them. *V.*, with the same vagueness, condemns the practice of eating with one's wife.

The leavings of the food of the preceptor are believed to cure the pupil of his disease[260].

B.[261] forbids eating on a stool or chair (āsanādi). *A.* prohiblts eating on a boat and on a palace (prāsāda)[262].

Vi.[263] forbids eating during solar and lunar eclipses.

V.[264] on the authority of the Vājasaneyins, condemns the practice of eating with one's wife. He says that such a practice results in the birth of weaklings (avīryavat) to them.

(3) Superstition concerning sins or impurities, and modes of their expiation and removal.

According to *G.*,[265] talking to Mleccha, unholy or impious persons, is supposed to taint a man with impurity which can be expiated by meditating upon pious persons.

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[256] V. VI. 4.

[257] *G.* I. 9. 57.

[258] 1. 2. 3.

[259] I. 2. 5.

[260] B. II. 1. 25.

[261] II. 6. 6.

[262] *A.* I. 17. 6, 7. This word is explained as dārumaya mañca (wooden platform) by Haradatta.

[263] 68.1.

[264] XII. 31.

[265] IX. 17-18.

Gautama further lays down that bath, with all the clothes on, removes the impurity caused by the touch of a fallen person (patita , Cāṇḍāla, a woman delivered of a child before the usual period of impurity is over), a woman in her monthly illness, Śava[266] (corpse) and of one who has touched the preceding persons, etc.

Samudra-saṁyāna is regarded as one of the sinful practices causing degradation (patana). This word has been explained by Govindasvāmin[267] as going to another island by boat.

Minor Superstitions

Besides the above, we meet with a number of other superstitious ideas and practices throughout the DS. The principal among them are noted here.

Euphemistic expressions are to be used to indicate certain objects whose real descriptions are unpleasant. A dry cow is to be referred to as dhenubhavyā and an inauspicious thing as bhadra (auspicious)[268].

Indra-dhanu should be referred to as maṇi-dhanu. A cow, feeding its calf, should not be told of to others.[269]

With shoes on, one should avoid sitting, greeting others or saluting the elders (abhivādana) and salutation of gods[270]. A person should not salute another who is carrying samit (sacrificial wood), a pitcher of water, flower or rice, nor should he allow himself to be saluted by others in these conditions[271].

The rope, with which a *vatsa* is tied, should not be crossed over[172]. *MB*. interprets vatsa as go-jātyupalakṣaṇam.

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[266] Explained by M. B. as a corpse or one who has touched it.

[267] On B. II. 2.2.

[268] *G*.

[269] *G*.

[270] *G*. I. 9. 45.

[271] B. I. 3. 32.

[272] *G*.

A.[273] prohibits the practice of counting birds remaining in a flock.

Riding a cart, drawn by asses, is prohibited by *A.*[274]

According to *Viṣṇu*[275], the performance of śrāddha should not be seen by a woman in her monthly course, dogs, pigs, village cocks (grāmakukkuṭa); but the performer of Śrāddha should carefully show it to an aja (goat).

5. ĀPAD-DHARMA

(Rules to be observed in times of distress)

General remarks

From what has been stated under Varṇāśramadharma above, it is clear that the authors of DS. fixed the duties of the different castes with great rigidity. It was considered to be a gross violation of social discipline for a member of one caste to take to the occupation of another. But the authors were not devoid of practical considerations. They took into account the exigencies of an adverse situation when it might not be possible for a person to follow his own calling. Below we collect the imformation, contained in the DS., about the rules to be observed by one in times of danger as also the restrictions imposed on the person concerned in such circumstances.

Brāhmaṇas

In times of danger, a Brāhmaṇa is allowed to study under a non-Brāhmaṇa. In such a circumstance, however, the service (śuśrūṣā) of the teacher consists merely in the pupil's following him (anugamana), and the elaborate rules of attending upon the former will not be observed by the

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[273] I. 31. 19. na patataḥ sa cakṣita. The word 'patataḥ' is taken by Haradatta to mean birds in a flock. He refers to other views according to which it means luminaries falling from the firmament.

[274] I. 32. 25.

[275] 81. 6. 9.

latter. After the completion of studies, the Brāhmaṇa pupil will be treated as the guru by the non-Brāhmaṇa teacher.

At such times, a Brāhmaṇa is allowed to carry on his usual duties of yājana (performing sacrifice for others), adhyāpana (teaching) and pratigraha (acceptance of gifts) without such caste distinction as is to be usually observed. He can perform sacrifices on behalf of members of any of the castes. Likewise, he can teach all, and from all he can accept gifts[276]. Of these three kinds of work, each preceding in the list is superior to the succeeding one, so that the inferior one should be taken to at first; and on failure of that the next one should be chosen.

If the means of livelihood, set forth above, be not possible, a Brāhmaṇa can even take to the occupation of Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas, the latter on failure of the former. But a Brāhmaṇa is debarred from dealing in unguents, oil, kṛtānna (prepared food), sesamum, hemp, flax and leather, dyed and washed cloth, milk and curd, roots, fruits, flowers, medicine, honey, flesh, grass, water and poison, beasts when there is the likelihood of their being killed, slaves, cows of the following descriptions:—barren, she-calf, one that has destroyed the foetus. *G.*[277] cites the opinion of 'some' who prohibit also *bhūmi*,[278] paddy, barley, goat, sheep, horse, bull, milch-cow and cart-drawing ox. *G.*, however, allows a Brāhmaṇa in distress to barter the following in exchange of similar things:—rasa, i.e., oil etc., beasts.

G.[279] ordains that, in times of extreme distress, a Brāhmaṇa may, in violation of the above restrictions, subsist

[276] *G.* VII. 4. As an alternative interpretation of this *sūtra*, the commentators suggest that the threefold occupation of the Brāhmaṇa can be resorted to by members of all other castes.

[277] *G.* VII. 15.

[278] Commentators explain it as gṛha (house).

[279] VII. 22.

by any means (*sarvathā*) provided, however, he does not take recourse to the occupation of a Śūdra. In the next sūtra, *G.* cites the opinion of 'some', obviously with approval, that even the occupation of a Śūdra may be adopted by a Brāhmaṇa when there is the risk of loss of life, the only restriction in this case being that he cannot eat garlic, etc. nor sit together with a Śūdra nor can his body come in contact with the Śūdras.

When there is any risk of life, a Brāhmaṇa may use arms[280] for self-protection.

B.[281] allows a Brāhmaṇa at such a time to take to the occupation of a Kṣatriya, on its failure to that of a Vaiśya, but does not impose the restrictions as described above[282].

Kṣatriyas

In times of distress, a kṣatriya can take to the occupation of a Vaiśya.

Vaiśyas and Śūdras

It is interesting to note that the authors of DS. do not show any anxiety to formulate rules to be observed by Vaiśyas and Śūdras in times of distress. Even in the case of a Kṣatriya no restrictions are imposed. These facts tend to demonstrate that the non-Brāmhaṇas, particularly the Vaiśyas and Śūdras, were at liberty to take recourse to any means of livelihood without the risk of being degraded.

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280 *G.* VII 25.

281 II. 4. 16, 19.

282 It is interesting to note that, according to *B.* II. 4. 17, Gautama does not allow a Brāhmaṇa to take to the occupation of a Kṣatriya on the ground that the latter is too difficult for the former. Curiously enough, the extant work of Gautama does not contain this prohibition—a fact that has led Govindasvāmin to suppose that another version of Gautama's work existed.

ROLE OF THE VEDIC GODS IN THE GṚHYA-SŪTRAS

By Sri Alakh Niranjan Pande

The Vedic conception of a deity

The Vedic conception of a deity is purely spiritual and philosophical and the notion that the deities were merely the representation of the natural phenomena is not consistent with the notion about the deities as held by the Vedic seers. The vedic conception of a deity as propounded by the author of the *Nirukta* is nothing but monistic. On account of the super-eminence of a deity, a single soul is praised in different ways. "महाभाग्यात् देवताया एक आत्मा बहुधा स्तूयते"[1] It is manifest from such a consideration that the basic idea of deity was that of a single entity of light or power which was utilised for certain functions and for attainment of divine ends which was far beyond the human reach to attain. It also happened that according to functions the Gods multiplied and so the author of the *Nirukta* lays down that they are original forms of each other. They are produced from each other "एकस्यात्मनोऽन्ये देवाः प्रत्यङ्गानि भवन्ति", "इतरेतरजन्मानो भवन्तीतरेतरप्रकृतयः" They are 'कर्मजन्मानः' and they are 'आत्मजन्मानः' The author of the *Bṛhaddevatā* is also of opinion that the conception of a god is through and through monistic and the different gods originated from Agni alone and all the gods, really speaking have come into being from a single soul.

पृथक् पुरस्ताद्यें तूक्ता लोकादिपतयस्त्रयः[2] ।
तेषामात्मैव तत्सर्वं यद्यद्भक्तिः (प्रकीर्यंते) ।
रसान् रश्मिभिरादाय वायुनाऽभ्रं गतः सह ।
वर्षंत्येव च यल्लोके तेनेन्द्र इति स्मृतः ।

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[1] *Nirukta*, 7.4. 9—11.

[2] *Bṛhaddevatā* 1.73. 68.

The above words of the author of the *Bṛahaddevtā* apparently show that the idea of a deity was necessarily monistic and one and the same god could be called by a different name only as his functions changed. The following lines show the powers of Vedic gods as they take part in the daily rites of the Hindus. The great authors of the Gṛhyasūtras were fully conversant with the powers of these gods and invoked them according to their powers in different functions. Thus the functional division of gods in the Gṛhyasūtras is of a thoroughly spiritualised and specialised nature. We have tried to show in the following lines such a functional division of gods.

In spite of the fact that the Gṛhyasūtras have added some more gods to the list, they still maintain and lay emphasis only upon the thirty three gods of the Vedic pantheon. During the course of the Agrahāyaṇī ceremony the Yajamāna utters a significant mantra: "May the three times eleven gods, the thirty three, the gracious ones whose purohita is Bṛhaspati, on the impulse of god Savitṛ, may the gods with all the gods offer me bliss"[3].

The mantra clearly indicates that all the thirty three gods of the Vedic pantheon along with certain other gods formed part of worship and invocation in the age of the sūtras.

The Ṛgvedic conception that the gods occupied the three regions viz the earth, the air and the heaven, was also established in the minds of the people. During the Upanayana ceremony the teacher murmurs in right ear of the boy "Stand fast in Agni and on the Earth, in Vāyu and in the Air, in Sūrya and in Heaven"[4]. Again, during the Śrāddha ceremony the following is uttered which testifies the same view: "The Earth is steady, Agni is its surveyor, the Air is steady, Vāyu is its surveyor, the Heaven is steady, Āditya is its surveyor"[5].

[3] *Hir.*, 2.8.17.4. [4] *Hir.*, 1.2.6.3. [5] *Hir.*, 2.4.11.4.

The delineation of gods according to their functions

Agni

The author of the *Nirukta* has to say the following about Agni, "अग्निः कस्मात् । अग्रणीर्भवति । अग्रं यज्ञेषु प्रणीयते । अङ्गं नयति सन्नममानः । त्रिभ्य आख्यातेभ्यो जायत इति शाकपूणिः । इताद्अक्ताद्दग्धात् वा नीतात् । स खल्वेतेरकारमादत्ते । गकारमनक्तेर्वा दहतेर्वा नीपरः ।" From what root is Agni derived? He is the greatest leader. He is led first in sacrifices. Śākapūṇī says, "It is derived from three verbs from going, from shining, from burning and from leading. He indeed takes the letter अ from the root इ to go, the letter ग from the root añj, to shine, or from दह् to burn, with the root नी to lead as the last member.[6]

The foremost deity in the entire range of Gṛhya rites is Agni. No ceremony could be possible without its being ceremoniously kindled and oblations being offered to it. Every householder kept the sacred Gṛhya fires alive and offerings were made to them both by himself and his wife twice or thrice a day. Agni as viewed in the Gṛhyasūtras is the great symbol of physical power, capable of granting longevity and source of prosperity and happiness to the worshipper. It is of holy lustre for which the people so often invoke it with emotion. It is the chief god to make the people grow. So the mantra in Upanayana shows that Agni, as the foremost leader, is thought to be the source of all-round prosperity and giver of energy and power: "This fuel is thyself Jātavedas. Thereby thou shalt be inflamed and grow. Inflame us and make us grow; through offspring, cattle, holy lustre and through the enjoyment of food make us grow"[7].

Agni is deemed to be the source of all impulse, energy, intelligence, wisdom and divine effulgence. The student, before beginning his Vedic studies, makes oblations to

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[6] *Nir.*, 7.4. [7] *Hir.*, 1.1.2.18.

Agni with the words :—"To Agni, I have brought a piece of wood, to the great Jātavedas."

Agni is also thought to be responsible for the protection of human life and a deity capable of prolonging the span of life because it is ever saturated with ghee which is efficacious for longevity. Thus, the prayer used for Agni in Upanayana, shows its miraculous power to grant a long life as it is ever offered with plenty of ghee :—

"Life-giving O god, choosing long life, thou whose face is full of ghee, whose back is full of ghee, the noble ambrosia that comes from the cow, lead this boy to old age as a father leads a son[8]". In the same ceremony the teacher looks at the boy while he is eating and utters "Him Agni, lead to long life and splendour." Further seizing the right hand of the boy together with his thumb he says, "Agni is long lived. May Agni bestow on thee long life everywhere." This is why Agni is called the lord of food which preserves life.

Agni is very often believed to be the standard of immortality and an assurance against short life as in the following mantra :—

"Myself has returned, my life has returned, design has returned to me, Agni grown strong with his rays; may he dwell in my mind, the standard of immortality[9]."

The Ṛg-Vedic conception of Agni as the carrier of oblations to gods and a witness of human activities and a giver of medicine is to be traced in the following mantra to Agni in daily offering :—

"Thou whom we have set to work, Jātavedas, carry forward our offering. Agni, perceive this work as it is performed by us. Thou art a healer, a creator of medicines, etc[10]." So the Agni is taken to be the lord of vows and

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[8] *Hir.*, 1.1.3.11. [9] *Hir.*. 1.5.17.4.

[10] *Hir.*, 1.1.2.18.

the student takes oath before it, "Lord of vows, I will keep my vows[11]."

The worshipper of Agni ever kept his favourite deity in his mind as he started in his struggle in life or whenever he happened to have a presentiment of certain evil approaching him. Thus for success in the assembly hall, "For me Agni and Indra accomplished my divine aim." Reciting this verse he looked at the assembly and turned towards it. And also whenever there was a cry of a she-wolf or an owl, Agni was prayed to avert the evil because in the Vedas it has been referred to as a killer of demons.

Agni, then, is the god responsible for the protection of cows. When the cows leave for the pasture, the following formula is said, "May Indra and Agni make you go[12]."

INDRA

"Indra" says the author of the *Nirukta* "is so designated because he distributes food (इरा + दृ) or he offers food (इरा + दा) or he keeps food or he sends food (इरा + दारय) or he holds food (इरा + धारय) or he runs for Soma (इन्दु + द्रु) or he pleases himself with Soma or he brightens (creatures by producing food and bestowing it)....or the word is rooted in इन्द्, to be powerful[13]".

Next to Agni is the importance of Indra in the Gṛhya-sūtras. Sometimes Indra gets a similar attitude as Agni, but the physical strength of Indra is more emphasised than that of Agni. Indra was the god who received daily oblations just as Agni did.

Just like Agni, Indra is also invoked for imparting intelligence, wisdom, vigour, splendour, and intellectual strength. In the Upanayana ceremony a brāhmaṇa invokes

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[11] *Hir.*, 1.2.7.21.

[12] *Āśv.*, 2.10..; *Śāṅkh*, 3.9.; *Gov.* 3.6.

[13] *Nir.* 10.8.

him for learning, a kṣhatriya for glory and a vaiśya for wealth. In the same ceremony the teacher looks at the boy as he is eating and repeats the words, "In every pursuit we invoke thee, Indra." Then approaching the acolyte he says, "Intelligence may Indra give thee". Before the student goes for alms, Indra is invoked for insight and the guest eats his madhuparka praying to Indra to offer him vigour.

As he was a weilder of thunderbolt, Indra was believed to destroy every thing evil with his invincible weapon. So the snātaka while holding his staff imagines that the staff that he holds is nothing but Indra's thunderbolt.

Indra had a great part to play in the family welfare. He was adored at the marriage ceremony for progeny and happy conjugal life and was also deemed to cause fertility even in a sterile woman. On the occasion of Garbhādhāna, Indra is requested to remove any sterility if it effected the woman at all, with the words, "Indra has laid down in the tree the embryo of the sterile cow, and the cow that permanently produces. Thereby become thou pregnant[14]."

The people believed that Indra could offer mental peace because of his invincible power to kill enemies and demons and to bring about the victory of worshipper in various spheres of activity. Along with Agni he is prayed for success in the assembly hall[15]. When pupils, companions or servants ran away they were to be rebuked with the mantra, "May the rebuke of Indra always rebuke you ......May Indra bind you with his bond and may he drive you back again." So Indra was thought to be a god who could work in the truant minds and bring them on the right path. Indra as a searcher of lost things as cows and waters from the hands of Paṇis and Vṛtra are well known events in the *Ṛg-veda* also. Again when a wife had a paramour then also

[14] *Hir.* 1—7 ; 25. 1.

[15] *Hir.*, 1.5.16.

with necessary ceremony Indra was invoked to drive away the paramour and create love in the husband for the wife. At the ominious cry of a jackal, Indra was invoked along with Agni to avert the impending evil. Again, in the building of a house the householder could not do without the help of the paramount powers of the Indra to protect his house from rain, storm, the evil eyes of the demons and worldly enemies. He is called by the name of the Mahendra[16] and Śacīpati[17] and is prayed at the time of house building ceremony along with Vāstoṣpati, Soma, Yama, Varuṇa and others.

VARUṆA

Nirukta[18] derives Varuṇa as, "वरुणो वृणोतीति सतः ". Varuṇa is so named as he covers all. Varuṇa, the all-perceiving deity of the vedic pantheon, from whose punishment no one could escape and to whom Vaśiṣṭha has addressed a memorable hymn, occupies a secondary position not only to Indra and Agni but also to other gods as Rudra, Sāvitrī and Prajāpati.

As in the Vedic pantheon, in the Gṛhya-sūtras also Varuṇa is very often associated with Mitra and their joint effort is sought for the attainment of certain ends. Thus, at the birth of a child both Varuṇa and Mitra are invoked for the production of intelligence. Again at the Pṛṣṭātaka ceremony which is sacred to Rudra and which is performed for the well being of the cows, the very first oblation is offered to Mitra and Varuṇa[19]. Varuṇa is the deity invoked at the Puṁsavana ceremony at the time when the Nyagrodha with fruits on both sides is bought[20]. It is so because Nyagrodha was believed to be sacred to Varuṇa as in the house building ceremony it is clearly laid down

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16 *Gobh.*, 4.7.41. 17 *Hir.*, 1.8.28. 18 *Nirukta*, 10. 4.

19 *Gobh.*, 3.8.; *Khad.*, 3.3.; *Sāṅkh.*, 4.1.

20 *Gobh.*, 2.6.

that Nyagrodha is the tree sacred to Varuṇa and a house built of it brings oppression to the owner through hostile arms[21]. Varuṇa's house as described in the *Ṛg-veda* has thousand doors and thousand columns; so he is the fittest god to be propitiated at the time of house building or entering a new house[22].

Varuṇa, the great moral governor of the universe, who directs all the beings on the standard of right conduct, is again remembered by the guru at the Upanayana ceremony when he seizes the right hand of the boy with the words "Varuṇa has seized thy hand," so as to lead him on the lines of right conduct.

The idea of the *Ṛg-veda* that Varuṇa keeps the sinners under his fetters has very often been repeated in the various Gṛhya ceremonials. Thus, at the time of leaving his guru the student takes the upper garment that he put on in his student life and prays to Varuṇa, "Loosen from us thy highest band, Varuṇa[23]." It is only by way of forgiveness for the sins that he might have inadvertently committed in his student life. So it is the proper time to invoke Varuṇa, the great forgiver, to the suppliants when the student has to enter the threshold of life. Again, at the time of putting off the girdle at this hour, he remembers Varuṇa with the words, "Loosen the highest fetter, O Varuṇa."

Varuṇa, then, is the god deemed to bring about prosperity to animals. So at the ceremony by which the thriving of horses is desired, Varuṇa is invoked and worshipped along with Agni, Pūṣan, and Indra.

As Varuṇa is all perceiving and keeps a note of the future evils, so he is particularly invoked when portents appear. Thus, if a dove sits down on the hearth, or the bees make honey in the house, or the cow suckles the calf of some other cow or a post puts forth shoots, or an ant-

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[21] *Gobh.*, 2.6. & 4.7.23. [22] *Gobh.*, 4.7; *Hir.* 1.8.1.
[23] *Hir.*, 1.3.9.

hill rises in the house, then Varuṇa is adored to avert the evil or misfortune that might lie in store due to these ominous presentations[24]. Again, in the marriage ceremony[25], Varuṇa is particularly invoked to remove all evils, so that the wife may not face the opportunity to weep over the distress caused by sons. "May king Varuṇa grant that this wife may not weep over distress through her sons." Varuṇa as the moral guardian of humanity must grant proper conduct to sons. Varuṇa is expatiated again, on the occasion of Sīmantonnayana ceremony so that the offspring may be moral, long-lived and lucky. So at the childbirth Varuṇa is prayed to free the child from his fetters, meaning thereby to please Varuṇa to set the boy free from the sufferings of previous sins so that the newcomer may live happily in the present birth leading a moral and virtuous life.

Aśvins

The writer of the *Nirukta* says the following regarding Aśvins :—

"अश्विनौ अश्विनौ यद्व्यश्नुवाते सर्वं रसेनान्यो ज्योतिषान्यः। अश्वैरश्विनावित्यौर्णवाभः। तत्कावाश्विनौ। द्यावापृथिव्यावित्येके। अहोरात्रावित्येके। सूर्याचन्द्रमसावित्येके। राजानौ पुण्यकृतावित्यैतिहासिकाः ।"

"The Aśvins are so named because they two pervade all, one with moisture and the other with light. Aurṇanābha says that they are called Aśvins due to their having horses. According to some, they are the heaven and the earth. According to others they are the day and the night. Some think them to be the sun and the moon; while the historians call them to be two virtuous kings[26]."

The two Aśvins as they appear in the Gṛhya-sūtras seem to have lost their great importance that they once held in the early vedic age. Here they exist merely as gods helpful to humanity through their extraordinary power.

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[24] *Hir.*, 1.5.17. [25] *Hir.*, 1.6.19.

[26] *Nir.*, 12.1.

They represent the ideal of physical power and their capability to help and protect is often referred to in emphatic terms. Thus, on the occasion of Upanayana, the teacher seizing the right hand of the boy along with his thumb utters these words, "By the impulse of god Savitṛ, *with the arms of two Aśvins*, with Pūṣan's hand I seize thy hand"[27].

Aśvins have been often represented as being wreathed with lotus. During the course of Upanayana ceremony the Ācārya approaching the mouth of the boy murmurs a prayer to Aśvins to grant intelligence to him, perhaps because of the fact that the great Aśvins of the vedic pantheon had been once famous for their medical knowledge. As the two Aśvins are famous charioteers, so on the occasion of ascending the chariot they are invoked with, "May this your chariot, O Aśvins, not suffer damage either in pain or in joy. May it make its way without damage dispersing those who damage us[28]."

The indication of Aśvins being the gods who promoted health and happiness, is apparent from the fact that they are particularly invoked for the protection of cows for milk and women's breast. Thus, at the time of marriage Hiraṇyakesin prescribes an invocation to Aśvins for the protection of woman's breast and in the same Gṛhyasūtra the Aśvins are prayed for the protection of cows. It was generally held that embryo in females is produced by Aśvins with their golden stick because in garbhādhāna the mantra says, "The embryo which the two Aśvins produce with their golden kindling sticks; that embryo we call into your womb, that those may give birth to it after ten months[29]."

Thus, we note that the Aśvins represent powers who help and protect, who destroy evils, and who grant protection to cows and the female sex.

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[27] *Gobb.*, 2.10.26.
[28] *Hir.*, 1. 4. 2.
[29] *Hir.*, 1, 7. 25. 1.

RUDRA

"Rudra", the author of the *Nirukta* holds, "is so called as he roars (रौति) or because he runs (द्रवति) making a violent outcry." 'रुद्रः रौतीति सतः, रोरूयमाणो द्रवतीति वा रोदयतेर्वा' ।[30]

Rudra, the malignant mighty deity of the *Ṛg-veda* gifted with healing powers is chiefly invoked for the well-being of the cattle in the Gṛhya-sūtras, though in daily offerings and certain other ceremonies he has a special place.

The Pṛśātaka and Śūlagava ceremmnies are particularly meant to propitiate Rudra. Pṛśātaka is performed for the well-being of cows where a mess of boiled rice and grains with milk sacred to Rudra is prepared on the full-moon day of the month of Aśvayuga. The Śūlagava is performed to adore Rudra to avert plague on cows. In this ceremony Rudra is invoked to come on his swift white horses that are as quick as thought. Here we have only the benevolent nature of Rudra. But in a later mantra we note his malignant and fierce nature as well; because then he is addressed with epithets as, Ugra, Bhīma, Rudra and later on, he is associated with wrath.[31] From this it is evident that the fierce qualities of Rudra are also well known to the people. Such an idea is all the more confirmed when we see that in the *Gobhila Gṛhya-sūtra*, Rudra is classed with Rākṣas and Asuras in connection with sacrifices procuring happiness. The physical features of Rudra are made clear when he is propitiated to crush down an adversary with the mantra, "Rudra with the dark hair lock, hero at every contest, strike down this my adversary as a tree by a thunderbolt[32]". Then Rudra is again addressed for success in trade, when some new business had to be commenced. On the occasion of Puṁsavana, Rudra is also invoked at the time of buying the nyagrodha in the *Gobhila Gṛhya-sūtra*.

[30] *Nir.*, 10. 5. [31] *Hir.*, 2.3 . 8. 5-7. [32] *Hir.*, 1. 5. 16

It must have been clear from the above that Rudra had a very important place in the popular faith of those days. Thus, if a fruit unexpectedly fell over a person, the *Hiraṇyakeśin-Gṛhya-Sūtra* has an elaborate adoration to Rudra as a great benefactor. In this context the vedic conception of Rudra being armed with an arrow also becomes clear. Here, Rudra is said to live on roads, among cattle, among serpents, in the air, in the waters, and all beautiful places including sacrificial sites and even a big tree. Here, we get a clue into the all-pervasive nature of Rudra.

The spit-ox ceremony of the *Āśvalāyana* clearly indicates that Rudra was believed to be a malignant deity and the animal sacrifice to Rudra is performed merely to satiate him. The worship of Rudra in this *Gṛhya-Sūtra* unfolds Rudra to be a god, armed with arrows and having his hosts in all the quarters. The mantras as, "What shall we do Rudra", "These prayers to Rudra, To thee, O Father, These songs to Rudra with the strong bow," are significant. The worship of all the quarters of the horizon at all sacrifices to Rudra means that Rudra and his hosts pervaded all the quarters. In this *Gṛhya-Sūtra* we get the following synonyms of Rudra's names—"To Hara, Mṛḍa, Śarva, Śiva, Mahādeva, Ugra, Bhīma, Paśupati, Rudra, Śaṅkara, Iśāna."[33] The *Khadira-Gṛhya-Sūtra*[34] also deems Rudra to be the lord of the cattle and thus prays Rudra, "Thou who art the lord of cattle, who walkest with the line of cattle, Rudra, the manly one, do no harm to our cattle; let this be offered to thee."

Thus, Rudra has been viewed both as a malignant and a benevolent deity in the Gṛhya-Sūtras. He is a god with a fierce out-look and keeps his hosts posted in all the quarters. He is the lord of cattle and possesses wonderful power to protect them.

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[33] *Āśv.*, 4. 8. 19—24.

[34] 2. 1. 26.

Viṣṇu

The *Nirukta* explains Viṣṇu as one who pervades (विषितः). Viṣṇu is derived from the root विश् to pervade or from व्यश् to interpenetrate[35].

In the *Gṛhya-sūtras* the place of Viṣṇu is not so important as Agni, Indra, Prajāpati or Soma. He is invoked comparatively in few ceremonies but is an important deity of family life. Thus, in marriage in the Saptapadī ceremony Viṣṇu is the chief god to be invoked because even from the days of the *Ṛg-veda* the three steps of Viṣṇu had been known to be for the good of humanity and for the creatures of the universe. Again, at the Garbhādhāna the husband touches the secret part of the wife and utters, "May Viṣṇu make thy womb ready." In the nuptials the husband has to utter, May Viṣṇu take care of thy womb.[36] "Thus the idea of Viṣṇu as a great protector from the evil beings still persists for in the *Ṛg-veda* Viṣṇu has been represented to kill the demons with his friend Indra".[37] That is why he has been called as the lord of beings. (Śrāvaṇā ceremony).[38]

Viṣṇu is the god deemed to bless the boy in the tonsure ceremony and lest the razor may injure him, Viṣṇu is invoked with his weapon with the words, "Viṣṇu's tusks art thou." In the daily sacrifices though Viṣṇu has a subordinate position yet he seems to be the guardian head of the sacrifice because if any thing is said or done unworthy of sacrifice, Viṣṇu was the god adored.

Thus, Viṣṇu was believed to be an important god of domestic welfare and perhaps the presiding deity of the sacrifice.

Prajāpati

Prajāpati as the *Niruktakāra* holds is the supporter and protector of beings (प्रजापतिः प्रजानां पाता पालयिता वा ।)[39]

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[35] *Nir.*, 12. 18. [36] *Sāṅkh.* 1. 24. [37] *Macdonell, Hymns.* Page 34.
[38] *Hir.*, 2. 6. 16. 4. [39] *Nir.*, 10. 43.

The conception of Prajāpati comes in the later Vedic period when he is taken to be the creator of gods[40] from upward breathing of his mouth[41]. This along with the story in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[42] that it was Prajāpati who awarded immortality to the gods, is at the root of the *Gṛhya-sūtra* conception of this deity. So long life, immortality, offspring and wealth in cattle were the principal objectives for which Prajāpati is invoked in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*. He is adored in Jātakarman ceremonies to confer long life on the son. As referred to in the house-building ceremony of *Gobhila*[43], udumbara is the wood sacred to Prajāpati. So at the Cūḍākaraṇa ceremony the handle of the razor is made of udumbara wood. One desirous of thriving in cattle was directed to make marks on the newly born calf with a sword of udumbara wood. Again, at the tonsure the cut-off hair is buried near an udumbara tree. All these details in ceremonials evidently show that Prajāpati was deemed to be a great preserver and multiplier of progeny both in cattle and in human beings. As a matter of fact this was also the real significance of his name in the religious history of the past. This is also the motive with which a student is put in charge of Prajāpati in the Upanayana ceremony[44].

The Aṣṭakā, a festival sacred to the night for bringing prosperity, is also consecrated to Prājapati along with the manes. It shows the importance of Prajāpati as the divine father who if duly adored is sure to award prosperity as the manes are wont to do[45]. The Śrāvaṇā ceremony is meant to avert fear from the serpents, and Prajāpati is invoked[46] along with Śrāvaṇā, Viṣṇu, Agni, and Viśvedevas. It is merely

[40] *Mait.*, 4. 14. 1. devānām pita
[41] Śatapatha., 11. 1. 6. 7.
[42] 10. 4. 3. 3-4, 6-8.
[43] 4. 7. 24.
[44] *Gobh.*, 2. 10. 31., *Hir.*, 1. 1.3. 7
[45] *Gobh.*, 3. 10. 3.
[46] *Gobh.*, 3. 7. 19.

to show that Prajāpati as the creator of both the gods and demons[47] is sure to avert fear from serpents.

Prajāpati as the most benign father of the beings is also invoked when the Snātaka puts on his umbrella[48]. It clearly shows that Prajāpati of both the human beings and the cattle was always remembered for protection against their enemies. There is to be traced a fatherly devotion to Prajāpati in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*.

PŪṢAN

Pūṣan is believed to be the lord of the path. In the *Āśvalāyana-Gṛhya-sūtra*[49], the newly married bride mounts the chariots with the words, "May Pūṣan lead thee from here holding thy hand." If one goes for a business, Pūṣan was to be remembered for a safe journey. If the lost thing is to be found or if one has strayed, Pūṣan is prayed "Bring us together, Pūṣan with a knowing one." If a long and dangerous road was to be traversed a prayer to Pūṣan was made "Journey over the ways Pūṣan[50]".

Pūṣan, as depicted in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*, is both a pastoral and domestic god. Along with Agni, Vāyu, Aryaman, and Soma etc., Pūṣan is also invoked in the marriage ceremony either at the oblation of the fried grain (*Gobh*) or after the bridegroom has made the bride turn from left to right so that she faces west and recites over her, "Thus, Pūṣan, lead her to us, the highly blessed one etc[51]." The *Sāṅkhāyana-Gṛhya-sūtra* has invocation for Pūṣan both in marriage and the fourth day ceremony after marriage. It clearly shows the power of Pūṣan as a god ensuring conjugal happiness and marital success. The belief that Pūṣan is the great preserver of life even of gods is apparent from the tonsure ceremony when the left side of the child's head is shaved with the mantra, "The razor with which

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[47] *Śatapatha*, 1. 2. 4. 8. [48] *Hir.*, 1. 3. 10. 11.
[49] 1. 8. 1. [50] *Āśv.*, 3. 8-10. [51] *Hir.*, 1. 6. 20. 2.

Pūṣan has shaven the head of Bṛhaspati, of Agni, of Indra, for the sake of long life with that I shave thy head[52]." In the same context when the cut-off hair is buried in a cow-house, or near an udumbara tree, or in a clump of Darbha grass, Pūṣan is invoked with other gods to keep the hair safe in heaven and earth.

Pūṣan, as the principal domestic god, is naturally prayed for the growth of kindred. Thus, in the daily oblation Pūṣan gets offerings with the following mantra, "Pūṣan is rich in kindred, let him make me rich in kindred by the father, the mother, the brothers of....[53]".

We also get a glimpse of the bountiful strong hands of Pūṣan in the Upanayana ceremony when the teacher with his right hand touches the right hand of the boy along with his thumb and says, "....with Pūṣan's hand touch thy hand[54]."

Pūṣan is the favourite pastoral god of the Vedas. As in the *Ṛg-veda* (6-54-5) in the *Gṛhya-sūtras* also Pūṣan is believed to be a god responsible for the prosperity of the cattle and their safe return if they go astray. Thus, at the cow sacrifice through which a thriving condition among the cows is gained and also at the horse sacrifice[55] boiled rice grain with milk is offered to Pūsan. And when the cows go out to the pasture ground the following invocation is made to Pūṣan along with Agni, Aśvins, and Prajāpati, "May Pūṣan drive you back again. May Pūṣan go after our cows."

Bṛhaspati

According to the author of the *Nirukta*, Bṛhaspati is the protector and supporter of the universe. Bṛhaspati,[56] "the sage of the sages", "supreme lord", the "controller"

[52] *Hir.*, 2. 1. 5. 11.
[53] Sā kh., 1. 9. 9.
[54] *Gobh.*, 2. 10. 26.
[55] *Gobh.*, 2. 7. 10. 13.
[56] *Nir.*, 10. 11.

and also sometimes called the generator of the hymns of the *Ṛg-veda*, occupies no lesser position in the realm of the *Gṛhya-sūtras*. As a matter of fact he is the chief god of instruction in the Gṛhya-sūtras. He is a deity who directs the child to moral and intellectual ends. The warlike qualities of Bṛhaspati which are so characteristic of him in the *Ṛgveda*[57] do not appear in the *Gṛhya-sūtras* merely because wars in this age had become the events of the past and did not come in the forefront of the people's mind. In fact the chivalrous qualities of even the most heroic gods seem to be fading away in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*.

Naturally enough, Bṛhaspati comes in the Upanayana ceremony just when the boy has taken off his old garments and the preceptor has made him put on a new one that has not yet been washed, the following mantra is uttered, "Dress him with this garment, let him attain the age of hundred years; extend his life. Bṛahaspati has given the garment to king Soma that he may put it on[58]." Again, while leading the boy to spiritual ends of life by seizing his right hand together with the thumb, the teacher addresses all important gods including Bṛhaspati who is requested to seize the right hand of the boy so that he may ever tread on the path of right conduct in life[59].

The conception about Bṛhaspatı as the guru of gods is evident when the teacher instructs the boy with the important duties of student life[60]. And while laying his hands with fingers upwards on the student's heart, he utters, "Under my will I take thy heart; my mind shall thy mind follow; in my word thou shalt rejoice with all thy heart; may Bṛhaspati join thee to me[61]." It is significant to be noted here that the teacher announces here his duty to instruct

[57] 2. 24. 3. 14.

[58] *Hir*,., 1. 1. 4. 2.; *Pār*. 1. 4. 13. 12.

[59] *Hir*., 1. 2. 5. 10., *Sāṅkh*., 2. 3. 1.

[60] *Hir*., 1. 2. 5. 10.

[61] *Sāṅkh*., 2. 4. 1.

only after understanding the mind of the child and make him happy by his lessons full of affection and amusement so that the matter taught may go home to the pupil's heart. Peculiarly enough such a view in education is the pivot on which the entire structure of present-day education built by the great educational theorists as Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Herbart, Dewey and others, rests. So Bṛhaspati was the distinguished intellectual inspirer to all those people of that age who had devoted themselves in the service of education. Such a belief about Bṛhaspati as a sublime moral elevator hints at the following mantra of the *Ṛgveda* which shows that the worshipers of Bṛhaspati attained great moral superiority over their fellows :—"The godly shall subdue the godless, the worshipper shall share the meal of one who worships not[62]."

Bṛhaspati, as viewed in the *Ṛgveda* is a 'leader of riches' possesser of wealth, increaser of store[63], a good protector and a kind prosperer[64]. Keeping this in view the following mantra of the *Atharvaveda* is generally quoted for success and prosperity in trade. The mantra has an invocation to Bṛhaspati as well : "If we trade, Oh gods, may Soma, Agni, Indra, Bṛhaspati and Īśāna bestow splendour[65]."

Bṛhāspati has also been represented as the lord of cattle and the preparer of paths[66]. He was the famous rescuer of cows from the hands of Vāla[67]. The idea is carried forward in the *Gṛhya-sūtras* when the cows leave for the meadows, "May Indra and Agni make you go. May the two Aśvins protect you, Bṛhaspati is your herdsman[68]. As the god is helpful in removing difficulties and capable of prolonging

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[62] 2. 26. 1. [63] 1. 18. 2. [64] 2. 23. 5.
[65] *Gobh.*, 4. 8. 19.; *Hir.*, 1. 4. 15. 1.; *Atharvaveda.*, 3. 15. 5.
[66] *Ṛg.-veda.*, 10. 67-8.; 2. 23. 6.
[67] *Ṛg.*, 2. 24. 3. 14.
[68] *Hir.*, 1. 5. 18. 1.

life and granting other rewards[69] so in the marriage ceremony he is invoked to bless the wife with the protection of her sons[70]. And the cut-off hair in the tonsure is kept under the custody of Bṛhaspati.

SOMA

Soma, "the lord of the strengthening food" who is pictured in the Vedas as swimming in water and roaring in the woods, dear to devas and father of the earth and heaven[71] is an important god of the *Gṛhya-sūtras* also, because no daily offering could be made without an oblation of a mess of cooked rice to him. The *Ṛg-veda* also designates him as the soul of the sacrifice—ātmā yajñasya[72].

As in the *Ṛgveda*, here also Soma is called the king of beings and is prayed wherever splendour, stability and glory is wished for. Thus at the opening ceremony of the annual term of Vedic study along with the chorus of Sāvitrī and its sāman melodies "King Soma" is invoked[73]. In the Puṁsavana on the occasion of purchasing the Nyagrodha shoot Soma is addressed, "If thou belongest to Soma I buy thee for Soma[74]." At the Śrāvaṇā ceremony, to the north of fire a bunch of darbha grass with roots is placed and Soma is addressed, "Soma the king and the agreement which you have made."[75]

The snātaka besprinkles the pair of new garments brought to him and puts on the under-garment saying, "Thou art Soma's body, protect my body." Similarly[76], Soma is never left out when success in trade is wished for[77]. Soma, on occasions, is represented to have many wives. In daily sacrifice the worshipper prays him to grant many

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[69] *Ṛg.* 7. 97. 2. 4.

[70] *Sāṅkh.*, 1. 11. 5.; *Hir.*, 1. 6. 19. 7.

[71] *Ṛg.*, 9. 90. 1.

[72] 9. 2. 10; 6. 8.

[73] *Gobh.*, 3. 3. 4.

[74] *Gobh.*, 2. 6. 7.

[75] *Gobh.*, 3. 7. 21.

[76] *Hir.*, 1. 3. 10. 5.

[77] *Hir.*, 1. 4. 15. 1.

wives. "Soma is rich in wives, may he make me rich in wives[78]." As Soma had many wives, an invocation to him was necessary in the marriage ceremony, in order to have conjugal felicity. It was a belief that he was the first to have the wife, as is clear from the following mantra, "Soma acquired thee first, after that Gandharva has acquired."[79] Keeping in accord with this conclusion is the charm set by the wife to bring the husband into subjection when the wife in the *Āpastamba Gṛhya-sūtra*[80] while sowing barley grains around the plant, clypea hemerdifolia, utters the following mantra, "If you belong to Soma, I redeem you from him." But Soma is never to be forgotten when the Fathers are to be satiated. He is a friend to the Manes. After the rites up to the Vyāhṛti oblations are completed, the worshipper with sacrificial chord over the left shoulder, transfers it over the right and sacrifices, "To Soma, with fathers, Svadhā[81]."

In the house building ceremony Soma is addressed as Indu and is prayed for wealth in cows and horses and a residence free from decay. "O Indu, Make our wealth increase in cows and horses. Free from decay may we live in thy friendship, give us thy favour as a father to his son[82]."

Thus, Soma is one of the major gods of the *Gṛhya-sūtras* and represents the source of splendour, strength, stability and conjugal well-being.

Savitṛ

The author of the *Nirukta* calls this god as ""सविता सर्वस्य प्रसविता।"" Savitṛ is the stimulator of all[83]. Savitṛ, the golden god of the Vedas, has an important part to play in the *Gṛhyasūtras*. As the very name suggests he is to be called

[78] *Sāṅkh.*, 1. 9. 9. [79] *Hir.*, 1. 6. 20. 2. [80] 3. 9. 5.
[81] *Hir.*, 2. 4. 10. 7.; *Sāṅkh*, 3, 13. 5.
[82] *Hir.*, 1.8. 28. 1. [83] *Nir.*, 10. 31.

"stimulator" and is believed to be the most impulsive of all the gods. Just like Agni he is deemed to be full of splendour and a prayer to him means the gift of divine effulgence and stimulation for the attainment of both heavenly and material ends.

Thus, in the daily sacrifice, after wood is placed on the sacred fire, and the ground around is swept, the worshipper bends down his right knee and pours out to the south of the fire his handful of water with the words, "Aditi, give thy consent." Then he sprinkles water around the fire once or twice so as to keep his right side turned towards it, with the words, "God Savitṛ, give thy impluse[84]." Again, in the Upanayana the teacher seizes the right hand of the boy with the mantra, "by the impulse of god Savitṛ, I seize thy hand." And then having touched from behind his left hand the left shoulder of the boy, "I give thee in charge of god Savitṛ"; because it is Savitṛ alone who could train the boy on the ways of right conduct and bestow him adequate energy and stimulation to gain moral and intellectual ends[85].

As Savitṛ is capable of granting stimulus to studies, at the three nights after Upanayana, a mess of boiled rice grains is offered to Savitṛ; so that the god may inspire and the pupil may apply all his mind to his vedic studies, that are soon to follow.

The day sacred to Savitṛ is under the Hasta constellation. On this day the annual term of vedic study is commenced with appropriate rites. Again, while being engaged in vedic study if the mind of the boy is distracted by some disturbing dream, Savitṛ is invoked so that the diversion from the sacred study may be removed and usual attention may be restored[86]. In the *Hiraṇyakesin Gṛhya-sūtra* the teacher causes the boy to say, "I have come here

[84] *Gobh.*, 1. 3. 4. [85] *Gobh.*, 2. 10. 32.
[86] *Gobh.*, 3. 3. 32.

to be a student, initiate me. I will be a student impelled by god Savitṛ." Again, the teacher while accepting the name of the pupil says," Happily god Savitṛ, may I obtain the goal with this Matṛdatta". Thus Savitṛ is a stimulator and giver of energy both to the teacher and the taught to reach their respective ends[87]. Then the teacher seizing the right hand of the boy says, " Savitṛ has seized thy hand, may Savitṛ protect thee."

Thus, the attainment of educational end is the important feature of Savitṛ worship but some *Gṛhya-sūtras* prescribe invocation for him at the time of marriage also in order to bless the sons with protection.

Then, Savitṛ is one of the important gods to be invoked at the time of tonsure ceremony. Here the razor cannot stop until Savitṛ has not blessed for glory and vigour so that the future may be brightened by divine splendour as a result of tonsure. The hind portion of the head is shaved with the mantra, "The razor with which the wise Savitṛ has shaven the king Soma and Varuṇa with that ye brāhmaṇas shave his head[88]."

The prayer for stimulation at the aṣṭakā ceremony is also noteworthy. On the day before the Aṣṭakas under the Anurādhās in the afternoon the wood is put on fire and darbha grass pointing to the south and east are strewn round it. Then rice is turned out of for shallow cups each having a purifier. On that occasion the following mantra is uttered forth "Impelled by god Savitṛ I turn out this cake prepared, out of four cups which may drive away all suffering from the fathers, in the other world. On the impulse of god Savitṛ I turn thee out agreeable to the fathers, to the grand-fathers, to the great-grand-fathers[89]." The invocation of Savitṛ particularly on the

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[87] *Hir.*, 1. 2. 5. 6.

[88] *Hir.*, 2. 1. 6. 11.

[89] *Hir.*, 2. 5. 3.

occasion of offering to the manes is well in accord with the vedic belief about him that he "conveyed the dead to the the abode of righteousness[90]."

SŪRYA

Sūrya according to the *Nirukta*[91], is derived from सृ, to move, or from सू to stimulate, or from स्वीर to promote well.

Sūrya, the physical sun, has been said to reveal the the glory of the gods and specially that of Agni[92]. So in the Gṛhya-sūtras he is the important god deemed fit to be invoked whenever splendour and glory are the objectives. In the *Ṛg-veda* Sūrya has been called the eye of the gods[93]. so in the Gṛhya-sūtras he has been represented as a witness to the human acts as Agni does.

The worshipper in the *Gobhila Gṛhya-sūtra* adores Sūrya at the Samāvartana ceremony for the sake of glory and splendour with the words, "The eye art thou etc[94]."

As Sūrya was the emblem of splendour, it was deemed to be sin to keep sleeping after it had risen or when it was on the point of setting. So the *Āśvālayana Gṛhya-sūtra* lays down that if the sun sets while a student was sleeping without being ill, he should spend the whole of the night without speaking to any one and should adore the Sun when it rises next morning with the verse, "O light, O Sūrya, by which thou destroyest darkness." Again if the sun rises if he is sleeping without being sick or being fatigued, due to laziness or having done some improper work, he should keep silence and perform his worship to the sun with Ṛgvedic verse[95].

Before beginning the instruction of the Vedas, it was but necessary for the preceptor to gain necessary splen-

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[90] Ṛg., 4. 53. 4.; 2. 38. 2. [91] 12. 14. [92] Ṛg., 1. 115. 1.
[93] 7. 77. 3. [94] 3. 4. 21.
[95] *Ṛg-veda*, 10. 37. 9.

dour and energy. So on such an occasion the teacher performed the worship of the Sun saying, "On me Sūrya bestow insight, on me offspring, on me radiance[96]."

While laying down the sacrifices for the attainment of special desires, *Gobhila*[97] declares that one who is desirous of enjoyment of riches, should worship Sūrya within the sight of that person from whom he wants to have wealth. If he desires to get his horses multiplied, he should sacrifice fried grains while the Sun has a halo. If he wants a safe return home, the fifth verse[98] should be repeated. The fourth verse of this series was believed to be specially pleasing to the Sun God for the procurement of wealth. In the same context *Gobhila* also holds that for the sake of gold and riches the Sun is the premier god to be invoked[99]. The worshipper of Sūrya was granted happiness and general weal. Gobhila clearly states that one who is desirous of glory specially worships the Sun in the forenoon, at noon, and in the afternoon. Worshipping the Sun at the time of morning twilight and evening twilight as believed by Gobhila was a source of happiness.

The Aśwattha was the tree deemed sacred to Sūrya and it is mentioned during the house-building ceremony that a house built of it brings danger of fire[100].

Like Agni, the Sun has often been called the lord of vows and in such rituals where the preservation of vows was the objective, Sun has often been invoked with Agni and Vāyu. The student while offering the optional gift to his guru, prays, to Sūrya, "Āditya, lord of the vow, I shall keep my vow[101]". The teacher makes him rise with the words, "Sūrya, this is thy son. I put him in your charge." Then the guru worships the Sun with the following mantra, "That bright eye created by the gods which

96 *Āśv*. 1. 21. 4. 97 4. 5. 98 *M. B.*, 2. 4. 9. 13.
99 *Gobh.*, 4. 5. 30. 100 4. 7. 23.
101 *Hir.*, 1. 2. 7. 10.

rises in the east, may we see it a hundred autumns...... May we long see the Sun[102]."

Sūrya, as the dispeller of all evils, is again rememberd at the Śrāvaṇā ceremony along with Agni, Viṣṇu, Vāyu, and other important gods with the words, "Adoration to the Sūrya and the red one, the lord of celestial beings[103]".

The remarkable thing to be noted about this god is that in the *Gṛhya-sūtras* his portraiture has not been so concrete as that of Agni or Indra or even Rudra, because his physical qualities are not so much stressed.

VĀYU

"Vāyu", says the *Nirukta*, "is the foremost deity of the middle region. Vāyu is derived from वा, to blow, or वी to move, Sthaulaṣṭhīvi derives from इ to go, the letter व being meaningless[104]".

Vāyu, the famous protector of Soma[105], who took an active part in the drinking of its juice[106], is the presiding deity of the air according to the Gṛhyasūtras and as he had once distinguished himself in the protection of the Soma, he is believed to be a befitting escort to the food offered to the Manes. So the following mantra in the śraddha ceremony, "The air is steady, Vāyu is its surveyor, in order that what has been given may not be lost[107]."

Just like Agni he has been deemed to be a witness to human action along with the Moon and the Sun. Thus on the fourth day ceremony in connection with marriage, Vāyu is invoked along with Candra and Sūrya. Also in the Upanayana ceremony while giving optional gift to the teacher the student, after praying to Agni to be a witness to his vows, invokes Vāyu also in the following words, "Vāyu, lord of the vow, I shall keep my vow[108]"

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[102] *Par.*, 1. 8. 7.; 1. 6. 3.; *Hir.*, 1. 2. 7. 13. [103] *Hir.*, 2. 6. 16. 4.
[104] *Nir.*, 10. 1. [105] *Ṛg.*, 10. 85. 5. [106] *Ṛg.*, 4. 48.
[107] *Hir.*, 2. 4. 11. 4. [108] *Hir.*, 1. 2. 7. 9.

In the Ṛg-veda Vāyu has been said to be a deity who disperses foes[109], who protects the weak[110], who possesses healing powers, and is capable of prolonging life. So the fittest occasions to invoke him in the Gṛhya-sūtras are the saṁskāras. On the tonsure ceremony when the warm water meant for shaving is made ready in a brazen vessel, Vāyu is meditated upon and the following mantra is uttered, "O Vāyu, come hither.[111]" In the marriage ceremony when the bride puts on the new garment, Vāyu is invoked to protect her thighs. This is not only because Vāyu is a protector of the weak but it is also a prayer to grant the woman adequate physical strength to accomplish the most strenuous duties of the house-hold. Such a capacity could only be bestowed by a god as Vāyu who ever wanders and never takes rest[112].

As Vāyu in the *Ṛg-veda*[113] has been praised as a disperser of foes, so in the Śrāvaṇā ceremony he is invoked for the sake of removing the serpents and other evil beings. Here he has been designated as, 'all pervading' and 'lord of the aerial beings'[114].

Pṛthvī

The conception of mother earth and father sky is very ancient in the religious history of many nations. In the *Ṛg-veda* both of them have been regarded as one of the most powerful means of protection from fear and danger[115]. The same idea seems to be in view when in Upanayana the teacher places the boy in charge of the heaven and the earth[116].

Earth has particularly been deemed to protect sons. She has been called the source of immortality and the giver

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[109] 4. 48. 2.
[110] 1. 134. 5.
[111] *Āśv*. 1. 17. 6.; Pār., 2. 1. 6.; *Gobh*., 2. 9. 11.
[112] Ṛg., 10. 168. 1-3.
[113] 4. 48. 2.
[114] *Hir*., 2. 6. 16. 4.
[115] 1. 185.
[116] *Hir*., 1. 2. 6. 5.

of all good. At the childbirth, the child is fumigated with small grains mixed with mustard seed. On such an occasion various gods are invoked to bless the newborn. In this context almost all the *Gṛhya-sūtras* prescribe an adoration to earth by the father who having washed his hands, touches the ground and prays to the earth, "O thou, whose hair is well parted! Thy heart that dwells in the heaven—in the moon, thus I, being the lord of immortality, may not weep over the disress through my sons." After this when the child is bathed with lukewarm water, both the heaven and the earth are prayed together to be kind to the boy along with all the herbs because the earth abounds in valuable medicinal herbs that may bring health to the babe[117].

Earth has been thought to be the mother of entire living creatures including even those lying inside it. So at the Śrāvaṇā ceremony and its concluding part the Agrahāyaṇī ceremony, the west of the fire is touched pointing to the earth with the Mantra, "Adoration to the Earth." "Be soft to us, O Earth, free from thorns, grant us rest afford us wide shelter."

Maruts

According to the *Nirukta* Marutaḥ are of measured sound मितराविणो, or of measured splendour (मितरोचनो) or they run very much[118]. The heroic Maruts of the *Ṛgveda* are rarely remembered in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*. The *Gobhila Gṛhya-sūtra* while quoting invocation to the Sun in the Samāvartana ceremony after the close of the vedic study, refers to Maruts as having shining spears and appearing in the firmament along with the Sun. In the same *Gṛhya-sūtra* when the nyagrodha is bought at the Puṁsavana ceremony, the Maruts are also remembered along with other gods. Gobhila has also an invocation for the Maruts when

[117] *Pār.*, 1. 6. 17.; *Hir.*, 2. 1. 3. 8-10.

[118] *Nir.*, 11. 14.

the plough is set into motion. In the *Hiraṇyakesin Gṛhya-sūtra* there is an invocation for the Maruts when the student sets out to beg alms. So the physical qualities of the Maruts and their capacity to lend a helping hand in need are the essentials of *Gṛhya-sūtra* conception of the Maruts.

The Maruts, in the *Gṛhya-sūtra*, are remembered at the time of setting the plough into motion because in the *Ṛgveda* they are represented as the associates of Indra and holding lightning along with rain in their hands. It is one of their important duties to shed rains[119].

Their invocation in the Puṁsavana and the Upanayana ceremonies hints at their Ṛgvedic conception as gods granting long life for over a hundred winters[120]. The same lies at the root of their being invoked at the Samāvartana ceremony as well.

Mitra

Mitra, in the *Ṛgveda* has few personal traits and is often invoked with Varuṇa; but in the *Gṛhya-sūtras* we trace individual invocations for him as a god granting splendour, chastity and power. In the Upanayana ceremony the teacher arranges the antelope skin as an outer garment with the mantra "The firm strong eye of Mitra, glorious splendour powerful and flaming, a chaste mobile vesture, this skin put on a valiant man." The mantra also indicates that Mitra is a form of Sun-god[121]. Mitra often shares the attributes of Varuṇa though he is often invoked apart from him. In the Upanayana when the teacher seizes the right hand of the boy, he says, "Mitra has seized thy hand," and after that, "Varuṇa has seized thy hand." It shows that all

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119 *Ṛg.*, 5. 54. 2. 3. 11; 1. 64. 5. and 8. 7. 25.; 5. 34. 11.; 1.64 6. and 5. 53. 6. 10; 59. 8.

120 *Ṛg.* 5. 54. 75.

121 *Hir.*, 1. 1. 4. 6.

perceiving qualities and the great physical strength of Varuṇa are attributed to Mitra also.

Sāṅkhāyana has an invocation to Varuṇa just after Mitra in the marriage ceremony when the bride puts on the newly dyed garment and sits behind the fire. It means that though the gods are not invoked together, yet they are thought together and Mitra is a close associate of Varuṇa sharing his important attributes. But at the same time a tendency to treat these two gods apart was also coming forth.

Bhaga

Bhaga is very sparingly addressed in the *Gṛhya-sūtra*. Gobhila has prescribed oblations to him while setting the plough into motion[122]. And in the marriage ceremony the *Hiraṇyakesin Gṛhya-sūtra* prescribes invocation to Bhaga along with Aryamana, Purandhī and Savitṛ; while Sāṅkhā-yana has an adoration to him when the bride puts on the newly dyed garment.

So Bhaga, the Sun god of the *Ṛgveda* and *Nirukta*[123] is only a minor deity of the Gṛhya-sūtras, prayed for agri-cultural well-being for the good of the offspring and the family circle. His time is previous to Sun-rise before Savitā[124].

Mahārāga

Mahārāga is very rarely invoked and the Vedas seem to make no reference to him. Gobhila has prescribed an invocation to him at the time of house-building. As a bali is offered to him in the northern direction, he seems to be a form of Śiva for whom Sāṅkhāyana and Āśvalāyana give good many number of synonyms in the animal sacrifice.[125]

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[122] 2. 4. 28.
[123] 12. 13.
[124] *Nir.*, 12. 6.
[125] *Āśv.* 4. 8. 19.

Kāma

Kāma has been addressed in the *Gobhila-Gṛhya-sūtra*[126] while the bride is besprinkled with surā, "Kāma, I know thy name. Intoxication art thou by name". So kāma is nothing but the god of love prayed at the time of marriage in order to generate love and attraction towards the husband unknown to the bride.

Āryaman

Āryaman, according to the *Nirukta*, is the Sun, having many chariots, and with his path unimpeded, chastises the enemy. His seven rays suck juices for him or the seven sages draw divine effulgence from him[127].

Āryaman is one of the twelve Ādityas mentioned in the *Ṛgveda*. As his name is found in the Avesta so there is every possibility of this name being Indo-Iranian. As his very name suggests the idea of comradeship, he is adored mostly in connection with the marriage ceremony. Gobhila adores this deity on the occasion of the sacrifice of fried grain in the marriage ceremony. Hiraṇyakesin has prescribed an invocation to Aryaman when the bridegroom seizes the hand of the bride. Sāṅkhāyana has a prayer for him at the fourth day ceremony after marriage.

So Āryaman is the source of conjugal grace and everlasting friendship and love.

Aditi

According to the *Ṛgveda*[128] Aditi is the guardian of noble wealth, giver of perfect innocence, and blessed strength, food and offspring.

Aditi, the mother of the Sun god is the first deity whose permission is sought while commencing the daily oblations in the *Gobhila-Gṛhya-sūtra*[129]. She is the maker of spiritual

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[126] 2. 1. 10.
[127] *Ṛg.*, X. 64. 5.; *Nir.*, 11. 23.
[128] 1. 34. 5.
[129] *Nir.*, 11. 24.

garment for her great son so she is prayed by Hiraṇyakesin on the occasion of putting on the new garment by the boy in the Upanayana ceremony with the following mantra, "May Aditi tuck up the garment so that you may study Veda for the sake of insight and belief and forgetting what thou hast learnt, for the sake of holiness and holy lustre.

Hiraṇyakesin has an adoration for Aditi in the Annaprāśana ceremony where Aditi is prayed to proptect the boy like a mother. So Aditi is the source of protection, holy lustre and greatness as depicted in the Gṛhya-sūtras.

ANUMATI

The *Nirukta* explains this deity as "अनुमतिस्तु मननात्" on account of approving.

Hiraṇyakeśin prays this deity for consent in the daily offering and also adores it at the time of marriage and Upanayana. Anumati seems to be an invention of the Sūtra-Age as *Ṛgveda* makes no mention of it. It is prayed for auspicious means as Gaṇeśa in the later days.

INDRĀṆĪ

She is the spouse of Indra as represented in the *Ṛgveda*. In 10-86-11-12. of the *Ṛgveda*, she has been shown as conversing with Indra, her husband. Gobhila pays adoration to her for the sake of agricultural welfare as her husband is the lord of rains[130]. Sāṅkhāyana has a prayer for Indrāṇī along with Indra in the marriage ceremony when the bride puts on the newly dyed garment.

RĀKĀ

Rākā is the goddess of the full moon night and is adorded to dispel the demons and other evil beings of the night. Hiraṇyakeśin has prescribed an adoration for her in the Sīmantonnayana ceremony where she is called to be full of grace and the *Gobhila-gṛhya-sūtra* lays down a worship

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[130] 1. 3. 1.

for her in the Āgrahāyaṇī ceremony at the meeting of roads where an offering of fried grain is made to her.

She has the power to protect the embryo as Viṣṇu has because Sāṅkhāyana prescribes a prayer to her in the Sīmantonnayana where she is adored with Viṣṇu to take care of the womb. The etymologists have called Rākā and Anumati as the wives of gods, "अनुमति : राका इति देवपत्न्यौ"[131]

Sarasvatī

In the *Ṛgveda*[132] as explained in the *Nirukta*,[133] Sarasvatī presides over all sacrifices and with her great wisdom she makes the great ocean (of knowledge) manifest.

Sarasvatī, primarily the deified river, becomes the goddess of intelligence and learning perhaps because she had been the source of much inspiration to the Āryans who composed their beautiful hymns residing by her bank. Hiraṇyakesin prescribes her consent on the occasion of daily sacrifice and when the teacher seizes the right hand of the boy in the Upanayana ceremony, "Sarasvatī has seized thy hand", is uttered. Hiraṇyakesin[134] again, prays to her for intelligence to the boy along with Indra and Aśvins, when the teacher approaches the mouth of the boy in the Upanayana ceremony. Again, before beginning the actual study of the Vedas, the teacher blesses the pupil with the words, "May Indra give insight. May Sarasvatī give insight."

In the marriage ceremony when the bridegroom seizes the thumb of bride, Sarasvatī is invoked. "Sarasvatī, promote this (our undertaking), O gracious one, rich in studs, thou whom we sing first of all that is."[135] This is merely to give proper mental power and intelligence to both the bride and bridegroom.

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131 *Gobh.*, 4. 4. 32.
132 *Nir.*, 11. 29. 2.
133 1. 1. 6.4.
134 11. 26.
135 1.2.6.4.

But Sarasvatī is prayed even at the very start of life at the Garbhādhāna to give conception[136] and Sāṅkhāyana prescribes adoration to her in the Nāmakaraṇa, where she is addressesed as the goddess of speech and the father speaks in the right ear of the boy, "Speech, the goddess, united with mind, together with breath ....may she rejoice in the goddess, the great one, the sweet sounding, the music, the full of music, the flowing self produced, for the sake of joy."[137] From this follows the later picture of Sarasvatī as playing on vīṇā and full of sweet speech.

Gaṅgā

The name of Gaṅgā comes only at the end of the Ṛgvedic period in 10.75 of the *Ṛgveda* because the Āryans reached as far as the Gaṅgā late after residing for a very long time in the Punjab. Among the Gṛhya-sūtras only the *Hiraṇyakesin-Gṛhya-sūtra* refers to this river at the time of Sīmantonayana when the husband holding the porcupine quill etc. parts the hair of the wife with the words, "Soma alone is our king, thus says the Brāhmaṇa tribe, sitting near thy banks, O Gaṅgā, whose flow does not roll back, may we find our way with thee through all hostile powers, as through streams of water".[138] It only shows that Gaṅgā in this context has been invoked to grant strength to the embryo to face the attack of all evil beings most successfully because the state of pregnancy in a woman was believed to be beset with the danger of demons and other evil beings. The mantra also is the inspiration that the Āryans used to draw from the powerful current of the Gaṅga.

Waters in general are very often invoked because they had a deep impression on the minds of the Āryans who had a long and close acquaintance with them. Thus the *Hiraṇyakesin Gṛhya-sutra* has an invocation for the

[136] *Hir.*, 1. 7. 25. 1.

[137] *Sāṅkh*;. 1. 24. 10.

[138] *Hir.*, 2. 1. 1. 3.

waters along with Agni at the Jātakarman ceremony when the newly born babe is bathed with lukewarm water. The father after washing the left breast of the mother places a covered water pot at her head and prays to the waters, "O Waters watch in this house. As you watch with the gods, so watch this wife, the mother of the good son." As the waters served as physical barriers against the enemies to the Āryans, so they were believed to have the power to protect.

Parjanya

According to the *Nirukta* Parjanya is one who gives satisfaction and is favourable to men.[139]

Parjanya, as represented in the *Ṛgveda*, is the personification of the rain cloud and he is the god who is responsible for the actual rainfall[140]. In the age of the *Gṛhya-sūtras* he was seen in the same light and was deemed to be an important agricultural god. The *Gobhila-Gṛhya-sūtra* has an invocation for him on the occasion of setting the plough into motion.

Vāstoṣpati

"Vāstoṣpati" says the *Nirukta* is the protector and supporter of the dwelling.

The conception of Vāstoṣpati in the *Gṛhya-sūtras* is in due accord with the Ṛgvedic view about the guardians watching over the welfare of the house and of the field. Thus Vāstoṣpati is the lord of the dwelling. The chief occasion of his worship is the House-building ceremony or the ceremony concerning the entering of a newly built abode. The household prosperity is the chief aim in worshipping him.

Pāraskara-Gṛhya-sūtra has an elaborate worship of Vāstoṣpati at the said occasion. Having established fire

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139 *Nir.*, 10. 10.   140 5. 83.

inside the house, having made the Brāhamaṇa sit at the south of the *vēdi* and having placed the water pot at the north, and having cooked a mess of sacrificial food, the householder stands at the door of the newly built house and asks the permission of the Brāhmaṇa to enter the house. Having done so, he prepares the *ājya* oblation and addressing Vāstoṣpati as 'joy' he offers oblations with the following mantra of the *Ṛgveda*[141] "Vāstoṣpati, receive us in thy protection. Give us good residence and drive away the evils. We ask thee for that favour. Be a saviour to us, to men and animals." "Vāstoṣpati, be our father, make our wealth increase in cows and horses." "Vāstoṣpati be in fellowship with us, which may be valliant, joyful and all proceeding. Protect our wishes when we rest and when we do our work. Protect us always". "Driving away calamity, Vāstoṣpati, assuming all shapes, be a kind friend to us".[142]

As Vāstoṣpati is the dispeller of all calamities of the household, he cannot be forgotten at the time of the Agrahāyaṇī ceremony which is performed at the conclusion of the serpent worship. On such an occasion Gobhila prescribes a water barrel to be placed on a solid stone and then the worship of Vāstoṣpati[143] is performed.

Kṣetrapati

According to the *Nirukta*[144] क्षेत्रपति is the protector and supporter of the house क्षेत्रस्य पतिः क्षेत्रं निवासकर्मणस्तस्य पाता पालयिता वा"।

Kṣetrapati is the lord of the field and is believed to grant well being to the cattle and the crop. For the prosperity of the cows a mess of sacrificial food with milk sacred to Kṣetrapati is cooked and the sacrifice is performed at a place where the cows move. The ceremony is gone through without fire, on four or seven leaves. It was a

141 7-54 & 55.
142 *Pār*., 3. 4. 7.; *Hir*., 1. 8. 28. 1
143 3. 9. 6.
144 10. 14.

belief that the god had a sharp appetite and as such, it is ordained that the sacrifice must be executed with all haste. The remainder of the food is shared by the blood relations.[145]

Sītā

Sītā is the deity of the furrow. Pāraskara has prescribed a special sacrifice for her in the field on a clean spot that has been ploughed, so that the crop may not be damaged. The person who had once performed this sacrifice had the option to perform it even in his village. The intention of the sacrifice is to gain protection of the animals and to make the land fertile so that a bumper crop may enrich the fields. Sītā has been said to be the wife of Indra and so is deemed to bring rain, eminence and luck like her husband. In the sacrifice to Sītā a mess of cooked food of rice and barley and *ājya* oblations are offered to her with the following Mantra that gives a vivid idea of this deity. The first oblation naturally goes to Indra, her husband and then follows offerings to her with the mantra, "In whose substance dwells the prosperity of all Vedic and worldly works, Indra's wife, Sītā, I invoke. May she not abandon me in whatever work I do. Svāhā. Her who rich in horses, rich in cows, rich in delight, who inexhaustibly supports the beings, Urvarā, who is wreathed with threshing floors, I invoke at this sacrifice, the firm one. May she not abandon me."[146]

Yama

According to the *Nirukta* Yama is so designated because he dominates उपरमयति-यच्छति.[147]

Yama, the ruler of the dead[148] living in the highest heaven[149], is very rarely mentioned in the *Gṛhya-sūtras*. Hiraṇyakesin has an adoration for him on the occasion of

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[145] *Āps.*, 7. 20. 13.; *Hir.*, 2. 3. 9. [146] *Pār.*, 2. 17. 9.
[147] *Nir.*, 10. 19. [148] *Ṛg.*, 10. 14. 9. [149] *Ṛg.*, 10. 14. 8.

entering a newly built house. After prayers to Vāstoṣpati and Soma, for the sake of cattle and wealth, the worshipper proceeds to invoke Yama to avert the danger of death to the inmates, of the household. "May death go away; May immortality come to us. May Vivaśwat's son (Yama) protect us from danger."[150] Again, in order that premature death may not occur, Yama is made the guardian of the student in the Upanayana ceremony of the *Hiraṇyakesin-Gṛhya-sūtra* with the words, "I give thee in charge of Yama."[151]

These are the gods of the *Gṛhya-sūtras* that are often invoked with emphasis in the various gṛhya ceremonies. In addition to these there are certain minor gods that are sometimes addressed in different rituals. *Sinīvālī*:—She is prayed in the *Hiraṇyakesin-Gṛhya-sūtra* at the time of Garbhādhāna to grant conception along with Viṣṇu and Sarasvatī.[152] *Ṛgveda*[153] represents her as a graceful goddess with fine hair. The author calls Sinīvālī to be moon-less night.[154]

VASUS

The eight Vasus as declared by the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*[155] indicate merely an order of gods form whom other gods came forth. They have been the objects of special invocations on certain occasions in certain Gṛhyasūtras. Their power in the *Gṛhya-sūtras* is akin to that of Varuṇa or Rudra. They are deemed to be gods capable of bestowing protection from the evil beings, and granting the birth of a male child as gods like Soma, Indra, Varuṇa or Agni do. So the *Gobhila-Gṛhyasūtra* invokes him at the hour of buying the Nyagrodha shoot in the Puṁsavana ceremony with the words, "If thou belongest to Vasus, I buy thee for Vasus.[156]" Their invocation along with the Sun before

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[150] *Nir.*, 1. 8. 28. 1.
[151] *Hir.*. 1. 2. 6. 5.
[152] *Hir.*, 1. 7. 25. 1.
[153] 1. 173. 6.
[154] *Nir.*, 11. 31.
[155] 7. 5. 7. 2.
[156] *Gobh.*, 2. 6. 7.

the student sets out for begging alms[517] for the sake of long life, indicates that the Vasus were ranked with Agni or Indra in their capability of granting longevity. The *Hiraṇyakesin Gṛhya-sūtra* again prescribes invocation to them at the time when the student wipes the ground from left to right before actually commencing his daily sacrifice. The invocation indicates their great power to liberate from difficulties and the student in this prayer for them means to request them to help him in his difficulties, if he has any.[158]

Vāsukī

Vāsukī, perhaps the lord of the serpents, is adored by the *Gobhila Gṛhya-sutra* on the occasion of house building. On this occasion a *bali* is offered to him along with other gods upwards in the sky. The significance of his adoration at this ceremony is to keep the house secure from danger from the serpents[159].

Viśvedevāḥ

The Viśvedevāḥ have been invoked both by Gobhila and Sāṅkhāyana on the occasion of marriage keeping in view their invocation in the Ṛgvedic marriage hymn, for the sake of uniting the hearts of the couple. In the *Gobhila Gṛhya-sūtra* the water carrier stands behind the bridegroom and sprinkles water over him who utters the following mantra, "May the Viśvedevās unite."[160] Sāṅkhāyana uses the same mantra when the bride is anointed.[161]

Viśvedevās, like all other gods, have been prayed for protection, help and material prosperity. Gobhila again, remembers them in the Puṁsavana ceremony when the nyagrodha shoot is bought and Hiraṇyakeśin has an adoration for him at the Upanayana when the teacher gives the pupil in charge of the gods. Gobhila also holds that

157 *Hir.*' 1. 2. 7. 14.
158 *Hir.*, 1. 2. 8. 3.
159 *Gobh.*, 4. 7. 41.
160 2. 2. 15.
161 1. 12. 5.

Aṣṭakā, a festival held for the sake of prosperity, was sacred to the Viśvedevās also.[162]

Tvaṣṭṛ

Tvaṣṭṛ is so named as it pervades quickly. It may be derived from त्विष् to shine or त्वक्ष् to do.[163]

Tvaṣṭṛ, the famous maker of Indra's thunderbolt, has been invoked by the *Hiraṇyakesin Gṛhya-sūtra* at the Upanayana ceremony when the teacher seizes the right hand of the boy with the words, "Tvaṣṭṛ has seized thy hand." Sāṅkhāyana has laid down an invocation for him in the marriage ceremony when the bride takes hold of the bridgroom who offers *Ājya* oblations to him along with other gods.

In the *Ṛgveda*[164] there is a colloquy between Indra and Varuṇa in which Varuṇa while praising himself says that it was he who fashinoned the two halves of the regions and knew all the beings as Tvaṣṭṛ did. The reference shows that Tvaṣṭṛ has been deemed in the *Ṛgveda* as a deity gifted with wonderful power to build and keep in mind all that it built or made. In short it was possessed with the great omnicient qualities of Varuṇa, Sūrya or Vāyu. Such a view lies at the Gṛhya-sūtra conception of this god in propitiating him in the Upanayana and marriage ceremonies.

Other Gods

In addition to the above is a host of divine beings addressed by the Gṛhya-sūtras. As their reference is very rare and no definite idea has been laid down for them, they are being summarily dealt with.

Dhātrī :—Dhātrī has been prayed for the support of the lives of kinsmen in the funeral hymn of the *Ṛgveda*[165] The same idea is carried forth when in the *Hiraṇyakesin*

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[162] 3. 10. 3.

[163] *Nir.*, 8. 13.

[164] 4. 42.

[165] 10. 18. 5.

Gṛhya-sūtra the deity is invoked in the Upanayana and the Jātakarman ceremonies. In the Upanayana ceremony the teacher remembers Dhātrī when he seizes the right hand of the boy with the following words, "Dhātrī has seized thy hand."[166] In the Jātakarman, after the Aupāsanā fire is brought and after rites upto the Vyāhṛti oblations are performed, twelve oblations are sacrificed with the verses, "May Dhātrī give us wealth etc.[167]

Viśvakarman :—Viśvakarman has been deemed in the *Ṛgveda* to be the creator of all that exists[168]. 'विश्वकर्मा सर्वस्य कर्ता" says the *Nirukta*. Viśvakarman is the maker of all. He is of penetrating mind pervading, maker, disposer and the greatest god to reveal the senses. He perceives the object of senses i. e. objects desired, thought about or aimed at.[169] So if anything was brought in the household or the articles of trade arrive, it was thought to be a special occasion for Gobhila and paying tribute to the creator of things. So the Gṛhya-sūtra lays down—"Of the articles which he has bought, he should after fasting three days and nights make an oblation with the formula, "Here this Viśvakarman."[170] The *Khadira Gṛhya-sūtra* has also prescribed the following, "Of articles of trade let him make an oblation with the formula, 'Here this Viśvakarman."[171]

The seven Ṛṣis :—Hiraṇyakesin has prescribed a worship for the seven Ṛṣis at the time when the bridegroom reaches his house with his newly married wife. The couple sits on a red bull's skin with hair outside till the stars appear. When the stars appear the bridegroom worships the stars with the words 'May we not be deprived of our offspring." After the worship of the moon the worship of the stars follows. The worship begins with the verse "The

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166 *Hir.*, 1. 2. 5. 9. 167 *Hir.*, 2. 1. 4. 91 168 *Ṛg.*, 10. 81. 2.
169 *Nir* 10. 26. 170 4. 8. 19.
171 4. 3. 7.

seven Ṛṣis who have led to firmness etc."[172] The special feature of this worship is the adoration to the polar stars for firmness and protection from adversaries.

CONCEPTION OF THE GODS IN THE GṚHYA-SŪTRAS

These are the gods of the Gṛhya-sūtras that are often invoked with emphasis, in the various Gṛhya ceremonies. The Gṛhya-sūtras have nothing to say about the origin of the gods because they take the various gods of the Vedic pantheon and invoke them in various rituals ordinarily keeping their vedic conception in view. Thus, Viṣṇu, the protector of the embryo in the *Ṛg-veda* is invoked by the Gṛhya-sūtras on the occasion of Garbhādhāna ceremony.

The general characteristics of gods, as traced in the Gṛhya literature is that they pervade the different quarters, wearing armour, weilding strong bows and arrows, not winking the eyes and vigilant about the affairs of men[173]. The demons are separately satiated to keep and preserve the smooth current of life. The gods possess the wonderful power to kill diseases and even the worms of diseases.[174]

The entire Gṛhya literature cannot be held to be magic-ridden. It is ceremonial through and through. There are certain observances for the attainment of special desires that savour of magic but such magical portions of the Gṛhyasūtras merely occupy a minor position as most of them are not concerned with the gṛhya rites proper and most of them have nothing to do with the domestic fire. The most that can be said about these magical portions of the Gṛhya-sūtras is that they indicate the deep influence of the *Atharva-veda* on the life of the people. It is proved by the fact that on such occasions the mantras from the *Atharvaveda* are quoted in the Gṛhya-sūtras. Thus,

[172] *Hir.*, 1. 7. 22. 14.
[173] *Gobh.*, *H.* 9. 19.
[174] *Pār.*, 2. 17. 13. 15.

in the *Hiraṇyakesin*[175] Gṛhyasūtras, the *Atharvaveda*[176] has been quoted for success in trade. That the Gṛhya-sūtras deemed only the three Vedas as respectable is clear from the following mantra, 'Draw in your breath with the Ṛk, breath within with the Yajus, breath forth with the Sāman.'[177] The mantra is uttered at the time of Jātakarman when the administering of the sacred lore is performed by the father, so that the child may gain the mental strength to carry on and grasp the vedic learning. Here *Atharvaveda* is excluded and it merely indicates that the author of the Gṛhya-sūtras did not believe the knowledge of the *Atharvaveda* very essential for the moral and intellectual well-being of the child. Such magical rites and practices exist in the cultural history of all the nations and even the present age cannot be considered to be completely immune from them. So the idea of exercising coercion to gods as certain scholars hold and which is a natural conclusion to the above view, also stands refuted.

Certain scholars are of opinion that in the Gṛhya-sūtras the attitude towards gods has changed. They are not seen as miraculous beings but merely as agents to human needs and aspirations. Such an opinion about the religious view of the Gṛhya sūtras is altogether contradictory to the spirit of their contents. The Gods in the Gṛhya-sūtras, as the above lines fully indicate, are treated with full devotion and are deemed as supplementing the human powers. Human feeling of helplessness on certain occasions of spiritual gain and also for the attainment of certain material ends relating family, nation or society is the goal of spiritual faith which makes the society ideal. Really speaking, it is the only way in which an ideal society can happily live. Coercion to gods or calling the authors of the Gṛhya-sūtras to be superstitious are the outcries of materialistic

175 1. 4. 15. 1.
176 3. 15. 3.
177 Sāṅkh., 1. 22. 2.
178 *Gobhila*, 4. 9. 15.

people who view the spritual life of the great ancient sages of India with modern materialistic angle of vision. Thus, while in Upanayana the Guru touching the arm of the boy says, 'I touch thee with the hands of Aśvin,' he means to infuse the great physical and mental dexterity of the great Aśvins in the boy having borrowed their powers from them.

He declares to the world that his education will make the boy spiritually, morally and physically fit to serve both the "Kindred points of Heaven and Home." Again, while touching his heart and the naval, the guru invokes Agni meaning to say that the बिन्दु that resides at the heart and naval must reach the ब्रह्माण्ड through the aid of Agni who alone is capable of that function being possessed with upward tendency to move as it must be remembered that according to the science of Yoga such a movement of रेतस् is essential for real spiritual life and the true knowledge of Vedic learning. The authors of the Gṛhya-sūtra were great Yogins who could realise it fully well that being ऊर्ध्वरेतस् was very necessary for the attainment of Brahmavidyā and no god but Agni was capable of bringing such a condition in the boy. Such a spirit lies at the root of deification of in-animate objects as a chariot, staff, turban, girdle and mirror, etc., or the abstract qualities as hunger and thirst[179] and we must recognise the presence of the same spirit everywhere in the Gṛhya-sūtras while determining the relation of human society with the gods.

Thus the attitude towards the gods, in the Gṛhya-sūtras, is purely devotional and spiritual. They are invoked for the encouragement and supplementation of human efforts. Even in the days of the Gṛhya-sūtras they were viewed as being possessed with miraculous and supernatural powers as they were done by the authors of the great Vedas.

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[179] *Gobhila* 4. 9. 15.

KAUṬALYA AND HIS ARTHAŚĀSTRA

By ŚRĪ DEV RAJ CHANNA

EVER since the discovery of the manuscripts of the *Artha-śāstra* there has been a great deal of controversy regarding the authenticity of its author. There is hardly any aspect of the problem which has not been dealt with at great length. But in going through some of these writings we find however that certain aspects of the question still need a word or two to be said. Our aim is to take them up one by one.

We would, first of all, like to discuss certain remarks of those scholars who do not accept Kauṭalya as the author of this work or who do not think that the present text is an authentic one : They have compared certain passages or expressions of the book with those of the other texts, such as the Dharma-śāstras. They have certain ideas about the technical knowledge of that period, (for example in the domain of metallurgy), and they compare it with what they find in the Kauṭalīya. They have noted the complete absence of the contemporary data, such as the name of the Emperor, his capital, etc. They feel that there is some incompatibility between the geographical information furnished by the author and that by the contemporary foreign travellers such as Megasthenes. They are also surprised by the strangeness of the name, "Kauṭilya", as they feel that no one could have had this word as one's name. All this has made them believe that either there was no such person at that epoch or that the present text is not authentic.

We should observe in the first place that the comparison between the passages and phrases of the *Arthaśāstra* and those of other texts cannot be decisive, because the date of almost all of them remains yet to be finally settled within definite narrow limits. Moreover, if according to one

scholar, a certain passage or a certain word goes to prove a later date for Kauṭalya, according to another, it proves the contrary. In many such cases, the scholars seem to have based their opinion on their personal suppositions. Jolly, for example, thinks, "..The Dharmaśāstra or the science of duty and religion has far better claims to a high antiquity than the *Arthaśāstra* or the science of gain, which in its turn is older than the Kāmaśāstra or the science of love, the three sciences based on trivargas having followed each other in point of time as well as in rank and value."[1] He thus, formulates a principle and utilises it to give a judgment, without giving any proof for the principle itself, further, uses this principle to show that the *Arthaśāstra* is later than the smṛti of Yajñavalkya. But how does Jolly come to the conclusion that the principle formulated by him, is universally acceptable. Actually it is an arbitrary opinion.

According to some scholars, Kauṭalya cannot be taken to have lived in the Third century B.C. as the technical knowledge displayed in his work, cannot but be true of a later period. They are convinced that India of that epoch had not made such an advance. But without taking into account the ruins of Mohen-jo-daro and of Harappa, we can note references to metals even in the *Ṛg-veda*. Now *atleast* one thousand years had elapsed since that time and therefore, it is not very surprising that in the Fourth and Third centuries B.C., Indian scholars had already acquired sufficiently detailed knowledge of the techniques.

Here is another objection: The social standard of the Kauṭalīya is much higher than that furnished by Megasthenes, an eye-witness of events and life at Palibothra. Leaving alone this Greek traveller, may we point out that the standard of life described in the *Arthaśāstra* can be

[1] *Arthaśāstra*, Lahore, 1920, v.i, p. 20.

explained as the logical development of the social level that we find in the early texts of the Tipiṭaka. Kauṭalya is also blamed for having said nothing regarding his Emperor, his capital, etc. But we would like to know why the mention of such names was necessary in his work? If it was really necessary, it is time someone told us why? Moreover, we are not absolutely sure that in all the books written by various authors, one can always find similar data.[2] It is true that Megasthenes has said nothing regarding such a remarkable personality which was Kauṭalya and who occupied the post of the Chief Minister in the court of the first Maurya. But Megasthenes has not mentioned the name of any one except the Emperor. Should we then suppose that the Emperor had no Chief Minister, no minister, no commander of his armies, etc.? On the other hand, can' we not suppose that the authors who have preserved only certain extracts of Megasthenes, have kept only one name, that of the Emperor, and that they have omitted the names of every other member of the Royal Court.

Those who believe that a Chief Minister could not have such a bad word for his name, have never told us why they have preferred "Kauṭilya" to "Kauṭalya" and this despite the fact that the majority of manuscripts give us the second and not the first version. It is strange that while refusing to accept the Indian tradition regarding the *Arthaśāstra* in full, they pick up only the part relating to the name and use it to advance arguments against the authenticity of the very tradition of which the name of the author is a small part. Moreover, the word, *Kauṭalya*

[2] Let us examine the writings of A. B. Keith, who has written also on Political Science. One wonders if there are *always* references to the British King or to his capital in these works. Even in his "History of Sanskrit Literature", if only the text, without its Preface, were left to us, it will be difficult to believe that it is a work written so many thousands of miles away from India!

can be explained as being derived from the word, *Kuṭala*, referred to in the *gotra-pāṭha*. Even if it is ultimately proved that "Kauṭilya" is the original form, that may not matter much, as it is not the only pejorative name in ancient Indian history. We have also such names as Śunaḥ-śepa and Kaunapadanta. In the Ṭipiṭaka we come across a seṭṭhi, Meṇḍaka by name. These strange names can be and could be explained. (This is, by no means, a phenomenon reserved to Ancient India. Even today we can find such names in other countries, including those of Europe. Have there not been and are there not names like Death, Few, Bullock, Boîteux, Pfenning, Shlecht or Mauvais? One can even find names like Cocu and Torcheboeuf.). Moreover, if the name has been changed by some writer at a later date, he must have found it acceptable.

Some other scholars do not believe in the authenticity of the work as the author quotes himself in the 3rd person, singular. This continues to remain a major argument inspite of the fact that it is a common practice of the Indian authors and here no one seems surprised by such references. We may refer here, for example, to Govindasvāmī : "Prāyeṇa granthakārāḥ svamatam para-mata-apadeśena bruvate."[3] Examples of this custom can be found even in Pāli literature where similar expressions are attributed to the Buddha.[4] We also find the same tendency in the literature of certain European countries. To give but one example: Caesar had left us his commentaries, in which he sometimes refers to himself in the 3rd person, singular. And here is Victor Hugo, writing under a drawing of himself: "Mr. Victor Hugo in the sun".[5] Here

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[3] Referred to by P. V. Kane in the "*History of the Dharmaśāstra*", v.i, p. 21.

[4] "Atha kho Bhagavā....Ānandam āmantesi....icchati Tathāgato virecanam pātum ti", *Vinaya-Piṭaka* ed. by Oldenberg, v.i, p. 278.

[5] *Letters Françaises*, Paris, 24 mars, 1955.

it is a case of irony, but it is once again, in the 3rd person, singular.

There are, however, still others who cannot believe that a big work of encyclopaedic nature could have been composed by one man alone. This is the work of a genius whose very existence is unbelievable. Hence, they refuse to accept it as the work of one man. In arguing thus they mix up two questions, which should be studied separately. It is not our intention to defend here the genius of Kauṭalya. We would simply like to remark that a work of encyclopaedic nature could be composed by a man single-handed and that several such instances are not wanting. We know that Pliny, the Elder, composed a work "which deals with all the natural sciences as also with all the human arts."[6] Pliny himself, left nothing in doubt when he detailed the number of texts consulted by him. Similarly, men of genius, who excelled in a number of fields at the same time, have existed. One need only quote the name of Aristotle in this connection. To us, this does not appeal as the best means of refuting the authenticity of this work. These arguments carry as little conviction as those of scholars like Shri V.R. Dikshitar, who while admitting that generally it is "impossible that a man should have been a specialist in all the branches of knowledge", does not admit the validity of this "principle" for the sages and seers of Ancient India, because

[6] Farrington, "*Greek Science*', H'worth, 1944, v. ii, p. 133. We give below the exact quotation of Buffon, utilised by Farrington :—

"Son *Histoire Naturelle* comprend indèpendamment de l'histoire des animaux, des plantes at des minéraux, l'histoire du ciel, et de la terre, la médecine, la commerce, la navigation, l'histoire des arts libéraux et mécaniques, l'origine des usages, enfin toutes les sciences naturelles et tous les arts humains...c'est, si l'on veut une compilation de tout ce qui avoit été écrit avant lui, une copie de tout ce qui avoit été fait d'excellent at d'utile á savoir; mais cette copie a de si grands traits.... qu'élle est préférable á la plupart des ouvrages originaux qui traitent des mêmes matières.". *Oeuvres Complètes*, Paris, 1837, v. i, p. 25.

"this is not impossible in India, and especially in ancient India, where we know of the versatile knowledge possessed by many a Pandit. They became sages and seers, because of their knowledge in all branches of sciences and arts ..."[7]

Recently, Mr. Kalyanov has connected the *Artha-śāstra* with the period of the fall of the system of slavery in India :"..we can draw the conclusion that the differenciation of science noticed in the *Arthaśāstra* probably belongs to the period of the downfall of the slavery-system and the birth of feudalism, that is, the I-IIIrd centuries A.D[8]." But there he does not advance any arguments in favour of thus dating the decline of the slave-system in India.[9]

If the scholars who have doubts regarding the authenticity of the *Arthaśāstra*, thus put forward arguments, which cannot escape criticism, it is also true, that some of the arguments advanced by the supporters of the authenticity of the Kauṭalīya, leave the reader unconvinced. These scholars take their stand on the remarkable convergence of the two branches of the Indian tradition, namely, the Sanskrit and the Ardha-māgadhī and thus meet the arguments of the adversaries. But they have not been always able to prove that the work has been passed on to us without any change. Moreover, having repeated the same arguments many times, they have convinced themselves and declare :"..The *Arthaśāstra* has stood the test of very rigourous criticism for so long a time that its genuineness must not be recognised to have been placed beyond any doubt.."[10] This is the final opinion of Shri

[7] *Mauryan Polity*, Madras, 1932, p. 325.

[8] Communication at the International Congress of Orientalists, Cambridge, 1954.

[9] For our views on the question of slavery, see "*L'Esclavage dans l'Inde ancienne..*", Pondichery, 1957, pp. 114—23.

[10] K. N. Shastri, "*History of the Nandas and the Mauryas*", Patna, 1952, p. 201.

K. N. Shastri, who has examined the problem at length. We would like to be permitted to take up one of the issues raised by the learned author. Some years ago, Sylvain Lévi had noted the presence of the expression, "pravālam alakanandakam" in the text and had concluded that the mention of the name of Alexandria could not but have been later than the foundation of that town by Alexander, the Great. This meant that *atleast* the expression in question was a later interpolation. Shri Shastri takes up this point and maintains that "pravāla" was known to Indians for a long time before Alexander. This in his opinion, is sufficient proof for showing the weakness of the argument advanced by Sylvain Lévi. But clearly this is only half the argument because it is equally essential to say something regarding the word. "alakanandakam" in the text.[11]

For our part, we feel that the Indian tradition regarding Kauṭalya cannot be lightly brushed aside and that a man of that name lived in the Nanda-Maurya period. It is equally clear that he could have composed a work of this type, for which purpose he could have consulted various works available at the time, as is said in the beginning of the work. There is, however, nothing to prove that there has been absolutely no change in the text, specially when we know that such practices have prevailed among the later day Pandits, anxious to show themselves off in

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[11] However as regards the objection concerning the presence of the word ,"*cīna*", signifying the country of China, we owe the following remarks to the courtesy of M. Léon Hambis :—

It is true that the name of *T'sin* is applied to the entire country of China only from the commencement of the 2nd century B.C. This was the period when the ruling dynasty of the kingdom of *T'sin* succeeded in conquering other kingdoms and in bringing them under its control. *But* the kingdom of *T'sin* existed before this period and it is perfectly possible that an Indian author had known and referred to the country of *T'sin*, from the period when it had still not extended its authority and its name over the entire country.

the dress of another. In fact, there are very few texts, such as the *Ṛg-veda* and the *Mahā-bhāṣya* which have escaped later-day changes. We feel, therefore, that the *Arthaśāstra* contains materials of a period, anterior to the beginning of the Christian Era, although it is difficult to believe that the text, in its present form, has reached us without any changes.

ANCIENT SCHOOLS OF VEDIC INTERPRETATION*

By Dr. S. K. Gupta

In my paper '*Nature of Vedic Śākhās*' read before the 15th Session of the Oriental Conference I tried to show that the Śākhā-texts of a Saṁhitā formed the earliest step towards its interpretation. These texts differed from each other in some cases minutely and in some cases vitally as well as widely. These differences must have been due to the individual taste, theological beliefs and practices and level of learning of the originators and of the teachers-in-charge of those schools. Apart from textual differences, the differences in explanation of these texts and their theological application must have been very prominent. What these differences were it is impossible to suggest under the present state of our knowledge.

In the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads the verses from the Vedas have been explained mostly with reference to the sacrifice and metaphysics respectively. Other types of explanation, also, are found. The Brāhmaṇas do not lack legends and historical stories in connection with Vedic Mantras. Numerous physical explanations are met with. Etymologies are very common. In spite of such a variety of interpretation of Vedic words and Vedic verses no attempt has ever been made to reduce them to different schools. The modern scholars summarily accept that the sole purpose of the Brāhmaṇas is ritual and they treat all explanations given in the Brāhmaṇas as sacrificial. But the Brāhmaṇas do contain much material that is not sacrificial. They have preserved for us some reminiscences of the various types of explanations that must have been current in the days of Śākhās. To cite an exmple the

* This paper was read in the Vedic Section of A.I.O.C. 1951.

Śatapatha-Brhmaṇa gives us some glimpses of etymological, sacerdotal, historical or legendary and metaphysical as well as physical explanations. This Brāhmaṇa does not hesitate to include in its body such diverse views. It indicates that the differences in such explanations were neither of principles nor of a vital nature. There was an essential unity behind them. This is further supported by the unity underlying behind the various schools of Vedic interpretation mentioned in the *Nirukta* as we shall presently see.

The Pada texts were named after the names of their authors. The differences in the various Pada texts of the same Saṁhitā could only be in the nature of differences in the analysis of certain words and consequent differences in their meanings. There could not have been vital differences calculated to allot them to particular schools of Vedic interpretation. The differences in these texts must have been completely individual and in matters of details only and not in principles.

It is only the *Nirukta* where several schools of Vedic interpretation have been clearly mentioned and quoted for their views. These schools are: (i) the Adhidaivata, (ii) the Adhyātma, (iii) the Ákhyāna Samaya or the Aithihāsika, (iv) the Naidāna, (v) the Nairukta, (vi) the Parivrājaka, (vii) the Pūrve Yājñika and (viii) the Yājñika. Camūpati makes this number ten by including the Vaiyākaraṇa school and taking the Ákhyāna Samaya and the Aitihāsika as two separate schools. He has also changed the names of the Adhidaivata and the Adhyātma schools to Àtma Pravāda and Àrṣa[1]. The Vaiyākaraṇas do not appear to have maintained a separate school of Vedic interpretation. Yāska's remarks that the science of etymology is a completion of grammar[2]

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[1] Yāska Yuga, p. 11.

[2] *Nirukta* I,15. Cp. 'tadidam vidyāsthānam vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam.'

and that etymologies should not be explained to one who is not a Vaiyākaraṇa[3] clearly show that Yāska does not consider the grammarians as different from the etymologists. Similarly, Yāska by using the word Ākhyāna in the sense of Itihāsa in the *N.* xi, 34 and other places impresses that he considers these two words as synonyms[4].

Yāska deals with the Aitihāsika or the Ākhyāna school at length along with the Nairukta schools to which he himself belongs. His treatment of other schools is very scanty.

The Vaiyākaraṇas have been referred to in the *N.* I, 12 and in IX, 5. In I, 12 the point at discussion is the origin of nouns. The etymologists believe that all nouns are derived from roots. Some of the grammarians do not contribute to this view. Yāska's words 'Vaiyākaraṇānām caike' suggest that there were two sections among the grammarians on this point. One of them, perhaps the major one agreed with the etymologists. The word 'eke' can lead to this conclusion only. In IX, 5 the formation of 'maṇḍūka' is discussed. The grammarians derive it from-*maṇḍ* whereas the etymologists derive it from-*masj*, *mad* or *mand*. The grammarians attach more importance to form than to matter or sense. The etymologists attach due importance to both with particular emphasis on the sense of the word in question. In XIII, 9 the view of the grammarians about the explanation of the words 'catvāri vāk'[5] is given. It is the same as given by Patañjali.

It is, therefore, evident that the differences between these two schools were the relative importance of sense or form in the derivation of a word and that a section of the grammarians did not accept the view of the etymologists that all nouns are derived from roots. One of the Nairuktas

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[3] N.II, 3, cp. 'naikapadāni nirbrūyāt. nāvaiyākaraṇāya.'

[4] Priya Ratna Ārṣa, Veda meṁ itihāsa nahiṁ hai, pp. ca-jha.

[5] Ṛv. I, 164.45.

also appears to have differed on this point[6]. It is not clear from the text of Yāska whether these dissenters denied this proposition only in the case of proper nouns or only in the case of nouns used in the classical Sanskrit alone or in the case of certain nouns used in the Vedic language also. Whatever the case may have been the grammarians were agreed to the etymologists on the vital points in the matter of Vedic interpretation.

The Naidānas have been quoted in the *N.* VI, 9 and VII,12. In VI, 9 they hold that a 'syāla' is so called because he becomes near on account of his relationship.[7]' The Nairuktas derive it as syāt lājān āvapati', 'he sows parched grain from a winnowing basket[8].' In VII, 12 the Naidānas derive the word 'sāma' as 'ṛcām samam mene' 'he thought it equal to the stanza[9].' The Nairuktas, on the other hand, derive it as 'sammitam ṛcā, 'measured out by the stanza'[10] or from as to throw. This school, thus, agrees in two main principles with the Nairuktas. It believes in deriving nouns from certain roots laying special emphasis on their sense. Of course, they appear to have believed in some original sense of words which in some cases undergoes changes on account of long use, change in customs and environments. They appear to have been the Semantists[11] of ancient India. In spite of such a difference in their approach to the problem the results do not appear to have

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[6] He is Gārgya.

[7] Cp. 'syāla āsannaḥ saṁyogena.'

[8] Dr. L. Sarup's translation.

[9] Dr. L. Sarup's translation.

[10] Dr. L. Sarup's translation.

[11] Dr. Sarup has translated the word Naidānāḥ as "they who are well-versed in primary causes" in N. VI, 9 and by 'they who are well-versed in Vedic metres' in N. VII, 12. He has not been able to give a consistent translation in these two places. How could the same name denote two sets of scholars who were not necessarily identical ? The correct translation in both these places should be 'those who explain words with reference to their original sense.'

been substantially different from those of the etymologists.

The Parivrājakas are mentioned in the *N.* II, 8 on the interpretation of 'bahuprajāḥ nirṛtim āviveśa[12].' Their name indicates that they must have been wandering ascetics. They had a metaphysical outlook. It was natural. Their stand about the principles of interpretation does not appear to have been different from that of the etymologists. The results arrived at by them in interpreting a Mantra do not appear to have been very different from those arrived at by other schools especially the etymologists. In most cases they must have been identical with those arrived at by the etymologists. Their metaphysical outlook must have had some influence on their etymologies, some of which must have differed from those of the etymologists. Yāska has noted only one case. In his opinion no other differences were noteworthy.

The Pūrve Yājñikas have been quoted in the *N.* VII, 23. They regard Vaiśvānara as Āditya. Their arguments are ritualistic in nature. They appear to have explained Vedic verses with reference to their application in sacrifice and the ceremonies connected with it. They, thus, had a leaning towards ritualistic explanation of Vedic verses. They might have belonged to the orthodox school of the Yājñikas who probably did not attach too much importance to the outward form of the sacrifice. They do not appear to have explained many verses in terms of sacrificial technic. Yāska has supplied such a scanty information that nothing can be said with certainty.

The Yājñikas have been mentioned in the *N.* V, 11; VII, 4; XI, 29; 31; 42; and 43. In V, 11 their explanation of 'sarāṁsi triṁśatam' and other words[13] is quoted. The Yājñikas hold that the words Anumati and Rākā both mean the last day of the bright fortnight[14] and that the words Sinī-

[12] *Ṛv.* I, 164.32. [13] *Ṛv.* VIII, 77.4. [14] *N.* XI, 29.

vālī and Kuhū both mean the last day of the dark fortnight[15]. They translate 'gauḥ' in the Ṛv. I, 164. 41 as 'gharmadhug' (giver of warm milk)[16], i.e., a sacrificial cow[17]. Their explanations are thus sacrificial.

They also hold that the deity of a Mantra which has not been used in sacrifice and for which no deity has been specified has Prajāpati as its deity[18].

The Yāñikas, thus, represent a school with elaborate sacrificial details and ceremonies. They are thoroughly sacerdotal in their outlook and can see nothing else than sacrificial details in Vedic verses. They appear to be the predecessors of the later Mīmāṁsakas. They have been distinguished from the earlier Yājñikas which fact forcibly leads to the conclusion that the elaborate details of sacrificial ceremonies and sacrificial explanation of verses of the Vedas is of later origin and hence was not acceptable to the earlier school. Yāska's treatment of this school shows that these ritualists differed from the etymologists in restricting the Vedic verses to sacrifice only. There appears to have been a complete agreement between the two schools in regard to other general principles of Vedic interpretation.

In the Supplement (*N.* XIII, 9) the views of the schools of Ārṣa and Ātmapravāda have been quoted. The former appear to have been metaphysical in their explanations. The latter appear to have an influence of natural sciences on their outlook and interpretations. They have explained the Ṛv. I, 164.45 with reference to men and beasts. The views of another school of Ācāryas under the words 'eke' have also been quoted at the same place. They appear to belong to the Ātmapravāda school for they have explained the Ṛv. I, 164. 45 with reference to birds, reptiles and men. The Ātmapravāda, thus, must have been identical with the Adhidaivata school.

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[15] *N.* XI, 31.
[16] Sarup's translation.
[17] *N.* XI, 42;43.
[18] *N.* VII, 4.

The Aitihāsikas have been quoted in the *N.* II, 16; XII, 1 and XII, 10. They hold that Vṛtra is Tvāṣṭra Asura (II, 16); the two Aśvins are Rājānau Puṇyakṛtau (XII,1); the word 'mithunā' in the *Ṛv.* X, 17.2 refers to Yama and Yamī. The legend quoted in the *N.* XII, 10 gives the impression that Vivasvān, Saraṇyū, and Aśvinau are historical personalities.

The Ākhyāna Samayaḥ has been quoted in the *N.* VII, 7. This school believes that the description of Vedic deities found in the Mantras is figurative only. They are not real historical beings or persons having hands and feet and performing certain actions. In their opinion the anthropomorphic traits of Vedic deities are nothing but personifications of various phenomena going on in Nature[19]. This school, thus, must have explained Vedic descriptions in the form of the allegories and legends. There appears to be no other difference between the Ākhyāna Samayaḥ or the Aitihāsika school and the Nairukta school.

Besides these references several itihāsas and Ākhyānas have been narrated by Yāska in connection with his interpretation of Vedic verses. The purpose of these Ākhyānas is that Yāska wishes to impress upon the students of etymology that these Ākhyānas or itihāsas should not be treated in their literal sense but should be taken as figurative descriptions. They are not real history but are mere allegories. As such there remains practically no difference in the interpretation of the Nairukta and the Aitihāsika schools. But in due course of time the real significance of what Yāska intended to convey was forgotten and the legends connected with the Mantras to bring home the points discussed in those texts were taken as real facts. The mistake committed by the medieval commentators was repeated and vehemently defended by the originators as well as the followers

[19] Cp. 'api vā puruṣavidhānāmeva satām karmātmāna ete syuḥ yathā yajño yajamānasya. eṣa cākhyānasamayaḥ,'

of the modern school of Vedic studies. It was only Dayānanda who after several centuries pointed out where the mistake lay and what was the real sense behind these allegories.

The school of etymologists is represented by Yāska himself. The followers of this school hold that all nouns can and should be derived from roots according to certain principles. These derivations were not to be made for the purpose of intellectual exercises but had a definite purpose behind them. This purpose was that all nouns should be explained with reference to their derivative sense as far as the Vedic Mantras are concerned[20]. This fundamental position of the etymologists was put into the background by the medieval commentators. Even Dr. L. Sarup could not leave the track of the medieval scholars and translated the explanations of Vedic Mantras given by Yāska in the *Nirukta* much against the intentions and principle of the etymologists. Dayānanda alone had the courage to point out this fundamental mistake committed by the medieval scholars.

The several schools of Vedic interpretation cited by Yāska are, thus agreed on the main principles of interpretation of the Vedas. Their differences are not vital. They depend on the outlook of the followers of a particular school. Such differences in details or explanations were bound to arise. The typical example 'the sun is set' given by the Rhetoricians would make the point clear. Just as the various interpretors of this sentence will not differ in the literal translation of this sentence but would differ vitally in their explanation of the significance of this simple sentence, similarly the various schools were agreed with the Nairuktas on the general principles and consequently in the literal interpretation of the sacred texts but they

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[20] Vide Yāska's remark 'athāpīdamantareṇa....' (*N.* I, 15) at the close of the discussion on the derivative nature of nouns.

differed in their explanations which were influenced by their individual outlook.

With the passage of time Vedic studies declined. With this decline the unity of these schools and the underlying significance of their explanation were misunderstood. A blending of all the schools was effected by those scholars who wanted to show that there was no difference in all those schools. All was safe so far as the motive was concerned. But the lack of proper understanding on the part of these scholars resulted in disaster. All the schools irrespective of the shades of differences in their explanations were merged into one school which I have termed the medieval school represented by Skanda and Mādhava Bhaṭṭa. The new school was a complete metamorphosis of the ancient schools and was beyond all recognition to an ordinary man. The climax of this mis-blending is found in the commentary of Sāyaṇa. It is this Sāyaṇa who is regarded as a traditional commentator and is followed for all practical purposes by the modern school. Mr. T. V. Kapali Sastry has rightly observed :—

"Here again is a misconception or an ambiguity concerning what is called the traditional interpretation of Sāyaṇa. What is the tradition that was handed down to Sāyaṇa which he maintains in his interpretation of the Ṛgvedic hymns? Or, is it meant by the term the tradition that he himself started and that has been handed down to us through his commentary on the Ṛks? Such a question arises because when we go through his Ṛg-bhāṣya we find him maintaining a variety of traditions coming down from different schools of learning. He maintains mostly the ritualistic tradition that the Mantras are meant for sacrificial purpose , with great zeal, very often at the cost of a straight rendering of the text. But the Brāhmaṇas, the original ritualistic scriptures themselves, do not claim to be treated as the Vedas in the main of which the Mantras are a part

having their place in the rituals. In scores of places Sāyaṇa in his commentary maintains the Vedantic tradition, the Paurāṇik tradition and other Śāstric traditions without making any serious attempt to take notice of the discrepancies in his writings, much less to reconcile them at all. An instance may be cited to show that Sāyaṇa while endeavouring to expound the Ṛks in consonance with the tenets of the ritualist clean forgets that according to the latter there can be no mention of any actual historic occurrence in any portion of the Vedas, since thay are eternal—every sentence, every word, every syllable. Again, when Sāyaṇa finds certain hymns clearly symbolic or containing allegorical allusions, he explains them in a quite simple way making references to minutiae of certain rites that are meant and ought to be so understood and avoids to mention any other possible significance of the Ṛks in question. He was quite aware of the fact that the ritualists were just one of the three main interpreters of the Vedas and this is clear when he occasionally quotes Yāska making reference to a threefold interpretation of the hymns of the Ṛgveda. When he gives us alternative meanings of words or verses, which he often does, it is obvious he does so as a scholar, with a certain indifference to the acceptance of the alternative meaning if it does not fit with a sacrificial context. What then is the tradition he himself received or he has left behind? It is a jumble of traditions that we find registered in his commentary, as has been stated already, although of course he started his work with the avowed object of demonstrating that the Ṛks are ancillary and indispensable to the ceremonial rites of Vedic sacrifices.... ....But he made his choice and sided with the ritualist supporting not fully, but to some extent, the Mīmāṁsakas and wrote the commentary. The ritualistic tradition of Vedic religion was there long before him and he imbibed its spirit. That is not the same as to say—and it will be a

travesty of truth—that that was also the tradition in regard to the interpretation of the Ṛks. If there was any tradition, it was the threefold interpretation of the Ṛks to which Yāska draws our attention. But Sāyaṇa's work has left us a new tradition that the Ṛks are to be interpreted only in one way and that is the way of the ritualist. The ancient tradition of a threefold interpretation has been thoroughly eclipsed, if not wiped out of the memory of Indian Vedist for the last time and for good[21]."

In spite of such a decline of Vedic studies the correct method of interpretation and the threefold way of explaining the Ṛks were not altogether forgotten. Some rays of light were continuously flowing. Virajānanda received them from his Gurus headed by Pūrṇāśrama Svāmin. Dayānanda received them from Virajānanda and revived the ancient school.

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[21] Arvindu Mandir Annual, 5.



Plate 1.—Umāsahitā akṣa-krīḍāmūrti at Elephanta

A PLEA FOR 'UMĀSAHITĀ AKṢA-KRĪḌĀMŪRTI'

By ŚRĪ R. SEN GUPTA

THE Paurāṇic accounts of the incidents from Śiva's life have always been an inspiration to the Hindu artists and they were neither tired of reproducing the same themes again and again nor the charm of the themes was ever lost. Of them most interesting is the panel where Śiva and Pārvatī are shown engaged in playing at dice (*akṣa*). This theme caught fancy of the artists of Ellora where it has been carved as many as seven times. The artists of Elephanta and Jogeśwarī too have shown their fascination for this theme by carving one panel each in their respective excavations.

Scholars have been describing this theme from time to time by different names, such as *Umā-maheśvaramūrti*[1], Pārvatī in the attitude of *Māna*[2], *Mānavatī* Pārvatī[3] etc., which do not appear to be appropriate nor do they convey the proper attitude. Considering the theme, a nomenclature like *Umāsahitā akṣa-krīḍāmūrti* should be most befitting to such a panel which fully explains the mode and attitude.

In the main cave of Elephanta, the panel, to the left of the eastern entrance and opposite to the *Rāvaṇānugraha-mūrti* represents *Umāsahitā akṣa-krīḍāmūrti* (Pl. 1). This panel though much mutilated, still retains some of the original forms and suggests the works of a master artist. The sporting *gaṇas* of Śiva with Nandī among them occupy the lower portion of the panel. Above them are Śiva and

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[1] T. A. G. Rao—*Elements of Hindu Iconography*—Vol. II, Part I, PP. 138-41, Pls. XXVII-XXIX.

[2] H. Shastri—*Guide to Elephanta*, P. 45, Pl. XIV.

[3] S. A. Joglekar—*Gharāpurī* (in Marathi) PP. 23-4.

Pārvatī with attendants and Bhṛṅgī is sitting to the right of Śiva. At the top, blocks of stone with arched openings suggest the Mt. Kailāśa with caves and at the sides, gods hover in the sky. Pārvatī's affectation arising out of some disagreement over the game, has been beautifully portrayed by her movement in turning away from Śiva. The reaction of the spectacle on the child on the lap of the female attendant, standing between Śiva and Pārvatī, is also vivid, and shown as if it is trying to come down with the right hand (which otherwise should go round the body of the attendant in embrace) bringing forward and applying its force to be freed. Śiva's hands are all broken, but one of the broken left hands is still seen on the ground holding the end of Pārvatī's garment as if to prevent her from running away. The way the situation has been exploited by the artist and translated with his chisel and hammer, evokes nothing but effulgent appreciation.

There is an almost identical panel in the Rāmeśvara (Cave XXI) temple at Ellora. The Rāmeśvara panel (Pl. 2) also has in the lower half the *gaṇas* playing all sorts of pranks with the placid Nandī and above Śiva and Pārvatī surrounded by attendants are engaged in the game (*akṣa-krīḍā*). Bhṛṅgī is seen there sitting between Śiva and Pārvatī. Śiva sitting majestically has his front left hand on the left thigh and his back left hand is holding the end of Pārvatī's garment where as in his front right hand are the dice-coins and the back right hand shows the *tarjanī*. The inhibited Pārvatī, on the other hand, shows *vismaya* with her right hand and her left hand rests on the ground. In between them on the ground is seen a dice-board. The treatment of the figures in this panel speaks volumee of the artist. The entreating Śiva's efforts to pacify Pārvatī, the expectant on-lookers and the maids-on-duty together with the *gaṇas* in action in the lower section, all give an idea as if a scene of a drama while being enacted

has been petrified. Rao described this panel as, "Śiva is herein holding in one of his left hands the upper part of the garment of his consort and keeps one of his right hands in the Suchi pose and the other appears to be carrying a book. He is evidently giving out to Umā one of the *purāṇas* which are supposed to have been addressed by Śiva to Pārvatī. Evidently he mistook the dice-coins for a book.

Interestingly enough, at the other end of the wall in which this panel is carved, is the *Rāvaṇānugrahamūrti* panel which at Elephanta faces the panel of this theme and is noteworthy. The other panels at Ellora are with almost the same sort of arrangements of figures. In some instances, instead of holding the end of Pārvatī's garment, Śiva holds the right hand of Pārvatī.

The Jogeśwarī panel, in a much smaller scale, closely followed the Elephanta panel. Carved on the lintel of the eastern entrance to the hall, it has Śiva and Pārvatī in the foreground with attendants behind them. One misses the sporting *gaṇas* here but the full can be seen standing behind Śiva. In imitation of the Elephanta panel here also Śiva holds the end of Pārvatī's garment who has turned away and in his front right hand are the dice-coins. The dice-board is lying in front of them.

Dice playing or *akṣa-krīḍā* has a remote antiquity. In ancient days it has been a popular pastime as also been used for gambling. In the *Mahābhārata*, how Yudhiṣṭhira was made to play and gamble away everything including the wife is well known. Vātsyāyana in his famous *Kāma-sūtra* describing about a fashionable man of the town called *Nāgaraka* says his outer house is fitted with a pair of couches provided with soft pillows and white sheets ......On the floor not far from his couche is spread a carpet with pillows as well as boards for chess and dice-playing[4]. The

[4] R. C. Majumdar, Ed—*The Classical Age*, P. 575.

game found its way into the Buddhist *Jātaka* stories also. An account in the *Vidurapaṇḍita Jātaka* (No. 545) is related where Punnaka, the *Yakṣa* general won Vīdurapaṇḍita (Bodhisattva), the wise minister of the king of Indraprastha, after defeating the latter in a game of dice. The *Jātaka* story can be seen in the beautiful paintings of c. 7th cent. A.D. at Ajanta which is contemporaneous with the sculptured panels of Elephanta and Ellora.

The three panels described above belong to the 7th-8th cent. A.D. a time which synchronised with the activities of the renascent Brāhmanism, out to eclipse the others in both the spheres of art and religion. The panels, as a matter of fact, reflect the life and social condition of the time and though the theme is from Śiva's life it also gives an idea how the royal personages (surrounded by the attendants) enjoyed the pastime.



Plate 2.—Umāsahitā akṣa-krīḍāmūrti in Rāmeśvara cave

SIMILES IN ŚAṄKARA'S BHĀṢYA ON THE KAṬHOPANIṢAD

By DR. M. D. PARADKAR

IT is well-known that Śaṅkarācārya with his critical acumen coupled with an inimitable style, has eclipsed all other Ācāryas in the field. His *Bhāṣyas* on the major Upaniṣads also teem with apt illustrations as well as Upamās for which he is deservedly famous. Among the Upaniṣads, *Kaṭhopaniṣad* with the story of Naciketas as its basis is evidently narrative in character and metrical in form. This has helped Śaṅkarācārya in making his *Bhāṣya* on it all the more interesting with the use of several Upamānas expressed with a considerable amount of freedom. Hence, a study of the similes in this *Bhāṣya* of his is bound to be interesting as well as instructive.

Fire is chosen as the Upamāna thrice. (1) Thus on one occasion, *Fire* (*agni*) known to be distinct from *Lauha* or *iron* through its quality of burning it, is offered as the Upamāna for Ātman of the nature of consciousness, which is also distinct from the body etc., and is recognised through its quality of making their characteristics such as form etc. perceptible[1]. (2) *Fire* which is the real cause of *dāhakatva* in substances like *water* (*udaka*) etc. which are not of the nature of fire, becomes the standard of comparison for Ātman or Brahman which, likewise, is the real cause of sentiency in other sentient substances, which are not of the nature of Brahman[2]. (3) Substances like *water* (*jala*), *fire-brand* (*ulmukamalūtam* vide the Ṭīkā of Gopālayatīndra) which do not burn by themselves, but only follow *fire* which really

[1] II-1—3, P. 80 L. 6 & 7. References are to the Ānandāśrama Press edition of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* with the *Bhāṣya* of Śāṅkārācārya brought out by Mahadeo Chimnaji Apte in 1889.

[2] II-2-13 p. 100 L. 7 & 8 to p. 17 L. 4.

burns, are rightly offered as the Upamāna for such luminaries as the Sun etc. which also do not shine by themselves, but only emulate the Highest Lord who really shines[3]. (4) The *Point* (*agra*) (of a needle) becomes the Upamāna for mature and sharp intellect in respect of piercing the desired object[4]. (5) *Spokes* (*arāḥ*) put in the *axle* of the wheel of the *Chariot* (*ratha-nābhi*) become the standard of comparison for such gods as Āditya and the like caused to enter the Adhidaiva sphere and speech etc. caused to enter the Adhyātma sphere by Ātman at the time of the maintenance of the world[5]. (6) *Horses* (*aśvāḥ*) and the reins (*raśmayaḥ*) occur as Upamānas for senses like ear etc. and the mind as in both the former function only on being controlled and impelled by the latter[6]. (7) The *Aśvattha tree* becomes the standard of comparison for the tree of Mundane Existence in respect of being moved by the wind; the wind in case of the latter being desires as well as acts[7].

(8) The *sky* happens to be the favourite Upamāna of Śaṅkarācārya as is evident from his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras*. The same is true of the present *Bhāṣya* of his on the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*. Thus the *sky* (*ākāśa*) becomes the Upamāna for Ātman in point of being free from injury by weapons due to Asaṅgatva[8]. (9) It is offered as the Upamāna for Ātman again, as both, not being subject to change, cannot be struck by any means whatsoever[9]. (10) Ātman and the trio consisting of names, forms as well as actions are compared firstly with the *sky* (*gagana*) and *duskiness* (*mala*), secondly with *mirage* (*marīci*) and the *water in it* and thirdly with the *rope* (*rajju*) and the snake-rope (*rajju-sarpa*)

[3] II-2-15 p. 102. L. 10 & 11.
[4] 1-3-12 p. 70. L. 4.
[5] II-1-9 p. 83. L. 17...20.
[6] I-3-3 p. 59. L. 7 & 8.
[7] II-3-1 p. 105. L. 7.
[8] I-2-18 p. 49. L. 5.
[9] I-2-19 p. 49. L. 8 & 9.

as in all these the latter are falsely seen in place of the former and are to be ultimately dissolved and funded back into them on the rise of right knowledge[10]. (11) The *sky* is rightly chosen as the Upamāna for Ātman once in point of being complete in themselves[11] and (12) secondly in respect of being non-corporeal in character[12]. (13) On one occasion, the *sky* (*ākāśa*) is chosen as the Upamāna for Ātman in point of being subtle and able to assume various forms without incurring any change in themselves[13]. (14) Once the *sky* (*ambara*) becomes the standard of comparison for Ātman as both are said to be of the limited size (i. e. the size of the thumb) only due to limiting adjuncts, thus making the attribution figurative[14]. (15) Consciousness consisting of action, instrument and result wrongly-superimposed upon Ātman who is singularly free from it, is shown to be on par with the *serpent* (*sarpa*), *silver* (*rajata*), *water* (*udaka*) and *duskiness* (*mala*) wrongly superimposed upon the *rope* (*rajju*), the mother of *pearl* (*śuktikā*), the *saline soil* (*ukhara*) and the *sky* (*gagana*) which themselves are not really contaminated by them[15].

(16) *Mirror* (*ādarśa*) which cannot be considered as the support or *ādhāra* of the *face* (*mukham*) although the latter is reflected in it, becomes the standard of comparison for the body which also cannot be styled as the substratum of Ātman, although the latter is encased in it.[16] (17) Intellect on being cleansed of all defects is compared with the *mirror* which is polished.[17] (18) One's *own body* (*ātman*) clearly visible on being reflected in the *mirror* is

[10] I-3-14 p. 71. L. 5—7.
[11] II-1-10 p. 85. L. 8.
[12] II-2-12 p. 99. L. 9.
[13] II-2-9 p. 97. L. 9... 11.
[14] II-1-12 p. 86. L. 9... 11.
[15] II-2-11 p. 98. L. 9.... 11.
[16] II-2-12 p. 99. L. 9 & 10.
[17] II-2-12 p. 108. L. 10.

chosen as the Upamāna for Ātman which also can be seen in one's intellect which is cleansed of all the defects.[18] (19) On one occasion, luminaries such as the *Sun* (*āditya*) etc. become the standard of comparison for Brahman as both being endowed with light themselves, are found able to illumine others[19]. (20) The *Sun's light* (*āditya-prakāśa*) becomes the suitable Upamāna for Cetas i.e. knowledge (of Brahman) in point of being permanent and uniform in nature.[20]

(21) The *word āyuḥ* which can be figuratively used for *ghee* (*ghṛta*) in view of the latter contributing to the longevity of the former, is brought in comparison with the word Upaniṣad which also can be figuratively applied to the work (i.e. *grantha*-such as Kaṭha or Kāṭhaka) as the latter contributes to the destruction of the seed of mundane existence, which is the real meaning of the former i.e. the word Upaniṣad.[21] (22) The *plantain tree* (*kadalī*) is offered as the dissimilar Upamāna for Brahman as the former, unlike the latter, is perceived to be impermanent as it perishes after giving rise to the fruit, its effect[22]. (23) The *pillar made up of plantain tree* (*kadalī-stambha*) is brought in as the Upamāna for the tree of mundane existence in respect of being unessential[23]. (24) Enquiry (*into the number etc. of*) the *teeth of a crow* (*kāka-danta-parīkṣā*) is chosen as the suitable Upamāna for the question regarding the existence after death asked by Naciketas (to Yama) in point of being purposeless[24]. (25) A *pitcher* (*kumbha*) occurs as the dissimilar Upamāna for Ātman as the former unlike the latter is brought into by an increase in its parts

[18] II-3-4 p. 108. L. 8. . . . 10.
[19] II-2-15 p. 102. L. 14 & 15.
[20] II-2-1 p. 89. L. 8.
[21] II-1-1- Introduction p. 5. L. 3 & 4.
[22] I-3-15 p. 73 L. 13. to p. 74-L. 5.
[23] II-3-1 p. 103. L. 8 to p. 104. L. 3.
[24] I-1-25 p. 25. L. 12 & 13.

and hence is *nava* and not ancient[25]. (26) The *edge of a razor* (*kṣura-dhārā*) becomes the Upamāna for the path of right knowledge as both cannot be easily traversed.[26]

(27) *Magic* (*māyā*) occurs as an Upamāna twice. Thus the tree of mundane existence is compared firstly with *magic* (*māyā*) secondly with the *water in the mirage* (*marīcyudaka*) and thirdly with the *city* of *Gandharvas* (*gandharva-nagara*) in point of being impermanent due to being associated with the qualities of appearance and disappearance.[27] (28) The worlds seen in Brahman, the highest reality are rightly compared with the *city* of *Gandharvas*, the *water in* the *mirage* as well as *magic* (*māyā*) in respect of being modifications alike and hence impermanent.[28] (29) *Houses* (*gṛha*) and the like become the standard of comparison for Prāṇa and the like in point of the inability to exist independently i.e. without being put together by some one.[29] (30) *Knots* (*granthi*) are offered as the dissimilar Upamāna for the cognitions produced by Nescience in respect of being indissoluble.[30] (31) The *Cintāmaṇi* and *Viśvarūpa-maṇi* are offered as Upamānas for Ātman in point of being really uniform in nature in spite of assuming various forms due to limiting adjuncts[31].

(32) The *jar* (*ghaṭa*) occurs as an Upamāna four times. Once *it* becomes the Upamāna for the group of the body and the senses in respect of being falsely identified with the soul in spite of being non-Ātmans.[32] (33) On one occasion, the *jar* is offered as the dissimilar Upamāna for Brahman as the former, unlike the latter, is not self-luminous

[25] I-2-18 p. 48. L. 10, 11 to p. 49 L. 4.
[26] I-3-14 p. 72. L. 9 & 10.
[27] II-3-1 p. 103. L. 6 to 8.
[28] II-3-1 p. 106. L. 5 & 6.
[29] II-2-5 p. 94. L. 4 & 5.
[30] II-3-15 p. 117. L. 10 & 11.
[31] I-2-21 p. 52. L. 2. . . 4.
[32] I-3-12 p. 69. L. 3 & 4.

and hence stands in need of some illuminator.[33] (34) Effects such as the *jar* etc. (*ghaṭādi*) unable to go beyond and exist apart from their causes viz. the *clay* and the like (*mṛdādi*) form the standard of comparison for all the worlds which also are unable to go beyond and exist apart from their cause namely Brahman.[34] (35) The *jar* ever associated with their cause viz. *clay* becomes the standard of comparison for the existing world which also must be associated with some cause (i.e. the Ātman) endowed with existential character[35].

(36) *Many persons without umbrellas* being styled as possessing umbrellas due to *one with* an *umbrella* (*eka chatrin*) once occurs as an Upamāna for the Highest Soul to whom drinking or experiencing is attributed on account of his association with the Individual soul to whom it really belongs; the attribution being secondary alike in both.[36] (37) *Darkness* (*timira*) once occurs as an Upamāna for Avidyā in respect of screening the truth.[37] (38) On one other occasion, *darkness* (*tamas*) and *light* (*prakāśa*) are offered as the standard of comparison for the paths of Preyas and Śreyas in point of being diametrically opposed to each other.[38] (39) *Fire* (*agni*) permeating *wood* (*dāru*) and the like, is chosen as the Upamāna for Ātman permeating every being.[39] (40) *Starting against the current of a river* (*nadyaḥ pratisrotaḥ pravartanam*) is rightly offered as the Upamāna for realisation of the self as both speak of boldness as well as discrimination. (41) *Naciketas*[40] becomes the standard of comparision for any other person knowing Ātman in point of

[33] II-2-15 p. 102. L. 14 & 15.
[34] II-3-1 p. 106. L. 7 & 8.
[35] II-3-12 p. 115. L. 3. . . 5.
[36] I-3-1 p. 56. L. 8 & 9.
[37] II-1-11. p. 86. L. 6.
[38] I-2-4 p. 33. L. 5 & 6.
[39] II-2-9 p. 97. L. 9. . . . 11.
[40] II-1--1 p. 76. L. 7 & 8.

reaching the Highest alike.[41] (42) *Sleep* (*nidrā*) occurs as the Upamāna for ignorance in respect of being dreadful due to their being the source of all calamities.[42]

(43) The *earth* (*pṛthivī*) becomes the dissimilar Upamāna for Brahman as the former unlike the latter has a beginning and hence non-eternal due to being a modification all the same.[43] (44) The *extinction of a lamp* (*pradīpa-nirvāṇa*) becomes the standard of comparison for the disappearance of all bonds of ignorance in respect of perpetual non-existence.[44] The *servant* (*bhṛtya*) and the *master* (*swāmin*) become the Upamāna twice. (45) Once *servants* regularly abiding by the orders of the *master who approaches them with a strong weapon in his hand* (*vajrodyata-kara*) through fear are chosen as the Upamāna for the world consisting of such luminaris as the Moon, the Sun, the stars, the constellations etc. following the orders of the Lord, their master, through fear[45]. (46) On another occasion, the *master with a strong weapon in the hand* becomes the Upamāna for Parameśvara and the *servants* regularly obeying him through fear are brought in as the standard of comparison for the able Lokapālas obeying the Highest Lord through fear.[46] (47) *Deep* and *expansive lake* (*mahā-hrada*) is befittingly chosen as the Upamāna for Naciketas in respect of remaining undisturbed in spite of provocation.[47] (48) *Mother* (*mātṛ*) is offered as the suitable Upamāna for the scripture in respect of being compassionate alike; the former to her sons and the latter to its readers.[48] (49) *Ascetics* (*yatayaḥ*) turning away from all desires

[41] II-3-18 p. 120. L. 9 & 10.
[42] I-3-14 p. 72. L. 4.
[43] I-3-15 p. 73. L. 10 & 11.
[44] II-3-14 p. 117. L. 7 & 8.
[45] II-3-2 p. 106. L. 13 to p. 107. L. 5. . . 7.
[46] II-3-3 p. 107. L. 11 & 12.
[47] I-1-25-26 p. 25. L. 14.
[48] I-3-14 p. 72. L. 6 and 7.

(*nivṛttaiṣaṇāḥ*) become the Upamāna for the seeker (referring to himself as Aham) in respect of obtaining the bliss of the knowledge of Ātman.[49] (50) The *rope* (*rajju*) is once offered as the Upamāna for Ātman in point of really being beyond the ken of superimpositions (*Adhyāsa*) made on it by the people through wrong notions.[50] The *rope* and the *serpent* twice occur as the Upamāna.[51]

The *king* (*rājan*) is chosen as the Upamāna four times. Thus *he* is offered as the Upamāna for Ātman, (51) once in point of being the owner of a place which is different from him[52] and (52) secondly in respect of rulership.[53] (53) *Subjects* (*viśaḥ*) attending upon the *king* (*rājan*) with *offerings* (*bali*) are brought in as the standard of comparison for the vital airs and the senses attending upon Ātman with the knowledge of form and the like.[54] (54) On one occasion yet, the *King* (*pura-svāmin*) and his *citizens* (*pura-vāsin*) become the suitable Upamāna for Ātman and the airs in the body as in both the latter become helpless on the running away of the former.[55] (55) *Uplifted thunderbolt* (*udyata-vajra*) becomes the Upamāna for Brahman in respect of inspiring great fear and awe.[56] (56) The power of (the *growth of*) the Vaṭa tree (*vaṭavṛkṣa-śakti*) and the *seed* of *vaṭa* (*vaṭa-kaṇikā*) are offered as the Upamāna for the Avyakta, the root-cause of the expansive world and the Highest soul as in the case of both the former are woven warp and woof in the latter.[57] (57) Ordinary *tree* (*vṛkṣa*) is once brought in as the standard of comparison the tree

[49] II-2-14 p. 101. L. 11 & 12.
[50] II-2-11 p. 99. L. 2 & 3.
[51] See Nos. 10. and 15 above.
[52] II-2-1 p. 89. L. 5. . . . 7.
[53] II-2-1 p. 89. L. 7 & L. 9.
[54] II-2-3 p. 92. L. 6. . . . 8.
[55] II-2-4 p. 93. L. 4 & 5.
[56] II-3-2 p. 106. L. 13.
[57] I-3-11 p. 66. L. 5. . . 7 to p. 67 L. 2.

of mundane existence in respect of being non-existential in character.[58] (58) Ordinary *bridge* (*setu*) helping persons to cross the river, is appropriately chosen as the Upamāna for the Alaukika Setu i.e. the knowledge of Brahman which helps the sacrifices to cross the valley of grief.[59]

Śaṅkarācārya has fully elaborated the famous Rūpaka of Saṁsāra-vṛkṣa identified with Aśvattha tree in the last Valli of the second Adhyāya of the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*. Thus the mundane existence is identified with a huge tree; Avidyā, Kāma-karma and Avyakta with its *seeds* (*bīja*), the Highest i.e. Brahman arrived at Vedāntas with its *root-essence* (*mūlasāra*), *Hiraṇyagarbha* with its *sprout* (*aṅkura*), minute bodies of all beings with its *trunk* (*skandha*), greed with the *sprinkling of water* (*jala* or *salila-seka*) contributing its height and intelligence along with the object of sense with its *tender shoots*. Further it is rightly added by the Ācārya that the instruction in lores consisting of Śrutis, Smṛtis and Nyāya form the *leaves* (*palāśa*) of this tree, various acts such as giving food, alms as well as austerities constitute its *good fruit* (*su-puṣpa*) and pleasure, pain as well as sensation go to form the *sap* (*rasa*) of the tree. Brahmadeva and others in the seven worlds are identified with *birds* (*pakṣin*) forming their nests on this tree. Finally this elaborate Sāṅga-Rūpaka is rightly rounded off by identifying non-attachment with the weapon or the axe (śastra) with which this tree is to be uprooted.[60]

As Śaṅkarācārya was not primarily interested in similes, he is regardless of their form. This gives rise to stylistic peculiarities. Among Upamāvācakas, *vat* and *iva* are most common. The former occurs in Numbers 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20, 21, 23, 30, 32, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47 and 48;

[58] II-3-1 p. 103. L. 8.

[59] I-3-2 p. 57. L. 8.

[60] II-3-1 p. 104. L. 2...10.

while the latter is used in Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 31, 34, 38, 39, 40, 45, 46, 53, 54, 56 and 58. The usual correlatives *yathā-tathā* occur in Nos. 15, 18 and 45 where the Upamā is elaborately expressed with the help of two complete sentences constituting the Upamāna-vākya and the Upameya-vākya. *Tathā*, the corelative of *yathā* is replaced by *tadvat* in Nos. 1 and 3; but is dropped in view of the change of the order of the Upamāna-vākya and the Upameya-vākya as in Nos. 25 and 35.—Nos. 16 and 21 are Vākyopamās; in the former the Upamāvācaka *yathā* is dropped and merely *yadvat* is used while in the latter the Vākyopamā is expressed with *vat* in the Upamāna-vākya "*āyurvai ghṛtamityādivat*'. Majority of the Upamās contain double Upamānas. No. 53 is a case of a triple Upamāna where *rājan*, *viśaḥ* and *bali* became the Upamāna for Ātman, the vital airs with senses and *rūpādi vijñāna*.

At times the Upamā is expressed in the form of a technical Dṛṣṭānta with the help of either the word *darśanāt* as in No. 19 and 33 (based on Vaidharmya) or *dṛṣṭam* as in No. 29. The Upamāna is sometimes conditioned by a restrictive attribute. Thus in Nos. 45 and 46, the Upamāna *svāmin* is conditioned by the attribute *vajrodyatakara* in order to make it correspond to Īśvara in respect of inducing activity in their subordinates out of fear. In No. 49, the Upamāna *yatayaḥ* has to be restricted with the adjective *nivṛttaiṣaṇāḥ* for the purpose of adequately understanding the Sādhāraṇa Dharma viz. obtaining bliss of the knowledge of Ātman. Similarly in No. 55, the Upamāna *vajra* is conditioned by the attribute *udyata* in order to make it suitable for the Upameya Brahman in respect of creating fear.

Many a time, Śaṅkarācārya instead of expressing the Upamā, chooses to suggest it, leaving the readers to understand the Sādhāraṇa Dharma. Consequently Upamās become varieties of Dharmaluptā. Thus in No. 24 where

kāka-danta-parīkṣā is offered as the Upamāna for *maraṇa-saṁbaddha praśna* asked by Naciketas in point of being purposeless, the Upama is really implied in the word *rūpa* in *kāka-danta-parīkṣā-rūpa* standing for *tulya* making the Upamā Samāsagā Ārthī. In Nos. 51 and 52 where *rājan* is offered as the Upamāna for Ātman or Brahman, the Upamā is suggested by the word *sthānīya* in the expressions '*asaṁhatarāja-sthānīyasvōmyartham*' and *rājasthānīyasya brāhmaṇaḥ*' respectively. In No. 36, the word *nyāya* in the expression *chatrinyāyena* puts the readers on the right track of the simile. In No. 44, the Upamā is expressed in a very peculiar manner. Here, Upamā occurs in the words *pradīpanirvāṇavat sarvabandhanōpaśamāt* making *pradīpa* and *sarvabandhana* the real Upamāna and Upameya. There is correspondence between *nirvāṇa* and *upaśama*. The Sādhāraṇa Dharma viz. perpetual non-existence has, therefore, to be supplied in the Upamā.

Thus, the appropriate use of words and figures of speech in Śaṅkarācārya's *Bhāṣya* on the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* have not only softened the austerity of the philosphical discussions but have also added to the *Bhāṣya* the touch and polish of a good literary artist.

"RELIGION" AND "SCIENCE"—IN VEDĀNTIC ENSEMBLE*

By BHABES CHANDRA CHAUDHURI

PASCAL said that—as an art of the *ne plus ultra—viz.*, the Highest acme—religion has more than, perhaps, 228 definitions! Still it has something to do with science and *divine healing* is a science admitted by thinkers from the very ancient time.[1]

Christ cured the sick by spiritual medicine which may be akin to a *Divino-Motive-Faith* almost on the counter-sense of what is known as *Electro-Motive-Force* in modern science of electricity!

One however may know how electricity, by touch alone can in some cases, rejuvinate an atrophied muscle

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* In this paper an effort has only been made to suggest that as per ethics of VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY—which, teaches *inter alia* viz., that TRUTH IS UNIVERSAL—SCIENCE and RELIGION are not fundamentally contradictory—but complimentary and inter-congenitally rooted in blood-streams of WORLD-HUMANISM.

Reference—(Figures in parenthesis refer to works or books of standard authors pertinent to contexts and themes dealt with in the thesis).

1 "*Alchemy as a way of Salvation*" by Dr. F. Spiegelberg.

2 (a) "*Rāmkṛṣna Paramahaṁsa* by Romain Rolland.

(b) "*Memories of Swāmī Vivekānanda*" by Ida Ansell.

3 "*Occult training of the Hindus*" *and*

(a) '*Secret Doctrines* etc.' translated from Sanskrit by Ernest Wood.

(b) "*Mind : its Mysteries*" by Swāmī Śivānanda.

4 "*The soul of the universe*" by Dr. G. Stromberg.

5 "*The Human Mind*" by Prof. Sully.

6 "*Laws of Manu*" translated by Sir W. Jones.

7 "*Upaniṣads*" translated by Prof. Mahadevan.

8 "*Perennial Philosophy*" by Prof. Huxley.

9 "*Practical yoga Dictionary*" by Dr. Ernest Wood.

10 "*The Modern review*," November, 1957.

11 "*Brain and Personality*" by Dr. W. H. Thomson, M. D.

12 "*Adventure of Ideas*" by Dr. A. N. Whitehead.

or revive a sinking heart. It is known, too, that Ramakṛṣna[2]—the saint of Dakṣiṇeśvara at Calcutta, had just by a mere gentle *touch* once sought to completely transform a *Sceptic Naren* into a full-fledged "Vivekānanda" of ever blissful divine memory !

This obviously shows that divine power helps one to aquire *Siddhi*[3] or the power of doing supernatural actions—known as *miracles.* The ascetics can, thus by acquiring *Siddhi* contrive to change the molecules of an object and convert it into gold or any other compound; can draw their supply from the cosmic source, either and create any kind of thing—So observes the Indian adepts in Yoga.[3] For instance, it is said that Queen Chudâlâi performed "miracles" by moving freely above the ground and in the sky ; Śaṅkara did many hair-raising miracles : he is said to have drunk molten lead and passed into the body of a king—an art in Yoga, called *Parakāya-Praveśa,* meaning "the art of entering into the body of another." Sadāśiva Brāhmaṇa—another great Yogin could show him off in different places in the same time ; once he was buried underneath the bank of the Kāverī river in south India for some months ! His hand was cut, and he brought again the full hand.

Indeed, there are countless people in the world today, who may bear witness to this truth : that there is a divine law—a Force of Universal Good[4]—which needs as much attention for reciprocal benefit as either the scientist or the theologian may earnestly be in quest of, just to achieve the individual end and purpose in life. There is an inexhaustible fund of energy or power for good within every thing—which Religion does seek to recognize as God within the person as person, as Science[4] tries to interpret as *Flux of Force,* that sustains the spontaneous radiation-cycle, in an endless chain-reaction of all *fissionable* matter. And, as in the case of former, so in the case of

latter—through proper recognition and direction one may use such potential Power to bring immense good into the individual existence of both, *viz*, that of Religion as well as Science.

There are thus, different ways of using this good agency[3].

The psychiatrist employs say, this power by using some medicines to heal conditions, which a patient may suffer from; but an equal remedy a spiritualist, too, might effect of this malady with what is just, called the charm of a *Faith-Cure*[5].

And, no wonder, Religion in India, as per her Law-giver Manu—becomes a synonym for rigid performance of a *decalogue* of virtues[6], that is : *dhṛti* (unfailing affinity); '*Kṣamā* (mercy); *dama* (control over breath); '*asteya*' (dispassion); '*Śauca*' (purity); *indriya-nigraha* (self-restraint); *dhī* (intellect); *Vidyā* (learning); *satya* (truth); *akrodha* (non-anger)—just as *per contra*, the Romans in European Renaissance days sought too, to stabilize it on Seven Pillars of Cardinal Virtues, e.g., Faith; Hope; Charity; Prudence; Justice; Temperance and Fortitude!

Scientific pursuits, too, are more or less based on a like chain of concepts summed up or strung together in their virtual contexts! That is, if one should say, *viz*, that : Faith, Hope and Charity constitute the three basic items of the above "cardinal virtues," which make for "Religion" then, can't it likewise be, also inferred therefrom in the key that—the precise objective-study of science in so far as it relates to the applied branches, say, like that of medicine, psychiatry or psycho-therapy—rests likewise on essential elements of scientific-approach broad-based on what may, as well be called in technical phrase, e.g. 'Diagnosis', 'Prognosis' and 'Treatment'?

For, what is *Diagnosis* after all—than what one may but incline rationally at best—to believe in? Is n't it truly

then, *Faith*, at bottom? Similarly, *Prognosis* is something that one may expect to look for—what he should reasonably anticipate beforehand! Is it not, then, akin to—*Hope*?

Thirdly, of course, comes up as logical consequence of these two—what one understands by *Treatment*—which is surely nothing, if not, a *Charity* in truest sense of letter and spirit? Is not then the ethics of human welfare that postulates the foundation of Religion—co-eval with that of *Science* as viewed *mutatis mutandis*? Indeed, there is seldom at bottom—any difference between the two: call Science your *Religion* and you become a votary of Einstein, Edison or Marconi: whose only *Faith* was in the universal good of mankind!

Call *Religion*, again, your *Science* and, what wonder you transform yourself as the follower of Luther, Emerson, Buddha, Rāmakṛṣṇa or Christ. . . . men who equally lived and died by pinning their undying 'Faith' in good-weal of mankind, likewise!

Viewed humanistically, thus, into their fundamentals: don't we notice, however, that they are but, essentially, differences in names—as judged by their avowed ends and purposes which can only be equally realized by practising Faith, Hope and Charity in their real sense in all objective pursuits of Life?

The conviction of ignorance is about the first key that, according to the *Upaniṣads*,[7] unlocks the portal of nescience (*avidyā*) towards the Way of Wisdom—leading to Self-Realization.

To quote the text from the "*Iśāvāsya Upaniṣad* as a case in point, *viz.*—

Yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni
Ātmā eva abhūdbijānataḥ
Tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ
Ekatvam anupaśyataḥ

That is: *Where* to one who knows, all beings are verily identical with one's own self, *there* what delusion and what sorrow can be to him who has seen the identity?

Judged from *ordinary* stand-point, of course, we find most of us—are almost far from such endowment of Self-Realization! And what are we? A Darwin or Huxley is of opinion, viz, at one time you and I were nothing—but a simple microscopic speck of life! The high personality like Emerson or Gandhi was also in a similar stage! And so many cells have been added to that microscopic speck of life which Science calls the fertilised ova—a fact which can only be observed in a microscope.

Besides—there is what the Science, again, calls—chromosomes. Between the former* and the latter i.e., the microscopic speck of life—called the fertilised ova, the difference that exists seems to be as widely appalling as that between an elephant and the Himālayas; if the fertilised ova—so to say, is of a Himālayan size, the chromosome approximates to that of an elephant!

You might know, now—after what Science tells—that it is not from the microscopic speck of life that the Homo Sapiens have developed: but from those chromosomes[8]! That way: the *Ātman* (Soul) which, as per Religion of the *Upaniṣads*[9] seems to be the only *subtle Ultimate Reality* whence all things emerge, viz, to quote from the texts of the Upaniṣad—"Ātmanaḥ Ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ, ākāśāt vāyuḥ, vāyoragniḥ, agnerāpaḥ, adbhyaḥ pṛthivī"—that is, out of the *Soul*, emerge space; from space air; from air fire; from fire water; from water earth issue forth! In the *Kaṭhopaniṣad*[7] one may also, come across a like attribution of this Reality of *Ātman viz.*,—

Agniryathaiko bhuvanaṁ praviṣṭo
Rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva

Ekastathā sarvabhūtāntarātmā
Rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo bahiśca."

That is, "As 'Agni' (Fire) takes different hues of flames by entering the object it burns, so does One Soul becomes, also, many and varied by entering the body of all objects of creation" !

What is the inner philosophy behind Religion? The primeval man as he stood awe-struck before the sun, the moon and heavenly luminaries—like that in the Icelandic Edda—felt atonce rather intuitively transported to a world of divine power and, not only hastened to sing the enchanted *songs of odin's corpse* but, likewise too, felt infinitely exhilarated himself by reciting hymns in profound adoration of Celestial Power ! This was surely not nature—worship as commonly understood —a veneration of material body of the Sun or the like ! Rather, it was a spontaneous rapture of heart in thanks—not alone, for the life-giving warmth of energy, but in reverent homage to a Divinity believed to animate the physical orb, and to have a benignant influence on the soul of man.

The early Chistians, for instance, like the Sages of the VEDAS—well recognized the specific value of such solar hymns such as is testified to by the underlying hymn to the "CHRIST SUN"—in the West, *viz* :—

"*O Thou, Real Sun, in fill us,*
Shining with perpetual light
Splendour of the holy Spirit
Pervade our minds" !

A counter-part of this, we also find in the following verse, *viz*, *Gāyatrī*, of the Vedas :

Oṁ Bhūrbhuvaḥ swaḥ tat savitur Vareṇyaṁ Bhargo devasya dhīmahi dhiyo yo naḥ Pracodayāt, Oṁ !

That is :

"Earth ! Midworld !! Heaven !!!
That excellent splendour of
the Divine Sun, we meditate
upon,
May it illumine our heart,
Oṁ !"

Thus, the primeval man's basic concept of philosophy lay around the infinite majesty and grace of the subtleties of natural phenomena ! Then came in the Scientist. He found out astronomical laws with predictable results and merely stated what philosophy has long ago—sought to declare in poetic languages of the Hymns, Prayers and Psalms ! The science has lately discovered the wonderful *actinic* properties of solar energy , in as much as—sunlight as a healing agent of countless diseases, namely, leprosy, tuberculosis, rheumatism, obesity, anaemia, neurasthenia, eczema, colds, coughs, rickets, caries in tooth etc.—has been definitely well established and there has been an increasing rage in recent times for "SUN-BATH" hunters—particularly, in the West. Hence, it appears : what Religion describes as *divine*, *viz.*, *God Ra*, *Edda*, *Apollo* or *Missr* in varying languages of the globe—Science, too, characterises that in a technical sense only as. . . *actinic*, that is, both acknowledging their common *universal identity* in the art of *healing*—be it of MIND, Body or both![4] Next, Science, we know, has to deal with death and birth—particulary by its applied branch of medicine; but for all this can it definitely say that, *birth is the beginning and death is the end* ? And that *life is between the two* ? Surely not ! Well, one may say : my birthday is 4th July 1955—a day on which your parent calls you to have been born ! But, science tells that you must have been born certainly nine months and some odd days before ! Still, were you, to ask all seriously—born *then* ? Perhaps no ! And why ? Science

explains that like this : The sperm of your parent fertilised the ovum of your mother—and that day must you have been born! Is that really so? No—again, says the Science! That sperm must have been living! So, it comes to this : its birth was really a change of life from this sperm and the life came over to the ovum which ovum must have been living at the time the conception took place! So, *when* were you precisely born, pray? Your birth must have taken place in your parent's sperm and your mother's ovum. They were born in a very similar cycle! Therefore, are you not viewed remotely—and speaking figuratively, sprung like the fabled VENUS—from the *cosmic ocean* of ETERNITY?[1] Can Science then probe into this veil of mystery—to reveal the Truth? Similarly, on the debit side of Life—*viz*, Death. Can you say that *we are really dying*? Perhaps not—says the Science—because, it appears some part of life is transmitted everlastingly that keeps on renewing life! Look at an amoeba—a unicellular animal. That amoeba—as Science tells you—procreates itself; propagates itself, merely by the body of the amoeba itself being divided into two. One amoeba who is the parent amoeba splits itself into two daughter cells; the parent amoeba—it is said—does not die—but lives in the two daughter cells. So, where do you get 'death'? As per Science then, we find that there is no *physical death*! There is no 'corpse' of the amoeba? No, says the Science it has none of the sort—because amoeba is a uni-cellular animal that never dies![5]

Religion calls God as 'Omnipotent' and 'Eternal' as per *paripūrṇaṁ* in Sanskrit and that HE is *always existing*! Is not then, amoeba, viewed from same logic—very near HIM in this particular respect? Coming to higher life—what happens is this. In the case of amoeba having one cell only—that has to take food for itself, for growth and exhibit the various manifestations of life. Some of us

traders; some—are doctors, some are lawyers and so on. Some are there to uplift us.

But, in one cell—that one cell only can uplift: one cell can only breathe in the whole cell, and one cell can only reproduce because there is no *second* cell! There is again no cell to die—if that cell reproduces! In our case—viz.—that of the Homo Sapiens, of course, that function of reproduction is taken up by one particular cell which we call the sperm in male and ovum in female.[1]

Other cells are not—as Science suggests—required for reproduction—so they can die. That is the death of the *cell* only but surely not the death of 'ĀTMAN' or Soul! For can Science confirm yet the mortality of the Soul?

Therefore, it comes to this that both Science and Religion equally hold that we had no beginning and that we are not again going surely—to have an end in the real sense of an end.[8]

This brings one on to the modern concept of what is known as astro-cosmic Science—which comprehends, *inter alia* that astro-cosmic bodies do not die: i.e, only the physical bodies die. That is, the astro-cosmic bodies remain—living in the sun. Some other cells which die, must have queer *subtle existence* and, perhaps be *reborn* somewhere else! Does this fact provide a plausible reason for 're-birth'? Some at present do not believe in rebirth. But, that is no proof in support of its non-existence, to be sure!

If it is a fact that "gravitation law" *was*, *is* and *shall be*, in the universe, quite independently of Newton or Einstein's discovery thereof—similarly, the doctrine of the "transmigration of soul" might as well be a scientific fact, notwithstanding an absence of positive discovery thereof—all these thousand years *viz*., since such an idea took shape in human mind?[3]

Religion—particularly the Upaniṣads, then, (of the Eastern School of Philosophy)—postulates rebirth, evolution and self-realisation.—a fact which almost agrees with modern researches of Science, specially in Genetics, Medicine and astro-cosmics. Therefore, on such an analogy—cannot Science and Religion, as well be expected to meet together?

Again, we know that iron is a metal : obviously, it has then *no life*; medicine has likewise nothing to do with it—because it has no life, birth or death as a living being possesses.[8] But still it has what is called a therapeutic use and *healing* effect on life. Its further reaction to magnet is, also important and self-revealing! Are not its attraction and repulsion towards a pole of the magnet—humanly judged—akin to our mood of love and care or mood of hatred and tedium? The very fact that minerals exert what is called "Bio-chemic effect" may, speaking in an analogous philosophic view—well suggest the view, also, that they too have *life*! Poets like Homer, Kālidāsa or Whitman; thinkers like Democritus or Paracelsus; dramatists like Sophocles or Shakespeare etc.—have almost significantly hinted, since the dawn of Intellect on this planet—that "plants have life"! But, did Science for all that admit that truth say, even before 1899—the year when Sir J. C. Bose proved it with his self invented instrument, "crescograph," before Lord Kelvin in London, to the evident delectation of a rather fully awakened *sceptic* world[10]!

Thus, it is *proved* that plants have life! So, is it not possible too, that what we call 'mineral' might be endowed with similar life—albeit an animation in quiescence line that of some sporophytes?

It is known, however, that Paracelsus—a German Philosopher—naturalist was the first to state in the sixteenth century that the four cardinal elements which sustain Life, namely, *Air*; *Water*; *Earth*; and *Fire* are dominated by four

elemental spirits, namely *Sylph*; *Nymph*; *Gnome*; *Salamander*—as per mythological deities, viz. Mercury; Neptune; Atlas; Vulcan or the like, in corresponding Eastern legends of gods and goddesses. But the philosophy of Eastern Religion comprehends in the Vedas, the Upaniṣads or in the *Gītā* that life—'divine-life' is there in *everything*, viz., to quote a relevant line from the Upaniṣad :

Eko Devaḥ sarva-bhūteṣu Gūḍhaḥ" i.e. "He (Lord God) is the one-indweller in all beings and things."

Science, as we know, clearly demonstrates that the life in lower grades is of a different nature from that in the higher grades—as measured by their susceptibility to stimulus: the lower grades of life in metals or minerals possibly requires greater stimulus on a comparative scale, so that they might respond—such as is evidenced during volcanic outburst of energy; while higher grades of life, requires a proportionately smaller stimulus for the same purpose.[11]

Again, among 'animates'—animals need greater stimulus than men; while it is interesting that among Homo Sapiens there are grades and grades of human species and, they all require different stimulus for being emotionally or intellectually roused up to a certain definite goal or activity. Jesus, Buddha, St. Francis, Plato, Ramakṛṣṇa, Emerson and lots of such *ultra-sensitive Souls* who have verily glorified Life and its progress on this planet since dawn of civilisation—manifestly establish the existence of a like super-grade *Order* of *Divine Life* to which the ordinary common people may appear to be equally as dead in susceptibility to response, as that displayed often by a freshly hewn inert log or dry wood to "*Electro-cardiograph* !

This then unmistakably justifies why there need be Religion : whose object should be to postulate and to demonstrate by various scientific approaches to its inner philosophies—that divinity is latent in everything—the *Great Mind* of God—the *Brahman* or Ātman—to which

everybody has access—just to have a deep dip into HIS DIVINE NATURE—if one would only follow His prophecies uttered in various Holy Books like the Bible; the *Gītā*; the Korān, etc. etc. of the world.

Emerson mentions the core of such divine unity when he writes in *Self-Reliance* :—

> There is one mind common to all individual men what Plato has thought, he may think what a saint has felt, he may feel, what at any time has befallen any man he can understand.

"Who hath access to this universal mind is party to all that is or can be done, for this is the only and sovereign agent." Religion as expounded in the Upaniṣad or the *Bible* definitely establishes then, that there is a *divine agency* whence all things either emerge from or return to, viz., the *Ultimate Essence* i.e., *Tat Jalāniti*" in the invisible and subjective world and outward forms and conditions. That is, it is the witness to everything; it is every where i.e. "*Sākṣī Cetā*; *Sarvaṁ kiṁ Avyaktaṁ*"; ever ready and willing to respond to all creative impulses of a rational mind!

Viewed *mutatis mutandis* however, do we not come across similar prophetic lines in the *Bible* : ". . . . the Lord, is in the midst of thee : thou shall not see evil any more"*? or, as in the line : "Behold, I will do a new thing; now it shall spring forth. . .†"

Again, the *Bible* says : "As a man thinketh in his *heart*, so is he." What is this thing called : "*thinking* in one's *heart*", as distinguished from "*thinking* with ones *head*" ?

Does this not then, significantly connote and symbolise the fact that Religion—for *faith* in heart and Science—for *reason* in head complement each other in the unrestricted pursuit of the Highest Good in one case and God in the other ?

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* "*Zephaniah* 3 : 15.

† '*Isiah*' 43 : 19.

Science and Religion are not then, antagonistic to each other—but it is their canker of fanaticism only, which often renders each to be too much in self-love to consider other's views! And, so a great thinker, like A. N. Whitehead comments, incidentally: "It is the *dogma* that destroys TRUTH"![12]

Thus, be he a Millikan with his "Cosmic Rays"; an *Einstein* with his "*unified field theory*" or "RELATIVITY". a *Dean Inge*; *spengler or schweitzer* with a radiant faith in a divine order—it is evident, therefore, that the world is in a cyclical epoch of Progress when a certain attitude of humanism—a trifle sublimer in the scale of evolution than Mind—is just about to take shape, by degrees, on such a round of experience! And the striking thing to bear in mind—is that man is, now, too ill-equipped to penetrate the veil of the Divine Mystery just to take a dip in its Fount of Bliss. That is where some of the modern psychologists have halted, because they have realised, eventually the fact, that they are confined by their own narrow limitations to handle all ills, handicaps and problems in life—for an effective solution thereof.

Somehow, perhaps they have to grasp a larger picture—that that *element* in man which is using the entire human vessel is something more than ultra-cosmic!

Is it not then, really evident that a balanced combination of the active principles of the 'Divine', 'Spiritual' and 'Human'—the triple constituent elements of both Science and Religion—when evenly titrated with 'Hope'; 'Faith and Charity' would only contrive Humanity to have an access to that *divine healing therapy of* all its ills which—neither a mortal Doctor nor a Theologian alone could effectively cure for good an. ever?

SCIENCE OF GEOGRAPHY IN THE ṚGVEDA

By ŚRĪ MĀYĀ PRASAD TRĪPAṬHĪ

APART from its religious importance, the *Ṛgveda* possesses extraordinary value as a mine of scientific data and cultural facts for the spade worker attempting to unravel the mysteries and flashlight the fascination of the hoary past. There has been a long, reputed and satisfactory world-wide tradition for the study and investigation of the *Ṛgveda* from the beginning of the modern era, even if we leave aside the indigenous scholars, commentators and annotators of the ancient and mediaval age. The aforesaid tradition has studied the *Ṛgveda* from various points of views—historical, literary, cultural, religious, philosophical, political and economic. But none of the scholars has attempted to study the state of science of geography in this eternal literary masterpiece. Even if somebody has attempted in this direction, his endeavour has been confined merely to the investigation of names of places, countries, rivers and mountains and identification of these. Those dissertations make no attempt at all to study the geographical knowledge or science of geography in the sacred tome. It is for the simple reason that geography is an infant science in the world and still more a tender new-born babe in India. Western scholars have made commendable strides in studying the past of the science of geography in various countries of occident and Levant—Greece, Egypt, Babylonia and others. But this very important branch of knowledge remains almost untouched in India. Hence, the present author begins at the beginning in this direction and intends to cover the vast vista up to the milestone of the present century in due course.

For making the investigation and presentation scientific, methodical and systematic, the entire subject matter would be divided under following sub-heads.

(1) Cosmology, cosmogony and cosmography. (2) Astronomical Geography. (3) The earth—its motion, rotundity, interior, geology, solidification, earthquake, volcanoes and other terrestrial phenomena. (4) Physiography, geomorphology, mountains, rivers, deserts and other allied topics. (5) Climatology, meteorology, rainfall and other aspects. (6) Oceans, oceanography—waves, currents, tides, ocean resources and maritime activities. (7) Countries known, economic and commercial geography (Agriculture, canals, minerals, trade and industry). Urban geography. (8) Early concepts of ethnology and anthropology. (9) Survey work, card measurements and diagram making.

1

The mystery of the origin of the universe has ever been a riddle to human mind and it still continues to be so. To the Ṛgvedic Āryans also it was a great enigma. Towards this the *Ṛgveda* made beautiful poetic approaches of interrogation and paradoxes[1] and at several places has attempted to provide descriptive guesses on scientific lines.

The first explanation of the formation of the universe is given to be that it was created like a building—a miraculous feat of engineering[2] or, in other words, it is "the result of the mechanical production, the work of carpenter and joiner's skill." This concept very favourably compares with the nineteenth century speculation of science (led by Helmholtz. Lord Kelvin, Maxwell and others).[2a]

The other Ṛgvedic theory represents it to be the result of the natural generation.

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[1] X. 129. 6-7; X. 72. 3-4; X. 81-2-4.

[2] II. 15.3 and others—vide Wallis *The cosmogony of the Ṛgveda.*

[2a] J. Jeans—*The mysterious Universe.*

In connection with the Ṛgvedic cosmogony the hymns 72, 82, 121, 129 and 190 of the tenth maṇḍala are most important. In two hymns the origin of the universe is postulated to be a kind of evolution of the existent (सत्) from the non-existent (असत्)[3]. The hymn 190 states that from heat was produced order (Ṛta) : then night, the ocean, the year; the creator (धाता) produced in succession the sun and the moon, heaven and earth, air and ether. In the former evolutionary speculation, the anticipation of Darwin's Theory of Evolution can very legitimately be sought and recognised. As regards the latter statement of heat and the like, it can be observed that modern physics also attempts to reduce the entire universal phenomena to electricity—a form of heat[4].

The two mantras X. 82.1 and X. 121.1 represent the creation to have started with the origin of water and the cosmic golden egg (embryo) (हिरण्यगर्भ) which very well fits in the geological and biological evolution of the earth with the water age, origin of Zoophytes, primeval fishes, reptiles, invertebrate, vertebrate and mammals.

H. W. Wallis[5] says—"The origin of the world was, therefore, held to have been due to a primeval sunrise or primeval thunderstorm". It very discernably smacks of the nebular storm of the modern theories of cosmogony[6].

The same author further observes "We find mention in one hymn of a primordial substance or unit out of which the universe was developed."[7]

The modern ideas of primordial gaseous, nebular storm and attraction and collision of immense stars and genesis of bodies in the universe can further be read in the following lines :—

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[3] X. 72. 2—3; X. 129.4.

[4] J. Jeans, p. 69.

[5] p. 56.

[6] Wooldridge and Morgan.

[7] I. 164.6—46 ; X. 82.6.

"When Yee, O gods, stood firmly embracing one another in the formless depth, thence there arose from your feet a thickening volume of dust as from dancers."[8]

"Apparently, the Aśvins stirred up the dust, which formed heaven and earth, and gods were so pleased with the production that they wished to have them in solid masses."[9] This also indicates that solidification of the earth and the like took at a later period.

Extolling the cosmogonic and cosmological ideas of the *Ṛgveda* Wallis says—

> It is a not infrequent occurrence that a whole complex of the modern ideas finds its most happy and appropriate expression in an old term, or a proper name or attribute or in the words of an ancient saying."[10]

In this domain, the later Vedas and Brāhmaṇas could not always improve upon the *Ṛgveda*, rather are at places inferior to it. Wallis observes, "The cosmological guesses string together in the other Vedic collections, and even in the Brāhmaṇas, occasionally bear a more primitive character than those in the *Ṛgveda*".

2

The *Ṛgveda* furnishes considerable information about the astronomical geography. Astronomical observations and their correlation with earthly phenomena had started earlier than the *Ṛgveda*. H. H. Wilson says[11]—"The Aṅgirasas, as we have before seen, appear to have been among the ancient astronomers, the inventors of the lunar asterisms (नक्षत्र)". The Ṛgvedic Āryans knew that the sun was the distributor of time and space.[12] They had also

8. X. 72.6.

9. Vide sense of X. 24. 4-5. Wallis—p. 43.

10. p. 90.

11. See Vol. vi, p. 354.

12. I. 95.3.

the clear cut idea of one and only one sun.[13] The verse III. 31.17 says that the cause of the night and the day is the sun. In I. 164. 3 the Ayana-solstice[14] season, month, fortnight, day, night and hour are indicated as the seven portions of the year.[15] Explaining I. 155. 6 Prof. Wilson observes (in notes) about the reference "ninetyfour" "Ninety and four periodical revolutions—Viṣṇu is here identified with Time comprising ninety four periods—the year, two solstices, five seasons, twelve months, twentyfour half months, thirty days, eight watches and twelve zodaic signs." Commenting on I. 164. 11 Sāyaṇa also says that twelve zodaic signs were known to the *Ṛgveda*.[16] M. Mollien confirms Sāyaṇa's statement. Sāyaṇa's comment on X. 56. 5 further details the Ṛgvedic astronomical knowledge "having subdivided the planets, lunar asterisms etc." The hymn I. 25. 8 shows the concurrent uses of lunar and solar years. This, II. 40. 3 and I. 164. 15 also point to the intercalary months. On the basis of VII. 103. 9 Jacobi says that in the Vedic times the year began in rainy season, while some recognise the beginning of year with Hemanta,[17] but it does not appear to be quite appropriate. From the hymn X. 85. 13 it can be inferred that the Ṛgvedic Āryans also paid attention to the motion of the moon and I. 84. 15 most unequivocally expresses that the moon is illuminated only by the sun's light.

In I. 24. 10 we find a mention of the Great Bear or Saptarṣi-maṇḍala. The *Ṛgveda* also recognises fourteen Bhuvanas[18], six lokas[19] and seven lokas.[20]

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13. *Vālakhilya*, VIII. 10. 2.

14. VI. 32.5 refers to winter solstice.

15. Wilson notes, p. 268.

16. M. Mollien—*Memoirs de l' Academic des inscriptions, premiere serie*, Vol. 3.

17. VI. 10. 7.

18. X. 114. 7.

19. I. 164. 6.

20. VII. 18. 24.

The Ṛgvedic Āryans definitely knew about the occurrence of eclipses.[21] Ludwig goes to the length of saying that they even knew the theory of eclipse also, but Whitney has contradicted the statement.[22]

Mutual attraction of heavenly bodies and gravitation are referred to in X. 85. 1 and X. 149. 1. The sky is said to be rafterless[23] and so on and that it never falls is a source of great wonder.[24]

There are several other hymns which refer to some astronomical facts, but they are not quite clear to us—the full and real meaning of those references are not known to us, for example, X. 85. 16.

"We have also knowledge of. . . computation of the divisions of time to a minute extent. . . . ".[25]

3

The Ṛgvedic interrogator inquisitively and very aptly asks the relevant questions of Geography—[26]

> "I ask thee, (Institutor of the rite), what is the utter-most end of the earth. I ask thee where is the navel of the world. I ask thee, what is the fecundating power of the rain-shedding steed...!"

But the institutor of rites fails to give right answer to such a question and takes him into the jungle of ritualistic facts.

However, a few scattered lines of hymns provide various geographic informations which are given below. In X 81. 1 the earth is visualised as a fiery ball in some distant past. I. 59. 2 states that Agni (fire) is the navel (core) of the earth. The *Ṛgveda*, VII. 4. 5 also says of "the earth containing Agni (fire)". The lines II. 12. 2 speak of "making the earth firm", "tranquillising mountains" and consolidating

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21 V. 40. 5 to 9.
22 *Vedic Index*, Vol. II—p. 466.
23 II. 15.2.
24 V. 29. 4 and VI. 17.7.
25 Vol. II, *Introduction*, p. XI-Wilson X. 189.3.
26 I. 164.34.

the heaven." In X. 121. 4-5 we find a reference to the solidification of the earth having oceans. These three verses perhaps point to the idea that the earth initially was in a "molten state" or in such state which might have been gaseous or liquid, but not solid.

Spherical concept of the earth is expressed in III. 55. 2c; and X. 89. 4; I. 33. 8 unambiguously asserts of the circularity of the earth and gradual arrival of the sun's rays on it as shown in IV. 53. 3 can only be true, if it is accepted that here the earth is presumed to be spherical. Of course, this latter meaning is derived, if we explain "निवेशयन् प्रसुवन्नक्तुभिर्जगत्" in the way in which Jyotiṣācārya Pt. Girijā Prasad Dvivedi, the Hindi commentator of the *Siddhānta-Śiromaṇi*, has done. It must be borne in mind that his explanation of निवेशयन् as gradual arrival is fully justified by Sanskrit Lexicons.*

In several verses the earth is said to have a past circular motion, for example, V. 30. 8. Mantras I. 37. 7-8 definitely refer to the phenomena of earthquake and Marut is said to be its cause. This is further confirmed by the continuation of the idea in the near about dates of the Christian era when Uśanas opined—

चत्वारीमानि भूतानि कम्पयन्ति वसुन्धराम् ।
आपः शचीपतिश्चैव हव्यवाह : प्रभञ्जन : ॥[27]

The verse VIII. 20. 5 corroborates the same fact. It cannot be said with certitude whether the *Ṛgveda* knew of the volcanoes, but there is an allusion about the association of Agni (fire) and mountains, so it has been said—"Agni, the upholder of mountains."[28] In the two verses[29] fire is said to be the devastator of cities. But it cannot be surmised with certainty that it points to volcanic erruption.

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*Śankara Balakṛṣṇa Dīkṣita also derives the same meaning of these verses—Hindi Translation of his *Bhāratīya Jyotiṣa Śāstra* p. 31.

[27] Quoted in Vallālasena's *Adbhutasāgara*, p. 383.

[28] vii. 6.2.

[29] vii. 6. 1-2.

4

The "*Vedic Mythology*" by A. A. Macdonell outlines the Physiography poetically described in the *Ṛgvedà* in the following lines :—

"According to the *Ṛgveda*, she (the earth) abounds in heights, bears the burden of the mountains, and supports the trees of the forest in the ground (क्ष्मा). She quickens the soil, for she scatters rain, and the showers of heaven are shed from the lightning of her clouds. She is great (मही), firm (दृढ़) and shining (अर्जुनी)."[30]

Besides a large number of rivers, lakes and water-falls[31], deserts[32], snow-clad mountains[33], mountainous fringes or table lands[34] and shelving banks of the Gaṅgā[35] are the other topographic features mentioned in the *Ṛgvedu*. Vigorous erosion by the river Saraswatī is alluded to in VI. 61. 2. The whole hymn VI. 61 gives the description of river banks. Perhaps the Ṛgvedic Āryans had the concept of knowing slopes also by rivers as indicated in IX. 88. 6.

It is not known why mountains were called 'the maintainer of balance of the earth' (भूधर) and said to be moving from place to place in a very great antiquity in the Indian mythologies, but then two assertions are found in the *Ṛgveda* initially. If we try to interpret them scientifically (remembering that several natural, geographical and meteorological phenomena in the *Ṛgveda* are represented figuratively and symbolically) as "Bergaigne interprets the frogs as meteorological phenomena"[36], we can see in the aforesaid statements a glimpse of the theory of Isostasy[37] and a conception

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[30] p. 88. [31] VIII. 7.10.

[32] V. 83. 10; VI. 62.2 and others.

[33] X. 121. 4-5.

[34] Wilson's version. VIII. 85.2.

[35] VI. 45.31.

[36] *Vedic mythology*, p. 151.

[37] VII. 99.3.

of continental drift, Zwischengebirge[38] and orogenetic processes.[39] Even without any mythological colouring, the plain words of the two statements signify the same thing.

5

The Ṛgvedic Āryans had keenly and carefully demarcated the various seasons and divided the whole year into six such divisions.[40] Three such bigger divisions—hot, wet and cold are also recognized in I. 164. 48. The sun was clearly known as the determinant of seasons.[41]

Radiation, convection current and rainfall as their effect are described in the *Ṛgveda*[42] also say that the rays of the sun are the cause of rains, the verse 12 shows that clouds are constituted of various elements. Insolation, evaporation, moisture, clouds and rainfall are referred to in I. 141. 2 as explained by Sāyaṇa. Instrumentality of winds in the causation of rainfall[43] and their relationship with clouds can be easily seen in I. 19.7-8. The Mantras I. 38. 7 reveal how the moisture-laden winds bring some scanty rainfall in desert regions also.

In two Mantras[44] there are references to sixty-three and forty-nine types of winds respectively, their climatological and meteorological implications are still unravelled and they are mostly treated as merely mythologies. No clear-cut mention of the Monsoon is to be found in the *Ṛgveda*, but Marut hymns give its quite good and satisfactory description, of course; monsoon is clearly referred to in the later period in the *Atharva Veda as* सलिलवात[45].

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[38] II. 17.5.

[39] *Processes of mountain building*—Wooldridge and Morgan.

[40] I. 23. 15; II. 40.3.

[41] I. 95.3; I. 164.15.

[42] Vide I. 164. 47. Verses VII. 70.2 and I 161. 11-12.

[43] I. 19. 3-4; I. 165-1; V. 57; I. 38; V. 53; VIII. 7.

[44] VII. 85.8 and V. 52.17.

[45] *Cf. Vedic Index.*

It will, however, not be totally unreasonable, if the southeast and southwest monsoon are traced in the Ṛgveda[46] where there is also a better reference to rain-bearing winds. The Mantra VIII. 7.14 describes the winds ascending mountains.

Very scientific description of clouds is found in II. 24. 4 "stonelike, solid, downhanging and waterladen." In a verse[47] Macdonell explains the word "मिह" to mean mist, which cannot be differed easily if we see the context, though at other places मिह signifies rainfall. Violent gale in the *Ṛgveda* has been named ध्राजी.[48]

The verse I. 173. 6 states that the atmosphere encompasses the earth. The solar phenomena are associated with the vault of the sky or heaven, while lightning, rain and wind are referred to as occurring in the atmosphere, but it is doubtful whether the *Ṛgveda* knew exactly the limit or the vertical height of the atmosphere. Mantra V. 60.6 divides the atmosphere into three regions, in this connection a very pertinent question occurs to mind whether they denote troposphere, stratasphere and Ionosphere? On the basis of mantras[49], Wallis observes.

"According to a common idiom of the *Ṛgveda* the three—heaven, earth and air—may be denoted by any one of the three names; they are even all mentioned together as the three earths, the three heavens and the three airs."

For the three airs the aforesaid surmise (troposphere, stratosphere and ionosphere) has been advanced. Again, in the triple division of the earth, are we entitled to identify frigid, temperate and torrid zone, for different schools regarding Āryan home do recognise the Ṛgvedic Āryans' knowledge about frigid and temperate zone and just possible in course of their ocean voyages and advances for habitat

[46] X. 137.2. I. 19.7.

[47] *Vedic mythology*—VIII. 7.4.

[48] *Vedic Index* Vol. I. p. 405.

[49] I. 34; III. 56; I. 108.9-10 and V. 60.6, and others.

they might have known torrid zone also. But it is not possible to say anything conclusively on this point in face of different and frequently discordant interpretation and real obscurity of the hymns.

The *Ṛgveda* clearly asserts that the atmosphere contains dust particles and moisture or humidity.[50]

6

It must be admitted beyond controversy that the *Ṛgveda* had definite knowledge of oceans and its several routes, ocean navigation and ocean trade as is evinced by I. 25. 7; I. 182. 5-6-7 and I. 56. 2 respectively, of 'hundred oared ships'[51] further establishes this assertion. The Ṛgvedic people were also acquainted with the wealth of oceans.[52] They had good trade with Babylonia about the time of the composition of the *Ṛgveda* (if it is accepted that it was composed near about 3000 B. C.) as has been shown by Dr. A. S. Altekar in his dissertation "*Ancient towns and cities in Gujarat and Kathiawar.*"

But it cannot be said with certainty how many oceans were known at that time. Mantra X. 136. 5 mentions two oceans, namely, the eastern and western, whereas IX. 33. 6 and X. 47. 2 speak of four oceans. In X. 90. 15 there are mentioned seven oceans as explained by Mahidhara and "adopted by Persians."[53] This mention of seven oceans does not appear to be wholly inconsistent when we look through the vista of later geographic conception of the Hindus.

Ocean waves are referred to in IX. 50. 1 and wind is recognised as one of the causes of ocean water movements.[54] Perhaps IX. 97. 40 very faintly alludes to tide and lunar attraction.

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[50] Vide *Wallis*. p. 113.

[51] I. 116.5.

[52] IX. 33.6.

[53] As translated by Der Perron.

[54] I. 19. 7-8.

The phenomena of ocean-fire is repeatedly mentioned in the *Ṛgveda*[55] and also in later Sanskrit literature, but it cannot be said what geological or oceanographic phenomena it actually implies. At last in the *Ṛgveda* it does not conclusively indicate the existence of volcanoes under ocean waters, inasmuch as the book does not appear to have any knowledge of volcanoes except a faint reference.

7

Mantra I. 35. 8 gives a glimpse of the regional geography and states that there are eight mountains, three continents. . . . I. 121. 13 speaking of ninety rivers signifies some vast region. In VI. 47. 20 we read of a country which was devoid of cows, a geographic and economic criterion of the Ṛgvedic Āryans. The lines VIII. 4. 2 name रूम and रूशम countries. Do these indicate the Mediterranean region and Russia? The later *Brahmapurāṇa* also names a country of the Rusas (Russians ?).[56] Besides, there are several countries named in the *Ṛgveda* which are still unidentified.

Of course, the Ṛgvedic hymns mostly refer to the region west of the Gaṅgā, the Punjab, North-West-Frontier-Province, Kashmir and Afganistan and the mouth-coast of the Indus and Gujarat, which clearly implies that they inhabited these lands. But from this it should not be inferred that their geographical knowledge was confined merely to these territories and they did not know any other land. Further, it is just possible that there might have been several sects and tribes of the Ṛgvedic Āryans which inhabited other regions which have been left out for some reason or other or their reference was necessitated by the composition. This assertion is based on the same line of

[55] X. 32.6; VIII. 91. 4-5 and so on.

[56] *Studies in Indian Antiquities*—H. C. Raychaudhari, p. 75, note 3,

reasoning that in the *Hamlet*, the *Śākuntalam*, the *Paradise Lost* or the stories from Tagore all places, rivers or mountains known to the great authors, the contemporary people and scholars are not mentioned and could not be mentioned.

Reference to palace in VIII. 6. 23, three storeyed building in VIII. 40. 12 and X. 66. 5—7, one-thousand-columned palace in II. 41. 5 and acquisition of hundred towns in IV. 30. 20, good roads in I. 116. 4 indicate a good sense of urban geography and town-planning. A solitary mantra X. 97. 1 exhibits a sense of distributional geography also. Mineralogy was also in a remarkable stage. Existence of irrigation canals (कुल्या) is corroborated by X. 43.7 and V. 83. 8.

8

The *Ṛgveda* had some conception of ethnology and anthropology also. There are described features of Indra and some other deities. Mantra I. 7. 9[57] and I. 100. 12 classify the inhabitants of earth in five classes. Sāyaṇa, again, finds in I. 164. 14 a reference to five classes of human beings. Mention and description of the Asuras and Dāsas are too well-known and it is unnecessary to indulge in their useless repetition.

The hymn X. 85 gives a very vivid and detailed account of the Āryan marriage customs, practices and the whole ceremony.

9

At least four quarters were well-known to the Pre-Ṛgvedic Āryans. The *Ṛgveda* positively knew of all the ten quarters (eight quarters+zenith+Nadir) of the space as is proved by various mantras.[58]

Determination of quarters was extremely essential in connection with the construction of Vedis (Gārhapatya

[57] Does the word क्षिति here not imply *continents* ?

[58] I. 141.2 explicitly recognises ten quarters; VIII. 65.12 speaks of eight points of the sky plus zenith.

and Āhavanīya in vogue at that time) which are according to Oldenberg earlier than the *Ṛgveda*, and it was carried on by the observation of the sun, and started with the finding of the east. The *Ṛgveda* I. 95.3 says of Agni, in his character of the sun, as the indicator of the points of the horizon.

The eastern quarter was the pivotal point of all rituals, religious and litergical works, practices and ceremonies.[59] This is the first and most profound beginning of the practice of eastern orientation in all construction, drawing, cartographical and engineering works in India which was strictly adhered to in all later Vedic literature, Śulvasūtras, Vāstuśāstras and continued uninterruptedly and unchangeably till the time of Maratha Cartography.[60]

This practice of eastern orientation dominated the elaborate Ṛgvedic survey work also as is proved by II. 15.3 which says, "Surveying like a chamber (or sacrificial chamber), Indra has made this world east-oriented." This mode of eastern orientation was the special characteristic of the Ṛgvedic Āryans and later Indians,[61] very ancient Babylonians recoursed to North-west orientation and Egyptians to the north. In the later Vedic literature and Śulvasūtras the east-westline was called the पृष्ठ्या like the north-south line of modern surveyors and Cartographers all over the world.

Selection of site and very technical measurement and survey regarding the construction of the Vedis are the earliest modes of survey and cartography in India as revealed by the Ṛgvedic hymns (of course, leaving out the Harappa

[59] VII. 99.2; III. 8.9, II. 15.3 and the like.

[60] *Vide* "solution of a riddle of maratha maps" by the author read in the 45th Research Conference, Bhārata Itihāsa saṁśodhaka maṇḍala, Poona.

[61] Prof. H. H. Wilson annotating I. on 31. 14 remarks "This is said to allude to a legend, in which gods, intending to offer a scrifice, were at a loss to determine the cardinal points, until the perplexity was removed by Agni's ascertaining the south." This problem would be taken up in some other essays.

and Mohenjodaro civilization for the present). The concept of surveying is as old in India as her supreme and most appealing cosmogony outlined in the opening section. The Ṛgvedic practical and theoretical survey and cartography (though no sample of the age has been recovered so far except mere descriptions), are in no way attempts or instances inferior to Gaisur or the oldest Babylonian cartography.

Wooden poles and pegs were used in survey, plan and costruction of Vedis apart from the measuring rod, यूप (sacrificial wooden posts) also perhaps might have served some survey purposes as is indicated by III. 8. 2-9. Measurement of the heaven and earth,[62] measuring the unmeasured ancient divisions;[63] measuring the heaven and earth with measuring rod[64] and "Varuṇa standing in the region of the air, measurèth out the earth with the sun as with a measuring rod"[65] evidence very grand conception of surveying which was translated into practice in erecting great buildings and large sized Vedis where sacrifices (यज्ञ) were carried on for months and months together.[66]

Measuring or surveying of a field with a measuring rod is mentioned in the *Ṛgveda* I. 110. 5.

It has been proved beyond doubt that some sort of architecture, plan, painting and drawing existed in the Ṛgvedic times. The lines X. 34. 8 and others also clearly speak of a diceboard or इरिण which evidences the knowledge of sketch or diagram drawing also. Hence, there must have existed something in the shape of plan-drawings, place or region sketches as a piece of cartography. Nothing is known or has been unearthed so far about any world map or diagram.

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[62]. I. 159. 4.
[63]. X. 56.5.
[64]. III. 38.3.
[65]. V. 85.5.
[66]. V. 45.11.

In the conclusion, it must be observed that the *Ṛg-veda* is not a treatise on geography or regular scientific disquisition on a particular branch of learning. As such geographical information is merely scattered in it and is to be and has been culled from it. The geographical facts culled in this manner were merely the fragment used for the composition of the *Ṛksaṁhitā*. The knowledge of science of geography of the contemporary Āryans must have been greater and wider than is indicated by these hymns.

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THE CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIAN AESTHETICS

By ŚRĪ H. L. SHARMA

Continued from Vol. XV pts 3-4 pages 189—232

III. BEAUTY AS GESTALT

1. *Configuration Theory of Beauty* :—

IN the preceding chapter we discussed the form of beauty which is an emotion. Here we open a discussion in which beauty is considered as a quality of perception. It may be regarded as an objective approach to the nature of beauty in contrast to the subjective one of the last. *Beauty is not a form of emotion, but an emotion of form.* This specific kind of emotion whose nature is aesthetic springs from perception of sensible elements in art-creation. It is the beauty of form, though not exactly formal beauty. For, whenever we have a form or configuration, we must have a full-grown consciousness of the sensible elements also. This emotion arising from a 'configured' perception with a specific aesthetic accent is called beautiful.

'Unity-in-diversity' is the hall-mark of all aesthetic perception. This results from a basic 'whole-making' tendency, underlying even the simplest kind of perception. Gestalt Psychology has given coup d' etat to all 'additive' and arithmetical processes by its discovery of laws of whole-formations. We study one of these for getting more light on the mental dynamics which has entirely changed from mechanical to spiritual.

This is Exner's law: "The total impression produced by a picture which flashes across the retina is compounded of the excitations of innumerable and functionally dissimilar fibres. That we, in spite of this, receive a unitary impress-

ion, in which the partial sensations are wont to go unrecognised, is due to what I would call *the principle of Central Confluence*."[1] This law gives us an idea of dynamic relation between 'parts' and 'whole'.

"The Gestalt—or structure process... is functionally, inwardly active in such a way that the parts are conceived to be defined in terms of it—on the basis of primary tendencies towards defined conspicuous gestalt."[2]

The participation becomes an aesthetic feast of moving joys if the perceptual consciousness inflects towards the primary laws of beauty-perception, that is, harmony and symmetry, both reducible to the condition of 'balance' (Samata). Bharata defines a balanced (Sama), and, therefore, 'beautiful' perception as complete concordance in which participating units and sub-units as dance, music (vocal and instrumental) and others become 'sweetened' by that concordance (Samayoga).[3] An aesthic configuration, therefore, is a form of perception in which the 'structure-befitting' parts are made concordant by subordination of the "Structive-violating" parts.

Many thinkers in India are configurationists in this sense. Vāmana is the chief. Beauty he defines as a configuration[4] (Rīti or Bandha) qualified by a specific quality of its constituents.[5] There are ten ways in which the parts combine to form aesthetically pleasing wholes. The first is *Śleṣa*[6] (श्लेष), which is that form of perception in which a multiplicity of elements is grasped as a completed unity. In music and dance, Śleṣa is important because the whole thing should appear as an unbroken current of notes and movements. Bharata rightly compares this induced form of unity to the feeling of a continuous circuit formed by a revolving piece of live coal[7] (अलातचक्रप्रतिमा). But in this unity, the elements must not be lost. Each note, movement or line must assert its value, though only as an element in a total stream of aesthetic experience. This quality is known

as sweetness.[8] Each element, further, should be charged with a dynamo of its own, so that, whether the art is mobile or immobile, the elements seem to be moving in a playful dance. This is *Udāratā*[9] quality of composition. *Samādhi*[10] is the measured rise and fall, and so on.

Rūpa Goswāmī also defines some formal qualities of art. Rūpam in Sanskrit is confusedly used both for any form and the beautiful form. All definitions of form, given to us by our author, accrue from his basic stand that the unadorned feminine frame is the prototype of beautiful design, is both mathematically and emotionally artistic, and that all arts, graphic and musical, draw their fundamental conceptions from this prototype. Rūpam, according to this stand, includes symmetry and proportion of parts in a beautiful female body.

Rūpaṁ[11] is, further, an over-individual quality of the sub-unitary parts. The parts are overflowed with a new quality, when they make a whole. This quality is Rūpam. This author seems to regard this quality as static and mathematical. When, however, the form wakes up to pulsating life by energy of its own, a dynamic quiver is created, which is called *Lāvaṇya*. Both of Rūpa Goswāmi's commentators, Viśvanātha and Jīva Goswāmī, interpret *Lāvaṇya*[12] as *waving movement* of the form, which captures and sustains attention by its illumination (Kānti). Viśvanātha further tells us that Lāvaṇya is the beauty of form which, by virtue of transparency and exuberance, becomes the centre of uprising harmonies and charms. This vibrating quiver of the beautiful form is characteristic not only of the dynamic arts—music, dance and poetry—and of the living bodies, but also of painting and sculpture.

Indian painting being mostly linear, the line possesses a wonderful suggestive energy. By its sweep and undulation, it not only delineates but also depicts mass and movement. A painting by its suggestion of movement

becomes the vehicle of rhythmic energy. In India, painting and sculpture have been chiefly sacramental, and served to feed religious contemplation. Hence, the source of this energy has been the religious ardour coupled with formative will. An image is the translation of a mystic vision of super-reality. A. K. Coomaraswamy quotes the Aesthetic of the *Śukranītisāra* on image-making in the following words:

"One should make use of the visual formulae (dhyāna) proper to the angels (devatā) whose images are to be made. It is for the successful accomplishment of this practice (yoga) of visual formulation (dhyāna) that the lineaments (lakṣaṇa) of images are prescribed. The human imager should be expert in this visual contemplation, since thus, and in no other way, and verily not by direct observation (pratyakṣa) can the end be achieved."[13]

Another term is *Saundarya*.[14] It results from formal arrangement (सन्निवेश) of parts and sub-parts. Rūpa Goswāmī gives two more modifying phrases. The arrangement must be characterized by appropriateness: the volume, weight, shape etc., must be well-balanced, and must be what they ought to be under the principle of beauty. Also the parts should be well-jointed, so that we have an impression of unity. Rādhā, the paragon of the female beauty, is Sundara in the full sense of the term.

Rūpa Goswāmī thinks that *Abhirūpa*[15] is another quality of form. It is the quality of reflecting the beauteous form and colour of things in the neighbourhood. By virtue of this, the scenic effect is intensified, and the work of art comes in organic relation with its setting and environment. Specially in architecture and sculpture, the power of reflecting is essential. If the architectural form or the work of sculpture is too much circumscribed, and does not respond to the form-harmonies in its surroundings, it ceases to create an impression of artistic unity. Viśvanātha[16] in his *Ānandacandrikā* adds that the form which

is beautiful cannot be captured within the four walls of a formula, as the same is not intellectual, but is 'intuitive in origin.'

2. *The Mathematical Theory of Beauty*:

Melody (*Rāga*) and metre (*chandas*), and some forms of sculpture and architecture have been defined in mathematical terms in our vast canonical literature. We have developed Iconography, in which exact canons are laid down for each measurement. And yet a purely mathematical conception of beauty as an abstract contemplation of form seem to be foreign to India's art-genius. The creative artist in India is called upon to create, through his powers of 'intension' (Tapas) an aesthetically satisfying 'gestalt' with the help of 'trance-formula' (Dhyāna-mantra) from within, and then submit it to mathematical calculation so as to yield a definable form, fit for preservation. The intrinsic art-value of a form, its crescendo, climax and conclusion, are the original discoveries of the artist. This fact is based on a deep understanding of art-consciousness: The fact is:

> "What is wholly rational cannot entirely satisfy the aesthetic sensibility. It has always been the function of art to stretch the mind some distance beyond the limits of the understanding. The 'distance beyond' may be spiritual or transcendental, or, perhaps, merely fantastical; somewhere it will overstep the limits of the rational."[17]

An art of designs and patterns, containing an axis of reference, a punctum balance and ideas of symmetry and repetition, is Persian in origin. The Moghul art, though a result of fusion, has a dominant note of Persian art. Its characteristic, therefore, is the deep touch of delicacy. The Persian art itself was shaped by the influence of Neo-Platonic movement there. Plato and other Greek Mathematician-philosophers sharply distinguished between the

absolute 'geometric forms' and the relative forms obtained from imitation. The geometric forms yield us an absolute and pure 'platonic' joy of contemplation. The question that merits consideration for Aesthetics is: Why the contemplation of geometric forms in art is so universally pleasing? We may consider in brief three answers. The first is the argument of economy in the expenditure of nervous energy involved in form-contemplation. The difficulty with this view is that mere ease of neural functioning cannot be mistaken for joy of aesthetic experience. The second view banks on the relation of climate and art of a country. Herbart Read expounds the view as follows :

> "When the forces of nature are felt to be inimical, as in the frozen north and the tropical desert, art takes the form of escape not only from the flux of existence, but even from anything symbolical of it. The organic curve... is regarded unsympathetic; the artist therefore geometricizes everything. The vital art of primitive people... is sympathetic towards nature. It adopts the organic curve, enhances its liveliness; it is in the direction of the enhancement of a vitalistic urge."[18]

This second geographical view of artistic beauty seems plausible, for it fits in well with the general outlook on life in India. We never saw Nature red in 'teeth and claws'. Our art therefore is the art of life, and presents its inner and outer phases with a deep touch of vital joys. The third is the psychological approach to the above question. Jung regards the geometric shapes as the "archetypes, whose immanent nature is inaccessible to experience", and which "represent the deposit of psychic functioning of the whole ancestral line, i.e., the heaped-up or pooled experiences of organic existence in general." This view supplies a mental basis to the geometric conception of beauty. The difficulty of this explanation is that it puts the difficulty back in the primitive and infantile form of psychic functioning.

3. *Colour-Scheme in Indian Aesthetics* :

Colours define a 'form'. We must consider this definitive and formative power of colours. Before taking up the colour-scheme, we propose to work out a hint thrown by the Sāṅkhya Metaphysics. According to it, colours play an important part in the psycho-cosmic make-up. They inhere the very seed (Prakṛti)[20] of all creation—mental and material. The original Nature is a said to be red, white and black (Lohita, Śukla, Kṛṣṇa). It is made up of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, mind, life and matter. The qualities like generosity, courage, inner poise of the mind etc. are the qualities of Sattva. Restlessness, rage, cupidity, etc. are Rajas qualities, while infatuation rigidity or immobility etc., are the qualities emanating from Tamas aspect of Reality. Now attributing colours to qualities of the mind cannot be accidental. The hieratic canons of all rleigions prove the universality of this connection between colours (of robes) and qualities. White is Sattva, and so it suggests Sattva qualities; red is Rajas and so it suggests all qualities and experiences having Rajas nature; and the same is true of Tamas. The Sāṅkhya Metaphysics thus establishes the spiritual suggestiveness of colours, mainly three, red, white and black. This colour-scheme, however, has to be worked out to be used in aesthetic interpretation.

The one we propose to construct differs from some already prevailing colur-charts in two points; first, it is an aprioristic construction, not based on the faltering experience of individuals, but on the sure testimony of intuitions of the seers; second, it is not drawn from physical or psychological standpoints, but purely from the aesthetic one, i.e., the basic consideration is not how the body or the mind is affected by a particular colour, but, on the other hand, how a particular form is realized in a colour-medium.

According to Bharata, the following are the primary aesthetic emotions—erotic, aggressive, heroic and repulsive. Sṛṅgāra is said to be bright Śyāma (ujjwala Śyāma). It is burning bright. It is not one colour, but the father of all colours, having a tendency to develop in all directions. It is not a neutral tint or a dulled mixture of all colours. It is flame-like burning with an inner intense brightness, gauzed by blue and yellow fumes. Śyāma[22] is the colour of the Eros itself, underlying the infinite flame burning within us all, the central emotional energy moving the entire evolutionary stream towards fulfilment.

Śyāma in painting will have the nearest approach to the fully saturated cloudy mass of blue with an inner intense yellow flash of lightning. This colour best realises the deepest craving of life—the erotic urge. In an artistic painting, this colour, or this perfect unity of basic colours, cannot be harmoniously blended with any other colours except yellow and milk-white. Thus in a Sṛṅgāra form of painting, the harmonious effect is produced by Śyāma, yellow and milk-white. This is the happiest blend for conveying the erotic emotion in a colour-medium.

Erotic experience is opposed to all other emotions except Laughter and Wonder, which are realised through the colour-media of milk-white and yellow. This is why any other colour—black, red or blue—will produce a foreign and discordant effect on our sensibility. Bharata further maintains that Sṛṅgāra[23] is the primary emotion, of which the derivative is *Hāsya*. Regarding Hāsya as the complete release of emotional tension, we can maintain that complete un-saturation of *Śyāma* is milk-white (*Sita*). Saturation of a colour creates an inner intensity, which is released when saturation reaches the minimal edge. Laughter even according to the Freudian Psychology is the release of Eros. *Sita* and *Śyāma* are thus the primary and secondary respectively, emotionally representing Eros and Laughter.

In a painting of Hāsya, therefore, the milk-white is the point of balance of the entire colour-harmony.

Hāsya[24] is opposed to *karuṇa* and *Bhayānaka* (Pathos and Terror) for which the colour-media are pigeon and black (*kapota* and *kṛṣṇa*). Thus in a Hāsya painting, the milk-white cannot be harmoniously blended with pigeon-colour and black without marring the aesthetic effect. The other colours,—red, yellow, blue, etc., can produce a colour-concordance with it.

Raudra (aggressive) is an emotion of great intensity and action. Its colour is blood red (Rakta). It is sparkling red, and where the masculine energy and the dynamic effect of activity are to be realised in a colour-medium, red is to be the punctum balance of the entire colour-harmony. *Raudra* is opposed to *Hāsya* and *Śṛṅgāra*, that is to milk-white and Śyāma. These are to be avoided, while other colours can be aesthetically combined with red.

The following tables indicate the colour-scheme in Indian Aesthetics :—

A. *Primary*[25] *Colours*	*Secondary Colours*
1. Śyāma (Śṛṅgāra, Erotic)	1. Sita (Hāsya, Laughter)
2. Rakta (Raudra, Aggressive)	2. Kapota (Karuṇa, Pathetic)
3. Gaura (Vīra, Heroic)	3. Pīta (Adbhuta, Wonder)
4. Nīla (Vībhatsya, Repulsive)	4. Kṛṣṇa (Bhayānaka, Terror)

B. *Ally Colours*

1.	Śyāma	... Milk-white, yellow.
2.	Sita	... Śyāma, red, gaura, blue, yellow.
3.	Rakta	... Pigeon, gaura, yellow, blue.
4.	Kapota	... Red, gaura, yellow, blue, black.
5.	Gaura	... Śyāma, milk-white, red, pigeon, yellow.
6.	Kṛṣṇa	... Blue, yellow.
7.	Nīla	... Milk-white, red, pigeon, gaura, yellow and black.
8.	Pīta	... Śyāma, milk-white, red, pigeon, gaura, yellow, blue and black.

C. *Enemy-Colours*


1. ... Pigeon, blue, red, gaura, black.
2. ... Black and pigeon.
3. ... Milk-wite and Śyāma.
4. ... Śyāma, milk-white and black.
5. ... Black
6. ... Śyāma, gaura, red, milk-white, green and blue.
7. ... Śyāma.
8. ... None.

N. B. Bharata does not mention any aesthetic equivalent to *Śānta Rasa*, which he admits to be an important aesthetic emotion. The modern Psycho-Physiology reveals that green is the cool colour of calm and peace. We may hold, therefore, that sea-green represents the deep calm (Śānta) with a vision of Infinity; green with a yellow-dazzle may represent the creative peace of vegetation and growth; and green with blue-dazzle (Nīla-maṇi) indicates the aweful calm of equilibrium of superhuman forces.

In this colour-scheme, it may be remarked, we do not care to create merely a formal harmony of colours. It is an emotional harmony realised in a material medium. Each colour is, psycho-aesthetically, a material index of some emotional quality, and is, therefore, ally to some colours and enemy to others. Alliance or enmity is emotionally born. Enmity varies in degrees. In some cases, the enemy-colour may be subordinated, and in others totally suppressed. But the emotional meaning of a colour is not its direct meaning (Vācyārtha).[28] It is neither indirect (Lakṣaṇārtha) nor yet the implied one (Tātparyārtha). It is founded in the natural texture of our common artistic impulse. *Emotional*[28a] quality of a colour rises from it as an echo. In fact, the colour-language in painting is the system of articulation of our aesthetic sensibility.

Here, we compare this scheme with some that are already in fashion. There is a distinction of colours as 'warm' and 'cool' or 'light' and 'dark'. This distinction is also psychological. 'Warm' colours are red, yellow and their intermediaries; the 'cool' colours are green, blue and their intermediaries. Mathematically, these colours represent the four angular points of the common square base of two pyramids ending in light and dark points as their apexes. However perfect this scheme may be, it is not useful for Aesthetics of colours we are considering here.

The other is the Ostwald's colour-scheme. This circle of colours represents the directional relations amongst the colours. There is a change of quality at red, yellow, sea-green and blue, which are psychologically the rimary colours, while others are intermediaries. The opposition or alliance is suggested by the position of the Sectors in the circle. On this basis six forms of colour-harmony are indicated which are given below :—



1. Harmony of the opposites; 2. Harmony of the Neighbours; 3. Harmony of the Intermediaries; 4. Subdued Harmony; 5. Monochromic Harmony; and 6. Advanced Harmony.

These harmonies have an aesthetic basis. A harmony in itself is the pleasing combination of several colours or tints. But this scheme labours under two difficulties: first, here the analysis is purely intellectual, based on the psycho-genesis of colours; second, it is merely the formal harmony. There is no indication of a colour language, which is said to be the 'international language' because of its universal aesthetic appeal.

4. *Dualism and the Kāma-Sūtra.*

At this stage, Aesthetics faces sharp dualism of 'form' and 'matter' as Epistemology and Ethics do. The impulse to beauty is 'the will to form.' Form-contemplation is said to be the essence of aesthetic experience. On the contrary, it has been maintained that all art is lyrical, and that artistic enjoyment is the feast of emotions. In India, both the aspects, form and feast (Rūpa and Bhoga), are equally emphasized and the extremes of Formalism and Emotionalism reconciled in a vital synthesis. But, historically, this synthesis could hold its own against separatism so long as the creative impulse continued to be fed from the inmost sources of life. But in the tenth century A. D. an all-round decay set in, which, on the one hand, led to the progressive attenuation of forms, and on the other, to the sportive glorification of emotions in art. Needless to say that there was growth of lifeless and conventionalized art-forms everywhere without any attempts to create fresh ones. The canons laid down by the masters became the ultimate laws. Also at the same time, apotheosis of emotion led to the production of nasty literature and painting of the middle ages that shames even the sense of decency. There was thus the general weakening of the creative impulse by a divorce of form and emotion in art.

Below we consider two attempts at synthesis, before 'form' became too much attenuated or 'emotion' too much vulgarised. The one is in the *Kāma-Sūtra*[27] which lays down six laws of painting. The first is *Rūpa-bheda*, which means 'the definition of form'. It means conformity to canonical prescriptions and[28] types. The Indian Silpa-kāra being a mystic and Yogin develops 'form' from within through a process of intension or self-incubation (Tapas). The trance-formula (dhyāna-mantra) contains this definition of form. The artist crystallises and articulates the aesthetic from the calm ocean of life and light within (Samādhi).

This form, therefore, becomes the universal type. The later artists having no power of intuiting the original forms slavishly copy them from the canons. Creativity in art means the creation and crystallization of artistic forms.

Pramāṇa is the next stage. Here the stress is on proportion and balance of the formal relations, for each type has appropriate measurements (*Tāla and Māna*) of its parts. In this again the artist can be original and may not follow the canons and conventions. A. N. Tagore warns the artist against unthinking faith, for "art is not for the justification of the Śilpa-Śāstra, but Śāstra is for elucidation of of Art."[29] Again, an aesthetic pramāṇa is not the watertight channel for the flow of creative activity in art. It is the artistically defined 'standard' in the morphology of emotions, as the Law of Thought is the rationally defined 'standard' in the morphology of thought. Creative emotion like creative thought follows the 'will to form', and, where there is 'form', there is the question of 'standard' (Pramāṇa).

"Aesthetic pramāṇa therefore expresses in plastic terms the norm of properly directed action (correction du Savoir-faire); speculative pramāṇa expresses metaphysically the norm of properly directed thought (correction du savoir pensee)"[30]

In the first two laws, the author lays down how the artist evolves a fit art-form. But the form requires filling in. Its content is Bhāva (emotion). This is the third law. The next is *Lāvaṇya-Yojanaṁ*. We have defined Lāvaṇya as 'waving movement' in Rūpam. The artist is not satisfied with a static form depending merely on structural harmony of parts. He adds (Yojanaṁ) to the form, a mobility which springs directly from artist's passion (Bhāva) for beauty. Lāvaṇya-yojanaṃ is, as Coomaraswamy observes, 'the infusion of grace and charm.' Further the painting should have 'a recognisable likeness in portraiture'. It is *Sādṛśya*. *Sādṛśya*,[31] as we shall define later on, is not the literal transcription of a particular form. It involves both selection

and discovery. The artist in a portraiture brings out in line and colour the real person by selection of certain aspects, which fact alone distinguishes a work of painting from a photograph. The last is *Vārṇika-Bhaṅga*, which means the artistic disposition of colours. The text on these laws is so meagre that we have to find meaning in a speculative way. So we can interpret Vārṇika-Bhaṅga as the way of achieving colour-harmony in a painting.

We find in Kālidāsa[32] a rare example of the happiest wedding of form and emotion (Vāk and Artha). He trusts to the form and its magic effect on the human soul. In both the *Kumārasambhava* and *Raghuvaṁśa*, where we read Rati-Vilāpa[33] and Aja-Vilāpa, he uses a metre, which by its flow, creates an elegiac atmosphere in music about us. In the *Meghadūta*, the lyric quality is not so much the effect of the situation as of the lines of the metre itself. The musical march of the lines in Mandākrāntā first slow then fast, produces a pathetic image of Yakṣa, who in love-trance looks up to the mass of first appearing clouds for solace, ravished by the charm of his surroundings.

Kālidāsa in his choice of metre and words betrays a rare sense of form and its aesthetic effect, yet his form is deeply instinct with an aesthetic meaning. So much is this confluence of word and meaning, so ready a consent of sound and sense in his art that a casual reader only looks to what he says and not how he says it. Though Kālidāsa is a conformist, yet in his conformity to Śāstraic injunctions he finds opportunities for creation which, in his case, consists in the infusion of form and emotion. The blend is very close and yet very clear like the blend of percept and concept. If one without the other is empty, the other is also blind without it. If in Epistemology sharp dualism of matter and form must be ultimately untenable, in Aesthetics also dualism of emotion and expression must be transcended in the act of intuition. Indeed the empirical analysis of

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art-experience into form and matter will land us into complexities of Kantian Metaphysics. Aesthetic intuition is therefore a complete act whose organic unity cannot be broken without destroying it.

5. *The Meanings of Sāmavāda (Harmony) and Laya (Rhythm).*

To sustain and intensify beauty-experience, Art uses certain form devices. These are symmetry and harmony. In an aesthetic gestalt, each element possesses a relation of fitness with every other. In geometric forms, fitness is based on mathematical laws, but in other forms fitness is emotionally determined. Mathematical fitness based on economics of nervous energy is called symmetry. Emotional fitness of the elements in an artistic whole is harmony. But both these are equally soul-sustaining principles of beauty. Harmony is not an economic or measureable quality. This separates it from symmetry which admits qualification. In symmetry, repetition of elementary or complex patterns, arithmetically calculable from centre or axis, is essential. It thus seems to be an objective quality translatable into ease and economy of nervous energy. In harmony also the principle of economy works in the mental sphere. Disharmony is felt as an emotional interruption. This interruption is analoguous to the sense of contradiction in the development of a logical argument. Harmony is the mutual intensification of the several moments of beauty-experience, culminating into a blissful state of 'self-forgetfulness more restful sleep', when the limits of individuality are overthrown. This last is the state of rhythm.

Ānandavardhana discusses his theory of harmony in the *Dhvanyāloka*. The main law of harmony is the law of subordination, which aims to achieve fulness of emotion (Rasa-paripoṣa). A rasa emotion is known to touch its climax, when other emotions, whether hostile or friendly, agree to subserve the end of the master emotion. For

Abhinava gupta[35] adds thrilling effect (camatkāra) of a rasa emotion is not confined to itself; it should contribute substantially to the development of another one. As the main plot in a drama develops from seed-state, and, throughout remains one and unsubordinated and unconfused,[36] so a Rasa emotion develops as one and unique. Ānandavardhana points out two[37] main obstacles to emotional organization in harmony: (i) There is variousness amongst Rasa emotions (ii) There is incompatibility (बाध्य-बाधक-भाव) in some of them. The first of these can be overcome by subordination to the central and nuclear emotion. For overcoming the second of the obstacles, he points three laws which we give below:

(1) If one Rasa[38] forms the principal emotion in a certain piece, no other rasa, whether hostile or not, should be allowed to rule, or, at least, to overshadow it.

(2) There should not be predominance of anicilary emotions leading to the development of hostile moods.

(3) Even when the hostile Rasa emotion tends to develop, there should be time after time the assertion of the Principle of Subordination.

Abhinava gupta tells us that in the same way other laws aiming to avoid the cutting short of the principal Rasa should be thought out. He even points out a deep meta-psychologic truth behind the unity of emotions: The question of the principal and subordinate arises to those who institute a fundamental divergence and incompatibility in emotional life. There is no question of any 'oppostion' to those who regard all emotions as springing from a common matrix, and hence unifiable under the stress of the law of harmony.[39]

Even harmony is not the final aim or achievement of Art. As harmony begins to be felt, loosening of individuality bonds begins and the oppressive sense of time and earthly existence gives way to cosmic vitality. This merger of the finite in the Infinite, of the temporal in the

Eternal is described as Laya or rhythm. Rhythm is the undulation of harmony. It consists of two moments, inflow and outflow, tension and release. All movements, vital or mechanical, seem to be rhythmic, in so far as they are made up of alternating moments of 'concentration' and 'release' of stored up energy. Psychology of laya or self-merger takes us to yoga, according to which rhythm is broken by the irregular breathing, caused by psychic and organic disturbances and irregularities. With balanced diet, sleep, etc., the mind begins to flow rhythmically, and life is lived intensely in the very heart of eternal flow of vitality. We return to the very fountain of immortality, its serene joys and calm. It is the highest state of the human soul, the result of long and arduous self-discipline, aimed at even by Yoga, Bhakti and Mysticism. The finale[40] of Art and that of spiritual disciplines of all sorts is the same laya-state, or the dissolution of the individuality-bonds.

IV. Beauty As Embellishment

1. *Beauty as Embellishment* (*Alaṅkāra*)

Urge to embellish seems to be as strong as it is universal. It features almost all levels of culture. Ornament is one with tendencey for refinement in man. It is a part of the creative will, for wherever man has attempted to 'create', that is, to embody his deep urges and experiences in some intelligible medium, he has invariably decorated it. There is a good deal of psychology, and perhaps even meta-psychology, behind satisfaction we derive from decoration. The consideration of this 'satisfaction' is to us a side issue here; our main question is: *under what conditions the decorative tendency is said to spring from the will to beauty*? We have before us India's history of Art, when it was reduced to bare decorative devices. Ornamentation created a florid style of art in sculpture, architecture and music and literature, till its excess killed the formative spirit from which it originated. It was an age of aesthetic efflorescence in India.

The question is important because it helps us to distinguish the 'artistic' from the 'artificial'. It is a hard fact that we cannot altogether avoid the artificial, though too much of it is naturally resented. Bharata[1] regards the artificial element in drama as an indispensable aid to emotionalization. Ornament[2] is an aid to nature, and as such it must not overshadow it. Ornament[3] must be subservient to nature, for it leads to artificiality only when we overshoot the mark. In decorating[4] our art-forms we must know the fitness of the ornaments to nature, age, status and other conditions. Fitness in Bharata's Aesthetics is emotional. An ornament or any decorative device is acceptable if it intensifies our Rasa experience. If the contemplation[5] of a young lady separated from her lover is pathetic, it becomes doubly so when she is presented to us in her soiled garbs and with a single braid of her hair. Even her soiled dress becomes her decoration, while any elegance on her part will violate our sense of beauty. Bharata then lays down as the Dictum[6] of Embellishment in Art: Any ornamentation, decorative or chromatic device is aesthetically pleasing if it is born of the Rasa-experience. Artificial is that, we are led to conclude, which is imposed upon Art ab extra, and, as such that as produces an effect foreign to Rasa-experience.

India's iconographical art has followed the dictum. Each god or goddess has his or her own ornaments and decorations. The deity is not the product of imaginative photo-making. It is born in the contemplative self-merger (dhyāna) of the impassioned devotee. Dhyāna is the complete act of art-creation. Therefore the deity emerges as a full-fledged figure, having glorious halo of spiritual experience about it. Indian pantheon and incarnations consist of figures such as Viṣṇu, Buddha, Vāmana, Śiva, Vārāha, Nṛsimha and so on, which provide all sorts of Rasa-experience. Viṣṇu is the figure of Eros. Buddha represents pathos, and Vāmana laughter. Śiva is a complex figure, yet

his main emotion is rage. Vārāha (boar incarnation) and Nṛsimha (Lion-man figure) are the figures of terror. The ornaments and decorations of each deity are completely in consonance with its encircling emotional atmosphere. In the decadent age, however, the figures became overlaid with them and lost touch with the spirit of the deity. Beauty was ultimately identified with decoration.

2. *Speech and Alaṅkāra.*

Man's desire to decorate is fully satisfied in Literature, for 'speech' is the most plastic of all art-materials. In studying the Alaṅkāra in Literature, therefore, we are to discover the most natural idiom of artistic expression. The use of figures in speech is no mere accident. It is founded on some basic operations and tendencies of aesthetic consciousness. In India the figures of speech have been studied as a part of Rasa Philosophy in all their minute details and variety. Sometimes the very springs of art-life are flashed in them. Our study therefore would differ from that of Poetics in this that we shall be ever looking for the mainspring of the artistic activity at the root of poetic figures rather than their definitions or subtle distinctions.

The study of the figures of speech becomes philosophical the moment we note that the Indian thinkers never conceived of speech as anything less than a metaphysical energy. In outlining the Philosophy of speech which underlies the poetic figures, we take authority of Ruyyaka and his commentator Jayaratha. Speech[8] (Vāk) is transcendent energy. Our spoken language is the verbal articulation of that energy. But it is not the only one. The metaphysical energy which is the infinite and vital essence of our self is also present in the form of 'meaning'. The 'illumination of meaning' in the mind is not a cerebral act; hence it is not differentiated in the form of verbal memories.

It is in the form of an 'undifferentiated luminous[9] mass of meaning' constantly seeking an outlet for articulation. It is also the whole of our spiritual self. From this luminous mass of meaning starts a mental differentiation in the form of suppressed enunciation.[10] It is a kind of internal focussing and 'canalizing' the mind-energy towards cerebration. It is the second stage. At last the cerebral activity starts under the impetus of the 'internal canalization' of mind-energy. The vocal chords and the entire apparatus involved in audible speech move under its bidding and the clear pronunciation of words results.[11]

This centripetal conception of the process of speech-development is a challenge to all mechanical theories. It lends to us a fresh understanding of Bergson's thesis that perception develops out of memory, and, not *vice versa*, and that memory is not a 'cerebral deposit', but a "consciousness that illumines at each moment of time, that immediate part of the past which, impending over the future, seeks to realize and to associate with it[12]." It above all, proves that "all words are spiritual, and nothing is more spiritual than words" (Walt Whitman). Ruyyaka with others has regarded speech as something divine and wonderful. Jayarath tells us that it is not for nothing that we call Vāk as devī (goddess).[13] Deducing from Pāṇini's Sūtra, Jayarath concludes that speech is divine because it is superhumanly sportive, revealing, self-shining and blissful. Speech[14] has also been praised as the eternal cow which the poets have been milking for long without coming to an end. The Upaniṣads[15] also worship speech as cow. The idea behind these statements is that Speech, metaphysically, is the eternal fountain of all spiritual emanations. Art as a kind of spiritual emanation is a kind of speech.

Of late Jung has developed a conception of speech which is meta-psychologic by working out a few hints from the Upaniṣads. He has embodied that conception in his

Philosophy of libido. He tells us that "the Hindoo Metapsychology conceives speech and fire as emanations of inner light from which we know it is libido, the creating psychic force."[16]

"There is also philological evidence, he says, for the common psychologic origin of fire and speech. The word 'Tejas' in Sanskrit which stands for semen and light indicates the relation of fire and sex. "As the old Hindoos recognized in fire an emanation of the inner libido fire, so they recognized in the intoxicating drink (fire-water= Soma Agni), an emanation of fire. The Vedic definition of Soma as seminal fluid confirms this interpretation."[17]

Thus whether we accept the Metaphysical or metapsychologic conception of language, we should regard it to be a super-conscious energy, as the common matrix of all beauty and art. One of the later Upaniṣads[18] conceives of it as Kāma-Kalā and Śṛṅgāra-Kalā from which flow out all the cosmic forces. It is the wave of infinite bliss. It is the eternal truth whose name is Beauty.

Some such theory of language must underlie Alaṅkāra. Speech is the result of stirring of the primal fire in man. Art also is a rhythmic outflow of libido when it is 'emotionalized' by aesthetic causes. Whenever a man speaks therefore from the depths of his soul, he speaks but art. "No person can ever be a poet who is not at the same time a seer[19]." 'Seeing' is but returning to the primal source of life. Speech therefore that is artistic and 'original', though deflected from the ordinary form is inflected towards the figurative one. This figurative inflection of language, far from being accidental, is based on an inveterate habit of creative mind. Though no thinker in India has dared to confuse Beauty with Figure, yet none has denied its role as an intensifier of art-experience. Mammaṭa[20] and his commentators hold that where there seems to be no figure in poetry, it may be non-distinct but never non-existent. Viśvanātha also tells us that at times the Rasa quality of art may overshadow its beauty of Alaṅkāra. In what follows

we shall consider the role of Alaṅkāra in artistic expression, its genesis and place in our beauty-consciousness.

3. *The Nature and Function of Metaphor.*

An Alaṅkāra is a beautifying device. Here we ask: *What is it* we beautify by a figure, and *how* we do it? The Indian thinkers believe that the nuclear element in aesthetic consciousness is either an emotional state (Rasa), or some aspect of nature (Vastu) or of mind. In short what we beautify is some living experience. In finding out what we beautify by means of figures, the Alaṅkāra philosophers have charted and mapped the very subtle nuances of human experience. Memory (Smṛti), Illusion (Bhrānti), Doubt (Sandeha), Exaggeration (Atyukti), Impossibility (Asambhava), Negation (Apahnuti) and so on, almost all the states of the mind can be made beautiful by the use of figures. In the *Kāvyādarśa*[21], we find an example how a consciousness of argument (hetu) can cause immense aesthetic thrill. Even our logical consciousness of cause-effect relation, which seems to have no beauty-emotion, can bring about charm when presented artistically: The cause is either the cause of being or knowing of the effect. When the cause[22] intensifies the blissful feeling of an effect it brings about, we have an aesthetic experience. In the same way if the contemplation of the state of non-existence (Abhāva)[23] intensifies and sustains the experience, it becomes 'beautiful'. Even the presentation of facts (Svabhāvokti)[24] becomes an Alaṅkāra. The condition when such a factual presentation becomes artistic is when the individual intensely expresses the universal character or class-essence. Dīpaka[25] or mental illumination is an important form of Alaṅkāra, it being one of the four figures to emerge at the first stage of evolution of Alaṅkāra Philosophy in Bharata. When the momentary suspense is suddenly cleared by a burst of illuminating thought, we have the Dīpaka form of beauty experience.

Daṇḍin tells us that this sort of mental dazzling can take place in a variety of ways. In brief there is no form of human experience which may not be converted into a beauty-feast by means of the figures. This view of Alaṅkāra incidentally may be compared with the recent development of Dewey's[26] theory of Art. He also regards aesthetic experience as intensification of our ordinary experience. An Alaṅkāra is also a mental attempt to transform the common place into something artistic.

Now we can face the question: How the ordinary experience becomes accented with quality of beauty. Behind this question lies the important conception of Indian Psycho-aesthetics, namely the conception of Sādṛśya which A. Coomarswamy[27] translates as Sym-visibility or con-similarity. In so far as a figure is the product of original genius, its aesthetic charm lies in its capacity to reveal Sādṛśya. Appaya[28] shows a deep insight into the nature of figures by telling us that "Sādṛśya alone enters into all artistic expressions and creates charm like the dance-girl who thrills the spectators by her change of dress." All the figures are variants of Sādṛśya. He defines it as 'consonantia'[29] of two meanings which possess the quality of mutual fitness. This 'sym-visibility' should be at the same time an aspect of the two meanings, which has a quality of Kānti (beauty-illumination) in it. Thus, Sādṛśya is the sudden and tremendous revealment of the most thrilling aspect of con-semblance between two mutually fit objects.

Revealment of Sādṛśya is called technically Upamā (Simile). Jagannātha[30] has given us clues to the nature of creative image involved in Upamā. Upamā is to him an Alaṅkāra which reveals beautiful con-similarity. The beautiful is that which creates an ineffable bliss, without which there is no raison d'etre for an Alaṅkāra. The thrilling Sādṛśya[31] need not be factually true. The true creativity of aesthetic imagination is tested in the evolution

of Sadṛśya which can start artistic thrill in our mind. Sādṛśya thus is a super-real quality. It is neither illusion nor hallucination. It does not belong to the order of emperically real things. Its truth[32] is its power to charm.

This indeed is the functional approach to the understanding of imagery in Art. A Sādṛśya though a creature[33] of poetic fancy, is to be accepted as true just because it is true to its function. Here we can compare Jagannātha with Middleton Murray[34] who also lays down that "the highest function of imagery is to define indefinable spiritual qualities." Sādṛśya becomes intensely agreeable (हृद्य) to us because it reveals deeper aspects of things and subtlest shades of experiences which the matter-of-fact use of language can never do. Thus "all metaphor and simile can be described as the analogy by which the human mind explores the universe of quality and charts the non-measureable world[35]." The discovery of upamā therefore is an act of creation. Kālidāsa is great because of his upamā and its condensed form metaphor (Rūpaka). Aristotle also teaches that "the greatest thing of all by far is to be master of metaphor."

Jagannātha further gives us another test of creative imagery involved in the figurative expression, and it is that Sādṛśya must intensify the nuclear element in aesthetic experience. The nuclear[37] element is the total meaning. Nāgeśa his commentator lays stress on 'totality' of the meaning. The idea that is impressed is that a creative imagery suggested by a poetic figure must not remain detached from the context in which it occurs. The organic unity of imaginative act is essential in artistic creation, for the 'passion' causing it is one such completed unity. Middleton Murray here also tells us that "the greatest mastery of imagery does not lie in the use, however beautiful and revealing, of isolated images, but in the harmonious total impression produced by a succession of

subtly related images." Jagannātha[38] by numerous examples has shown us how this unity of impression can be achieved.

The above treatment leads us to the conclusion that metaphoric activity is a basic fact of human consciousness.

"Metaphor is," as Murray says, "the instinctive and necessary act of the mind exploring reality and ordering experience. It is the means by which the less familiar is assimilated to the more familiar, the unknown to the known."

But like all primary facts of consciousness, metaphoric activity cannot be explained. It is natural and essential mode of articulation of our aesthetic sensibility, without which we shall ever remain dumb. The greater is the faithfulness in the communication of our impressions, the greater is the inflection of our expression towards the metaphoric. Even scientific language could not free itself from metaphor. This is also the reason why the Upaniṣadic philosophy becomes indistinguishable from poetry. In Pañcāgnividyā, the seer conveys to us the dynamic nature of the universe, cloud, man and woman. There seems to be no way left to him but to conceive of a metaphor in which these are all compared to fire, its fuel, and burning sparks. Thus alone it appears to be the case that "metaphor is as ultimate as speech itself, and speech as ultimate as thought."

4. *Metaphor and Concept.*

Reason works with concepts in order to evolve 'order' within the cosmos of experience. The conceptual activity taking its ease in the desire for 'order' crystallizes and 'solidifies' our ever flowing consciousness into a few 'ideas' or 'generic images'. With them we create a static order in our knowledge. We call it 'static' because every fresh discovery of concepts causes a need for revision and rebuilding of the entire edifice of human science. In fact science has grown by the continual process of pulling down the old and raising a new superstructure upon it. In Art

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also there is "an escape[40] from chaos." For as Herbart continues, "*Art is movement ordained in number, mass confined in measure.*" Without Art, the ever surging emotions, the upwelling currents of deeper life could never have been captured and materialized, and the ever elusive and fugitive moments never immortalized. The poets and artists have captured and preserved in 'number and measure' all that is of enduring charm to man. By means of metaphoric activity, our dumb spiritual life finds voice. But the order which the poet articulates is an emotional one. An emotion is of the nature of stir and motion. The emotional order therefore is dynamic. Art thus, on the one hand, sobers down 'the feeling-storms' and other lower forms of animations, and on the other it opens new vistas of emotional enjoyment.

Metaphoric activity springs directly from creative genius (Pratibhā). Rājeśekhara[41] tells us that mind in man is of three grades, memory (Smṛti), Cognition (Mati) and Genius (Pratibhā). Memory is record of the past; Cognition is the apprehension of the present; and, genius is the prophet of the future. It is genius which explores, reveals and forms new and charming facets of natural and human existence. Genius is supported and sustained by energy (Śakti). The conception of poetic energy in Indian thought is universal, for it is again metaphysical in nature. Saraswatī is the goddess of art-energy and the astist, in the moment of spiritual communion, fills his soul with the same fire. We therefore here lay emphasis on Upāsanā for the artist. Kālidāsa is said to be the very flesh and marrow of the goddess Saraswatī.

The discovery of a concept is the product of analytic-synthetic activity. A concept unifies and orders multiplicity. Concept-formation is seeing one-in-many. It is also the work of genius. Herbart[42] regards genius as "the man who sees and feels, not only the object before him, but sees this object

in its universal implications—sees the one in the many, the many in the one." A metaphor unravels a vista, sometimes even a panorama, yet veiled under the cover of spiritual dumbness. But this unveiling cannot be without a stir. So genius in art is often compared to demonic possession. Even metaphoric illumination is thought to be a form of mysticism. Leuba[43] regards it as a kind of epileptic aura and its discharge alike spontaneous because it is organically caused. As metaphor always involves an upwelling of a symbol from within, the activity, according to Lyttelton,[44] cannot be called only conscious. It is the work of our super-conscious mind. "The living symbol cannot come to birth in an inert or poorly developed mind.... Only the passionate yearning of a highly developed mind....can create a new symbol."[45] Because the symbol dscovered and grasped by a metaphor is primordial, luminous and enchanting, Kritschner[46] regards it as a product of "the psycho-pathic inheritance, the demonic unrest and mental tension", which if we remove "from the constitution of the man of genius, nothing but an ordinary, talented person would remain." Rājaśekhara[47] considering creative genius at all the levels—from abnormal to super-normal as given above—has classified poets into ten kinds.

Concept in the sphere of Reason is much like metaphor in the sphere of Emotion. Both illumine and order experience; both grasp and gather up in a single flash vast stretches of rational and emotional life. A brilliant concept is as much an act of 'creation' as a luminous metaphor. They differ only in their spheres, but not in their ultimate achievement. Conceptual activity builds us the content of knowledge; the metaphoric activity supplies the content of the 'beautiful'. Both are equally primordial and necessary in understanding and explaining nature. Rājaśekhara tells us that creative genius[48] in art, which is the mother of metaphor, takes two forms both important to the creator and the critic.

one is creative, the other appreciative. To create or appreciate a metaphor we require genius, as we require it for understanding and elucidating Nature with the help of a concept. And at last we transform by super-imposing an order, our experience both with the help of metaphor and concept.

5. *Atiśaya and Idealization.*

To create in Art means to idealize. A metaphor is creative if and to the extent to which, it goes beyond the actual datum of sense. The extent to which it goes beyond is called Atiśaya. The creation of Atiśaya (excellence) is *sinequa non* of metaphoric activity. It is a fact of human nature that it is thrilled by the creation and understanding of Atiśaya. Thus the essence of metaphoric activity is the process of idealization. Some thinkers specially in the West have identified artistic creation with the process of idealization. Addison speaks of the Pleasures of Imagination or Fancy. "The poet", he says, "seems to get the better of Nature." Things greater stranger or more beautiful than the eye ever saw can be fancied by Imagination; on this account it is the part of the poet to humour Imagination in its own Notions, by mending and perfecting Nature where he describes Reality, and adding greater Beauties than are put together in Nature where he describes a Fiction.[49]

The conception of Atiśaya rules in many of our attempts at art-creation, even besides Literature. The purpose of this idealization of forms to us is not, as it is to Addison, to "humour Imagination" in anyway, though Indian architectural and sculptural forms are the beneficial food to it because of their deep symbolism. "The characteristic of Hindu sculpture in the extension of human powers and knowledge, Expansion and exaltation of consciousness (of light against darkness), extension and intensification of action (of right against wrong), accumulation and distillation

of cultural wealth (of spiritual, not sensuous pleasure), these and others are aesthetical virtues expressed in Hindu sculpture[50]." Because of this religious aim of our hieratic art, sometimes the forms may appear to be unreal, which in fact are only super-real, that is real to religious contemplation. This form of idealization raises several fundamental issues. We take for consideration only two: 1. What are the psychological and aesthetic limits of idealization? 2. What different forms can this idealization take in the sphere of Art?

In the process of idealization or creation of Atiśaya in the mind, first there is the object which is idealized. This may be called Viṣaya, for instance, the 'face' of a lady. Then there is the referent (Viṣayī) with whose help excellence in aesthetic charm is brought about. The process of referring Viṣaya to Viṣayī has been variously called as Nigaraṇa (swallowing), Sādharaṇatā[51] sampatti (Identification) and Abhedādhyavasāya (determination of unity). The question of extension of Viṣaya towards Viṣayī (of facial beauty towards the beauty of lotus or moon) can be considered both psychologically and aesthetically. The psychological standpoint is: How *possibly* can we give to face an ideal form? And the other is : How *allowably* can we give to it a *beautiful* ideal form? As the first question is not of direct concern to us we sum it up as follows : We idealize a form into another either on account of Sādṛśya (con-similarity) or any other kind of relation. The latter relations may be causal, spatial or that of inherence etc. Therefore the ideal or imaginal form can become a possible referent if it has a definable relation with the actual form.[53] When we say, "Child is fire", we idealize the child-form into the fire-form, because it is conceivable that the child has flame-like lustre. When we say, "Butter is life", we say so because butter is conducive to life, and so on. An imaginal form proves to be absurd if no definite trace or reference of relation can

be discovered. The ideal communicates with the actual by the way of a definite reference.

Of all possible reference, some are of great aesthetic value. These are the ways of artistic idealization (Utprekṣaṇaṁ). Ruyyaka defines artistic idealization as the *process*[54] (not accomplished product) of Adhyavasāya; whereas the latter is the *impression of identity* because of the actual form being completely covered by the ideal one. When this complete merger of the actual into the ideal is due to the abundance of Sādṛśya, Viśvanātha[55] tells us, it is known as upacāra. Ruyyaka[56] reminds us that if idealization of a form is to possess a real art-value, we should have an inescapable sense of truth about the process. A lurking consciousness of falsity in the ideal process will mar the aesthetic effect. Here we reach the limit of aesthetic idealization. The ideal form must possess 'the poetic truth'. If Art seeks to transform and re-build human experience by the processes of idealization and intensification, it must possess a 'truth' acceptable to the highest faculties of man. A merely subjective reading of Nature and her aspects is 'fallacious' both aesthetically and rationally. It is known as Pathetic Fallacy. And yet the truth of ideal form cannot be proved on cold and cogent logic. What can then be the nature of 'poetic truth' which sets a limit to idealization?

Jagannātha, with his rare insight, resolves the difficulty by pointing out two criteria of 'poetic truth'. Firstly the process of idealization must be governed by the sense of beauty[57]. The ideal form should be aesthetically enjoyable (Ramaṇīya). Beauty to him is an emotional illumination flooding the soul with ecstatic joys. Thus 'truth' in Art is emotionally tested. An art-form is true if it is powerful enough to 'emotionalize' the soul. This test however is not enough, for it is too subjective. Jagannātha therefore adds that 'idealization' is true if the quality which stimulates and sustains the process is true. To illustrate:[58] "A large

number of swans (Bakas) of silvery feathers are squeaking loudly half-immersed in the blue waters of the Yamunā." This is a heavenly sight. The half-immersion of *silvery swans* in the *blue* waters and their incessant *calls and cries.* This starts the idealizing process in the creative poet who voices his deep thrill and appreciation of the scene by adding: "I imagine the *children of the moon*, for fear of being swallowed up by *dense darkness*, are *crying* for help." Here in the words of Jagannātha, the success of idealization is complete in that the dark of the night can be imagined to swallow, and that the cries of the swans reflect the cries of fear of some one sinking. The stimulus here is the quality of the scene itself. It initiates, sustains and intensifies the ideal form invented by the poet.

Idealization first takes two forms :[59] The form may be given directly or suggested by the material. Then the latter takes three forms : 1. The whole of the *ideal form* (swarūpa) may be suggested, complete with its class-essence (Jāti), excellence (guṇa), activity (Kriyā) and material (dravya). 2. The ideal form may comprehend the cause (Hetu) in the same way or 3. the effect (Phala). We illustrate one of the numerous forms of idealization below : After the conquest of Laṅkā, Rāma flying back in the Puṣpaka to Ayodhyā describes to Sita how he picked up one of her ornaments set with chiming ringlets on his way where she was taken away by Rāvaṇa. "This is the place where in search for you I picked up one of your nūpuras, which was as if *silent* on account of *grief of separation* from[60] you." Here the scene becomes pathetic by imagining the gold ornament to be in grief. There is no 'pathetic fallacy' here because the imaginal forms of the grieving nūpura intensifies our pathos. This, according to Appaya, is the example of idealization of quality (गुणोत्प्रेक्षा).

Whenever there is 'idealization', the quality which initiates and sustains it is either itself common (Sādharaṇa)[61]

or is made so by other devices. At times even the process of Sādhāraṇī-karaṇa is unable to initiate 'idealization', for this may not be beautiful. The process only aims to remove the obstacles in the way of idealization. In developing proper art-forms in painting and sculpture, we need 'Sādharaṇikaraṇa' so that we draw inspiration from perfect paragons of natural beauty. Every part of the human body—eyes, nose, lips and all has been ideally perfected in form by the same process. Thus the process of artistic idealization (Utprekṣā) has been the inexhaustible mine of countless art forms in India. It has been fully treated by the Paṇḍitas of Alaṅkāra Philosophy.

6. *Aesthetic Representationism and European Aesthetics.*

Whence is the ideal form drawn? From external Nature or from a spiritual upsurge from within? On the answer to this question have the religious Art of Europe and the Art of India in general parted company with the modern European Art. The modern Indian Art is mainly inspired by the entrenched tendencies in the European Art. The difference is more fundamental than it appears to be on the face of it. They differ as much as Realism differs from Idealism. From the logical extreme of Realism as much as the extremist position of Idealism no account of Beauty in Art can be given. If one leads to flat Naturalism, the other to utter sujectivist account of it. And yet the interpretation of Art in both is different, which is a fact important to bear in mind.

"Those who wish to study the development of Indian Art must emancipate themselves entirely from the innate European tendency to use a supposedly geater or less degree of the observation of Nature as a measuring rod by which to trace stylistic sequences or recognize aesthetic merit. Indian art can only be studied as showing at different times a greater or less degree of consciousness, a greater or less energy; the criteria are degrees of vitality, unity, grace and the like, never of illusion. In Indian art of primarily representative interest,

that of portraiture, was practised by amateurs, and even so required a mental visualization only less formal than that of the hieratic work."[62]

The realistic art of Europe invents 'significant' forms, where an ideal form is a 'sign' which indicates the amount and extent of idealization of Nature achieved by the artist. An ideal form is equivalent to significant form. In fitness with the general idealistic trend of Indian thought, her art has been invariably 'symbolic'. A 'symbol' differs from 'sign' in many respects. For our present purpose a symbol is some concrete form of spiritual urge. The ethereal longings and deep spiritual experiences have a tendency to concretise themselves. In art they find the proper 'symbolic' forms. *The success of art therefore lies, not in how much it takes from Nature, but in how much it gives to it from the infinite energy within us.* 'Symbolic' art communes with Spirit, while 'significant' art traffics with Nature.

"Indian art is aiming at something quite other than the copying of Nature.... If here or there a relief or painting exhibits some features drawn from life, it is only accidentally that the artist has, in spite of himself, transcribed something from actual Nature: and this is certainly, from the indigeneous point of view, the least meritorious part of his work."[63]

The difference of 'symbol' and 'sign' raises another issue, that of validation of artforms. It is so in Epistemology. If perceptual experience represents some form of existence, whose esse is not percipi, its truth is to be proved by correspondence between 'esse' and 'percipi'. The test of validity will fall outside the perception. A thorough going correspondence view or the extrinsic test of validity (परतःप्रामाण्यवाद) cuts no ice without taking recourse to some form of internal harmony or coherence among the elements of our experience. Even Pragmatism is reducible to the standpoint of coherence between the practical and intellectual aspects of life. If 'correspondence' (बिम्ब-प्रतिबिम्ब-वाद) fails to furnish us a criterion in the sphere

of thought, it does so phenomenally in the sphere of aesthetic experience. And the realistic stand in art leads us to the correspondence view of truth only. An art form in fact, is not true because it refers to Nature, or corresponds with some of her aspects. The more on the contrary it does so, the more it falls short of the standard. "The more the image is true to Nature, the more it lies." Here we need only an intrinsic and inherent test of truth. An ideal form validates itself, because it springs from, and conveys, a spiritual longing in a tangible material. An art-form of India, say the figure of Lord Viṣṇu, with four hands etc., is not true because it may, and, is not false because it does not, correspond to anything outside. Its charm to us is not even the fact that it is the result of imaginative augmentation and conjunction of parts. Yet the form is completely true and self-validating, because it symbolises the Infinite creative urge at the root of things.

This idealistic conception of Art form incidentally explains why some forms are more valuable than others and what those forms are. Accentuation of forms takes place when the formative will is able to draw from the inner reservoir of spiritual energy, while their process of attenuation indicates the state of loosening (शिथिल-समाधि) of the will. In the process of attenuation symbols are thinned down to mere signs. We get our conclusion confirmed by A. K. Coomarswamy who says,

"It is true that in the decadence of Art, what should be symbols are replaced by what are merely signs, a formal by an informal referendum.... It is just in this connection that we are led to understand how and why it is that "realistic" art must be regarded as "decadent", that is to say, falling short of what is proper to the dignity of man as man, to whom not merely sensible, but also intelligible worlds are accessible. Granted that by restoring to the lotus all, or all we can, of those accidents that are proper to the lotus of the botanist, we produce an object apt to deceive an animal : what we have thus done is to make it clear that our reference is, and is only, to a

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natural species and not to an idea; our 'whole' work of art, is no longer creative, imitating an exemplary form, but merely a succedaneum, more or less apt to titillate our senses."[64]

7. *The Classification of Aesthetic Theories.*

We are now in a position to classify aesthetic theories, our ultimate aim being to formulate in exact terms the judgment in beauty-experience. First there are said to be Art of the ear and Art of the eye (श्रव्य and दृश्य), though we have according to Bharata, a third category which is both the Art of the ear and eye. Behind this distinction of graphic and auditory arts lies the whole psycho-aesthetics of space and time perception: For the arts of the eye are the enjoyable forms of spatial perception, while the arts of the ear or arts of the musical pattern are forms of temporal relations. Even a psychological account of time and space perception is quite intricate and interesting. Its Psycho-aesthetics further reveals that in spatial perception of form, colour, mass and volume, that is, the static qualities, the perceiving mind is in motion: A statue or a painting is not felt as beautiful so long as each turn of the line or bulge of the mass or the harmony of colours or its symmetry does not wake up to pulsating life. But what seems to be the pulsation of the object is only a rhythmic flow of the percipient mind. Thus the graphic art may be said to be enjoyed when its immobile qualities create mobility or movement by its inner dynamo in the enjoyer's mind. Music and musical arts like drama and dance, which are created in time, are the successive currents of intervals occupied by sound-harmonies. To be enjoyed the surge of currents should be gathered up in a moment, the flow arrested and intensified. Music therefore a movement in itself, is enjoyed by a creation of immobility of the soul.

This indeed sounds curious that 'immobility' is enjoyed by 'mobility' of the soul, and that the mobile arts are enjoyable in a state of immobility. J. H. Cousins[65]

calls it "the curious aesthetical contradiction", and classifies arts as mobile and immobile. The *Bhāgavata*[66] also maintains that the music spell of Kṛṣṇa's flute creates a stir in the immobile (जड़) objects and arrests the motion of the objects in motion (चर). The relative merit of this distinction over the previous one is that it takes note of both subjective and objective conditions in art and its enjoyment. On the previous classification of arts as those of the eye or those of the ear, no aesthetic judgment can be formed. The objective standpoint in aesthetic judgment is : This is beautiful because this is so and so. This may include both visual and auditory arts. The subjective viewpoint is : I feel it to be beautiful because I feel so and so. This may also refer to both of them. Thus we find that the classification of aesthetic theories for the sake of discovering the nature of aesthetic judgment should ultimately be subjective and objective arts.

Joad[67] and others have adopted this scheme. Admirable as it may seem, the scheme suffers from serious difficulties. As arte-xperience involves a sensible element, a purely subjectivist account of it is incorrect. But in so far as art-experience is *experience*, we cannot fully understand it only in terms of objective qualities, such as colour, volume or gestalt of a work of art. A work of art even as a perceptual object has a spirituality about it. As an object of aesthetic appreciation, it is completely spiritual. A piece of music as art is what it is enjoyed to be. A work of art is therefore equal to art-experience, a form of intensely enjoyable self-activity. Only it is less than mystic experience which is completely devoid of objective reference. Thus in any formulation of aesthetic judgment, there cannot be exclusive choosing of the subjective or the objective element. Art-experience being a bipolar activity, the difference in several formulations can arise from ·n emphasis on one or the other of the poles.

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The Indian theorists never committed themselves to the extremist position. The literary form of art being regarded as the most explicit expression of the human value called "Beautiful", is defined by our poet-philosophers as Sāhitya, which means the happiest concord of Śabda and Artha. There are definite indications to prove that Śabda is not equal to 'word'. It is anything which is a source of experience. It may be regarded as the sensible material of art experience. A word thus is completely saturated with spirituality. It is a spiritual index of a sensible quality. Artha is the meaning, the intelligible element in art-experience. Art results from the complete fusion of form and matter. Viśvanātha, Jagannātha and Ānandavardhana lay emphasis on the subjective element without disregarding the objective. Vāmana, Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha emphasize the formal side.

It is certain that a classification *cannot be based on subjective-objective polarity*, and no aesthetic judgment formed. And yet each theory has its centre of gravity, either gravitating towards the spiritual or the sensible element in art. The centre of gravity is the centre of inspiration. An internally inspired art abounds in spiritual qualities. The process of its creation or re-creation in enjoyment reaches the outer fringe as a result of spiritual articulation. The process starts from the inmost recess of spiritual existence, which becomes creative and highly charged with rhythm. It flows outward to concretise itself, and when it succeeds it invents a symbol which embodies the inner rhythm. This art we may describe as 'symbolic'. We propose to call it as 'ego-centric' art. The point-blank example is that of Vālmīki, in whom the inner disturbance, his Śoka (pathos), agitated within his creative soul to find a suitable embodiment. But art sometimes is inspired by forms outside, the forms that are inspiring and have tremendous satisfaction value for the human soul. A beautiful[68] grove,

a cottage in a green setting, a lonely tree in a bare plain, a solitary journeyman bathed in the sunset glory, an aged bard tuning his lyre to himself, and so on are the spectacles which are to the human soul a soothing balm and enchantment. Much of the art that is descriptive and narrative, whether in painting or poetry, whether used for background effect to make a spiritual quality prominent or as interesting in its own right, is thus externally inspired. This art may be known as 'Alter-centric. It is the art of 'significant' forms, the forms which have emotional, instinctual or even notional meanings to us. Art reaches the high pinnacle of perfection when it is a blend of 'significant' forms coming from outside and 'symbolic' forms springing from within.

8. *Mysticism in Aesthetics*.

Creation or re-creation of art forms (whether we regard them as 'signifying' some select aspect of external Nature or as 'symbolizing' a deep spiritual experience) involves 'an incalculable element', a mysterious 'X'. Even if we analyse the form into subjective and objective elements, this incalculable element escapes us. And this element known as चमत्कार is the source of all aesthetic delight. We have regarded camatkāra as the very essence of Rasa experience without which it will be indistinguishable from ordinary emotional experience. Camatkāra is translated as thrill, but it is much more than that. A mere thrill has no aesthetic value. That is why we refuse to honour a mere catch-penny 'thriller' or 'blood-curdler' as an artistic production. Camatkāra is bliss, illumination, release and thrill, all at once, perhaps even much more. The ideal forms in art, whether 'Significant' or 'Symbolic', are different forms of thrill (विच्छित्ति or चमत्कारविशषts:). Camatkāras is the sine qua non of an art-form.

To the question—why camatkāra evades the pincers of the analyst—the one reply that is given is ; Creation

is an unconscious act. According to Graham Wallas, any act of creation passes through four stages. The first is the stage of Preparation. It consists of overt action, and effort of accumulating, choosing and rejecting. Then begins the period of 'sleeping over' the problem. This is the stage of Incubation. Action passes down from the conscious to the Unconscious. It is when the libido is introverted (अन्तर्मुखी) and returns to its original rhythmic state which is creative. In the unconscious, new thought, new form or new invention, gradually takes shape and begins to show up a little. This is the beginning of the stage of Illumination. The conscious mind receives the new form with a pleasing wonder. It is the full-fledged form heading, by its inner force, towards materialization. This last stage in aesthetic creation may be called Execution, which in creation of a scientific thought, Wallas calls verification.

What interests us here are the periods of Incubation and Illumination. The incalculable element in art form is due to the unconscious activity. This unconscious activity is, according to Jung, Incubation. Incubation is Tapas,[70] and we have ample evidence from our Upaniṣadic literature that all creation starts from Tapas. In the Tapas the bonds of individuality begin to shatter, and life moves to a newer and higher plane of existence. This experience of spiritual expansion, extraordinary, ecstatic and thrilling, is regarded as 'mystic' by the intellectualist. Such an experience can be brought about in other ways also. The way of art is to induce it by the dynamo of sensible symbols. Thus mysticism in art becomes an inevitable conclusion.

That individuality does not condition our unconscious being is a proved truth of modern Psychology. Jung tells us that

"Individuality belongs to those conditional actualities which are greatly overrated theoretically on account of their practical signifi-

cance. It does not belong to those overwhelmingly clear, and therefore universally obtrusive general facts upon which a science must primarily be founded."[71]

The only pity is that modern Psychology does not regard this state of returning to the Unconscious, unconditioned by individuality bonds, as something healthy and supernormal. To us in India this mystic state of absorbing our small self in the very ocean of being and bliss is the height of life's pefection. And it is the source of all aesthetic charm.

9. *Pictorial Art.*

Art is graded into the first-rate (uttama), second-rate (madhyama) and pictorial (citra) according to the degrees of intrinsic capacity to take the mind beyond the mere sensible. The first-rate[72] art is that which subordinates the sensible element, and becomes suffused with, and a source of, aesthetic meaning. The sensible element reverberates with aesthetic suggestions and creates an overwhelming sense of value. An example[73] will illustrate the point; Pārvatī, the daughter of the Himālayas, sat with her father. To him the Heavenly Seers brought the message of Pārvatī's betrothal with Lord Śiva, on whom Pārvatī's young maiden heart was silently and irrevocably set. Kālidāsa describes the scene in a masterpiece as follows;

"So when the Seers spoke of the message of Pārvatī's acceptance in nuptials by Lord Śiva, she, looking downwards in the presence of her father, began counting the petals of the lovely lotus she held in her hand."

Here the counting of the petals, in itself insignificant, is the Key that unlocks the deep experience of joy, shyness and confusion of a young maiden who has just felt the first surge of erotic desire and its first fulfilment. But the sensible element, the counting of the petals by Pārvatī, is submerged under the tremendous flow of its aesthetic

suggestions. It may be added that a painter, dancer or sculptor succeeds in his respective domain of artistic creation to the extent to which he subordinates the media of presentation to what he presents, that is the aesthetic meaning.

In the second-rate[74] art-creation, our mind is so much overpowered by the medium that it does not move towards the mystic beauty-experience : We enjoy the sensible element, its direct and clear meaning which has a charm but no thrill. We relish it but do not enjoy. This is an art of sense-titillation and may easily head towards the sensational. The pictorial[75] art is third to come. Its main appeal is to the imagination and sense. It is seldom artistic and mostly artificial and caters for the infantile taste. The pictorial art, such as the use of alliteration in poetry or mosaic designing in painting or the use of too many ornaments in a statue, is a kind of cunning by an artist who is no artist at all. The pictorial art is born of the desire to attract and amaze the reader rather than awaken him to realize a new plane of existence. In art history, it is the sure index of the weakening of the beauty impulse and formative will.

Not that the colours, masses or lines do not speak at all. They have their suggestive power, and any collocation of them has a powerful emotional effect. Thus the sensible in art is the indispensable element. It becomes artistic the moment it begins to obey the Law of Subordination and Emphasis. Thus in the enjoyment of painting and poetry, the cubic suggestion sustains the aesthetic experience. The modern experiments in the psychology of 'thinking' also prove that even the subtlest and most abstract thought processes are borne on by a sensible element. The sensible element is either a visual, chromatic or sound imagery. It is the 'bearer', 'trager' (the carrier) of abstract thought. Exactly in the same way, the pic-

torial element in art must act as the 'bearer' of beauty-emotion. Art is degraded to third-rate when the 'carrier' of aesthetic message overrides the 'rider' and fills our consciousness with its own dazzle. Ānandavardhana[76] condemns this subduing power of imagery as an act of artistic dereliction. The colour-effect becomes, Ānandavardhana continues, more re- grettable if it overshadows the delicate sentiments of Śṛṅgāra experience, specially that form of it which is known as Vipralambha where its delicacy demands the bare outpour of heart.

The figurative element in the first-grade art plays its part when it submits to the Law of Subordination and Emph asis. Ānandavardhana[77] goes deeper and subsumes this law under a higher principle of mental life. An imagery is a true figure in art if it is born of the creative state of Rasa-experience, so that no separate effort is needed to bring it about. The artist does not aim at imagery; but it follows spontaneously upon the heels of creative passion seeking articulation. The imagery which 'bears' the beauty-impul-se,[78] says Ānandavardhana, is though a masterpiece of won-derful creation, automatic and incidental. When the sensible element emanates from an organic Rasa-experience it does not require a conscious effort on the part of the artist. Ānandavardhana emphasizes the ease and spontaniety of creative imagery in art. He tells us that a metaphor or any sensible element in art is very difficult to conceive in a cold intellectual[79] fashion. But when the artist begins to feel within him the upsurge of creative emotion, a whole stream of imagery bearing the beauty-impulse flows out. This is how the imagery and the colour-element in art is 'internal-ized' with Rasa-emotion. An imagery remains external (बहिरङ्ग), and therefore discordant, so long as it requires a separate effort for its production. The organic unity of a figure with the deeper aesthetic meaning is achieved this way only, without which the whole imagery will seem

to be a patchwork of mental pictures. The process of 'internalization'[80] or 'organization' of imagery with aesthetic experience is known as Śarīrīkaraṇaṁ (शरीरीकरणम्). Abhinavagupta tells us of this undercurrent of imaginal element in art experience that those figures alone achieve the inconceivable beauty and thrill, which are so 'organized' (शरीरतापादनम्) with their creative source. The emotion by overflowing the figures lends a new charm to them, without which they will be merely colour-illusions and cold in effect. At the same time the figurative element bottles up the fugitive experience, bears it up and conveys it to our souls in pleasing, concordant forms.

The law as put forward by Ānandavardhana subsumes under it and explains the Law of Subordination and Emphasis. It may be known as the Law of Organic Articulation. Our aesthetic consciousness, when in its intensely creative state, seeks re-ordering of the entire emotional life. When the emergence of the new order is in sight, the cognitive element works under the command of creative emotion, so that there is the total articulation of emotional life in imaginably pleasing forms. This gives a paradoxical result: While artistic beauty is immanent in the figurative forms and collocations, yet the element that unifies them into an organic whole and infuses them with pulsating life transcends them.

Beauty of a work of art lies in the forms, and yet it is not because of them. The work is beautiful and artistic because of, and to the extent to which, it achieves, the unity of subjective experience transcending the objective diversity. This is so with the moral judgment. Moral quality attaches to acts and intentions because they spring from an organic unity of life, that is the attitude which goes beyond them. Without the transcendent unity of experience, there is neither virtue nor beauty. There is no truth either in solitary cognitive experiences without their being

unified by a universal essence. An art is merely pictorial and descriptive in which the artist's creative passion does not reduce the rambling images into an organic unity. Ānandavardhana's Law of Organic Articulation is in line with the philosophical outlook of the Vedānta, where Truth means the articulation of a new cognitive order, Virtue the creation and expansion of a new order in conative life, and where 'growth' means the emergence of higher orders of existence.

Ānandavardhana[81] breaks up the Law of Organic Articulation into five sub-laws. (1) The metaphor, imagery, or for that matter, any art-element, must be worked up to intensify and sustain the transcendent unity of Rasa-experience and not independently. (2) It is worked up at the opportune time, (3) and it is left out at the proper moment, (4) there is no over-doing or over-development of any element, and lastly (5) the Law of Subordination asserts again and again so that the element does not tend to become a dominant and discordant note.

Mutatis mutandis the law and its five sub-laws apply to ethical life as well. Psychologically healthy life and ethically virtuous one is made possible by the internal organization of conative urges. If an unruly instinct breaks this organized unity of life and works its way to independent fulfilment, vice results. In the same way, an over-development and under-development of any aspect of life result in complex-formations. The complexes are the psycho-moral tumours, which are not only painful but also nasty, and make a really virtuous life impossible. The comparison goes further. Each act and intention receives its moral meaning in so far as it contributes towards, and, is derived from the master motive of life.

(*To be continued*)

The Call of the Jagadguru.—Śrī Śaṅkarācārya of Kāñcī Discourses of H. H. Jagadguru Śrī Chandraśekharendra Saraswatī compiled by P. Śaṅkaranārāyaṇan, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, with a foreword by His Highness Jaya Chamarāja Wadayar, Maharaja of Mysore. Pages xxxii and 244. Price Rs. 4/-, Ganesh & Co. Ltd., Madras—17, 1958.

Ādi Śaṅkara after establishing the four *maṭhas* finally settled in Kāñcīpuram, the then centre of intellectual life in South India and founded the *Kāñcī Maṭha*. In support of this there is historical evidence of a reliable character. The present Jagadguru has been occupying the *gaddī* from 1910 and is at present for the past one year in the city of Madras delivering discourses in Tamil to large audiences; and the present work is a summary in English of his 43 speeches.

The Mahārāja of Mysore who belongs to the Śṛṅgerī Maṭha and follows the Śaṅkara tradition of Advaita Vedānta has contributed a foreword commending the work to the readers—the citizen of the modern "secular state" and appealing that our direct need is to become spiritual.

We warmly recommend this book to our students. The entire work is a stirring call to the people of modern days to believe in the sanctity of the works of the past and to live the life enunciated therein as far as modern conditions would permit. *Dharma* should be practised with courage and constancy.

To quote a few examples of the teachings embodied in the work, lecture 8 refutes the cheap ridicule that Hindu religion is polytheistic. There is throughout the work a constant note to trace the foundations of the Śaivite and the Vaiṣṇavite religions to their Vedic sources. Hindu

religion does not grow by propaganda but by the rigid observance of its votaries. It is our duty to resuscitate and strengthen the Vedic religion in letter and spirit. Mere chanting of the Vedas without knowing its meaning and application in practice is like preserving the body without the soul which is vital to it.

In lecture 31 he emphasises the place of a true Sannyāsin in society. Regarding the Government's proposal to start a Sannyāsī-Saṅgha, he explains that a Saṅgha is the very negation of the solitary life enjoined on the Sannyāsins. The true Sannyāsin is an asset and should not be condemned as an unproductive dependent on society.

In lecture 43 he discourses on the *Ṣaṭ-padī-Stotra* of Ādi Śaṅkara and shows that the text

"नारायण करुणामय शरणं करवाणि तावकौ चरणौ।"

is a succinct statement of the Śaraṇāgati Mantra—words of absolute dependence and surrender to God adapted by Śaṅkara.

—A. S. Nataraja Ayyar

THE NAVAYATS OF KANARA, By Victor S. D'Souza, M.A., Ph.D., published by Kannada Research Institute, Dharwar, xii ; 266 pp. Rs. 5/-.

This is an ethnological and cultural study pertaining to the Muslim community of Navayats who are found in the coastal areas of North and South Kanara districts of the Mysore state throwing light on the social history of the community. An interesting account is given at the beginning about the commercial relations between Arabia and the bordering countries and India and the mode of formation of the Muslim communities on the coasts of India represented by the Muslims of Bhatkal, Navayats of Deccan, the Konkani Muslims, Moplahs and Labbais.

The derivation of the term Navayat is discussed and after a critical consideration of the different views about the origin of the Navayatis of Kanara it is traced that they are the progeny of male Arab and Persian ancestors who came by the way of Malabar and also directly from Arabia and Persia and married or consorted with some local Indian women who spoke a Konkani dialect. Numerous references that are given in the foot-notes not only add strength to the conclusions of the writer but also point to the wide range of the subject covered by this study. The minute details regarding every aspect of the Navayat life including details about their dwellings, ornaments, dress, food, mode of eating, marriage customs, religious practices, etc., indicate the thoroughness and the close intimacy with which the subject has been dealt with by the author. This is a valuable addition to the cultural history of different people living in India.

—V. Hanumanthachar

DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS IN THE KANNADA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Dharwar, Vol. 2, edited by Prof. S. S. Malwad and Sri B. S. Kulkarni, 1955, xii : 125 pp. Rs. 3 and Vol. 3, edited by B. S. Kulkarni, xii : 119 ; pp. Rs. 3/-.

The Second Volume of the Catalogue describes 44 works and Vol. 3, 48 works giving, in the usual manner, particulars about the substance of the manuscripts, its size, extent, author and short extracts from the manuscripts. Reference is given in the case of some works to Kannada *Kavicarita* for any additional information and attention of the reader is drawn to some important works which are not noticed in the *Kavicarita*. These volumes as well as Vol. 1 describing 57 *mss.* edited by Sri R. S. Pancamukhi will be of great use to those who are engaged in the study

of Kannada language and literature. In this connection it may be stated that many parts of Karnāṭaka are not fully explored with a view for collecting *mss*. A systematic and intensive search for manuscripts in that state would undoubtedly bring out many literary treasures which would throw more light on the history and culture of the people of Karnāṭaka. For this purpose the state Government should come forward with liberal grants, appoint search parties and organise manuscript libraries. Only then the formation of states on linguistic basis would have some significance.

—V. Hanumanthachar

A Guide to the Kannada Research Institute Museum, by A. M. Annigeri, M.A., Curator of the Museum, pub. by Kannada Research Institute, Dharwar., x; 60 : xii pp. Price 50 nP.

It is really gratifying to see that the *Kannada Research Institute*, Dharwar does not confine itself merely to the collection of manuscripts and publication of books, but is also taking active interest in collecting and preserving ancient relics in Karnāṭaka in the shape of archaeological finds, inscriptions, sculptures, coins, paintings etc., which are of great interest especially to a student of history. The book under notice which gives a vivid description of some of the more interesting objects, such as, pre-historic and historic antiquities, stone and metal images, memorial stones, epigraphs, coins, paintings, etc., and will be a true guide to the students of history and archaeology.

—V. Hanumanthachar

SANĀTANA-DHARMA-SŪTRAS of Bhagavān Śrī Nārāyaṇa: Preface, transliteration and translation into English by Śrī Janārdana, published by The Śuddha Dharma Office, Mylapore, Madras 4, xii : 78 pp. Price Rs. 2·50 nP.

This is the 11th publication in the *Śuddha Dharma Maṇḍala Series*, containing the text of the 33 Sūtras bearing on the Sanātana-dharma as explained by the followers of that Maṇḍala. These Sūtras are stated to have been originally taught by Bhagavān Śrī Nārāyaṇa to Sage Agastya. In his lengthy preface Śrī Janārdana has criticised the principles of the Sanātana-dharma prescribed by the ancient Seers and Law givers of India, which he identifies with Varṇāśramadharma, and has set forth the view of the Maṇḍala. According to this view Para Brahma, Jīva or Ātman and Prakṛti are the three tattvas. The Ātman becoming subject to the forces of Prakṛti which is the constituent of the three qualities---Sattva, Rajas and Tamas and knowing no way to control it, remains helpless until knowledge dawns. "Of all such knowledge it is the one regarding one's own state as Jīva that is held to be effective." This is the state of *Brahma-yoga* or *Śuddha-yoga* which is reached by the adept in the line. In broad outline this view corresponds to the principles of *Seśvara Sāṅkhya*. It is surprising that these Sūtras for which the origin is claimed from Śrī Nārāyaṇa had remained unknown to the world of scholars all these years.

—V. Hanumanthachar

THE EARLY WOODEN TEMPLES OF CHAMBA, by Hermann Goetz with 16 Plates and 12 Text-illustrations and one map. Leiden. E. I. Brill 1955. Memoirs of the Kern Institute, No. 1, pp. xiv and 121 with a foreword by J. Ph. Vogel.

The reviewer recommends unreservedly this monograph of the *Kern Institute*, Holland, as an ideal for Indian students to follow. The author has been connected with the editing of the Kern Institute's *Annual Bibliography* of Indian Archaeology and is now the curator of the National Gallery of modern art at New Delhi. The work describes the three hill temples in the Western Himālayas and they all pertain to the worship of the goddess under various names. At Brahmor she is called *Lakṣaṇā Devī*, at Chatrarhi *Śakti Devī* and at Chamba-Lahul she is known as *Kāli* for the Hindus and *Vajra-vārāhī* for the Tibetans. The author has not only described the ancient temples and images from an aesthetic and iconographical point of view, but has also given the historical background very elaborately and has traced their relation to the medieval art of India and unravelled the problems presented by the *Vaṁśāvalī* of the Rājas of Chamba in connection with our knowledge of contemporaneous Indian History. The evidence proves that the temples were erected in the 7th or the 8th centuries A.D.

This book assumes a real importance in the study of Indian Art as the great masterpieces of the period have been lost due to the invasions and ravages of time. The temples and images sheltered by the snowy peaks and gorges of the Himālayas are the representatives of that later Gupta art which was the source of most of the earlier art of Nepal and Greater India and of the Buddhist art in Eastern Turkistan, China and Japan. For this reason these temples and sculptures are of more than local interest; they are the keys to the great periods in the art history of Asia and of the world.

RĀGATATTVAVIBODHA, by Śrīnivasa, edited by V. S. Desai, Oriental Institute, Baroda, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. cxxvi : 1956, pp. ix and 62. Price Rs. 4.

This is a work on North Indian Music edited for the first time from a single manuscript in the collections of the Maharaja of Bikanir. The author is believed to have written between 1650 and 1680 A.D.

In the prefatory chapter the author has tried to establish in a novel way the importance and utility of Gāna basing his arguments on the *Vidhi* and *Niṣedha* as laid down by the Śruti, Smṛti and the Bhāgavata, and shows how besides gaining fame and wealth it is a sure way of obtaining final beatitude (*mokṣa*) and of constant companionship of the Almighty Lord.

The welcome feature of this publication is that the *Sangeet Nāṭaka Akademi*, New Delhi, sanctioned Rs. 10,000 to the Baroda *Oriental Institute* in 1955 for the publication of six works on Music, Dance and Dramatics; and the present publication is the first result of that grant.

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THE SOMA HYMANS OF THE ṚGVEDA. A fresh interpretation, Part I (Ṛgveda ix 1—15) by S. S. Bhave, Head of the Department of Sanskrit University of Baroda, Oriental Institute Baroda, 1957, pp. 8, 105. Price Rs. 4.

Vedic scholarship in India has now taken a different shape. It is time that new translation of the Vedic literature, based on all the available materials, is done; and of them the *Ṛgveda* claims precedence along with a new Vedic Index. The present work before us has appeared at the opportune time and is an attempt at a fresh translation of fifteen Sūktas—137 Ṛks—in the IX Maṇḍala of the *Ṛgveda* taking into consideration all materials eastern

and western from the days of the traditional interpretation culminating in the *Sāyaṇa-Bhāṣya*, up to the translation of Geldner (1923); and it takes into account also what modern Vedic scholarship has since done. The notes are exhaustive and explain the basis of the variant interpretations. We heartily congratulate the author on this learned and erudite translation with exegetical notes; and we eagerly await the publication of other parts of his translation.

In this connection we respectfully invite the attention of the Union Government that the translation of the Ṛgveda should be undertaken by them and the task should be entrusted to a central board of scholars. We would remind as to how the then Government of India sponsored the publication of Madonell and Keith's Vedic Index. What the then Government of India did the present Union Government should do with its ample resources. This is a field in which Indian scholars put to test have shown their mettle and it is high time that the results of Indian scholarship are allowed to be shown in their true colour. A suggestion may be made that the text of the Sūktas should have been given in Devanāgarī script along with the *Sāyaṇa-Bhāṣya*.

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MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN INDIA, by K. M. Kapadia, second edition, Oxford University Press (Indian Branch), 1958, pages xxxii and 318. Price Rs. 15-/.

The Oxford University Press should be congratulated for this excellent revised edition of the author's work. The author is a Reader in Sociology in the University of Bombay. The work may be divided into two parts: first, it deals with the history of the institutions of marriage and joint-family from the earliest times down to the present day inclusive of the interference by legislation. Secondly, it attempts at an evaluation of the working of the said

institutions at the present day. The first is important to the student of the history of social institutions in India and the second to students of modern sociology. Again, the work deals both with the Hindu and Muslim institutions. The Christian has evidently been omitted as being of recent origin after the British conquest.

The conclusions of the author on the historical working of the institutions are correct and they have been supported by reference to the original authorities. The author's observations on the working of the Institutions and forecasting trends are useful, and as he states "a comprehensive investigation by a team of sociologists is necessary for this purpose" (page xi).

For example divorce has come to stay as a legislative innovation; but it remains to be seen whether the provision may be used as medicine for remedying real individual ills or may be used as a handmaid of animal passions to corrupt the entire social system. The interference by the legislature with the institution of joint-family is deplored by the author, thus : "Hindu sentiments are hence [after an elaborate reasoning] even today in favour of the joint-family. The destruction of the joint-family by legislation is therefore, rightly considered to be non-Hindu, because, it ignores Hindu family history and sentiments (page 232).

Polyandry never existed as an Institution in Ancient India. The stray instance of the Pāṇḍawas marrying Draupadī is an anachronism. The modern instances in India, as in Assam etc., could be eradicated only by education. Polygamy though sanctioned by the *Dharma-Śāstras* was never in practice and monogamy now insisted by the legislature is welcome. Regarding the choice of the married pair the moral and legal injunctions found in the same ślokas in *Manu* had by the time of Medhātithi solidified into a few legal injunctions, such as, the prohibition of the *Sagotra* marriage and have ever since remained

as legal injunctions till the legislature wanted to abolish them as antiquated. The inter-caste marriage—the *Anuloma* type—once sanctioned by the *Dharma-Śāstras* has ceased to exist as a fact, for centuries until the legislature has now revived it and made it legal by its fiat. Hindu marriage even of the *Gāndharva* type had always remained a sacrament through the ages; and now the legislature has added a new civil type.

—A. S. Nataraja Ayyar

RATNAKIRTINIBANDHĀVALĪ.—Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti. Edited by Professor Anantalal Thakur, M.A., Mithila Sanskrit Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research, Darbhanga. Published in the Tibetan Sanskrit works Series, Vol. III, K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1957. Price Rs. 4/- Pages 36+163.

The volume under review contains 10 small treatises on Buddhist logic by Ratnakīrti, a well-known scholar and disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra of the 11th century. Of these, three were already published in the *Bibliotheca Indica series*, under the title *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*. Through the efforts of rī Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana we are in possession of several Buddhists works in manuscripts which have been preserved in the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna. A bundle in that collection contains all the treatises of Ratnakīrti written in Maithilī script.

Prof. A. L. Thakur has been working with great interest on Indian logic including Vaiśeṣika for a pretty long time and has done very good work. He has edited several works on Logic written by Buddhist scholars. His knowledge of the contribution of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti to Indian logic is admirable. It is through his hard labour that we are in possession of the works of the above mentioned Buddhist scholars in print.

It is needless for me to say that the study of the Science of Reasoning started afresh with Akṣapāda Gotama in about the 6th century B. C., or a little later Akṣapāda wrote his *Nyāyasūtra* in exposition of the views attributed to Naiyāyikas and also in defence of the Āstika views against the unsound arguments of the followers of the Buddha attacking the Standpoint of Naiyāyikas in various aspects. The work of Akṣapāda became very effective and the Buddhists criticised it from their own separate angle of vision. The followers of Akṣapāda wrote on the *Nyāyasūtra* and criticised the views of the Buddhis, who, in their turn, did not spare the non-Buddhists. This academic struggle continued for centuries till we come to Udayana who, in a way, finally stopped the struggle. The logical thoughts of these centuries are therefore, interwoven in the works of the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist scholars. It is not possible to understand the link of the arguments of one school without studying the works of the other school.

The work under review helps us in many ways in understanding the problems of logic attributed to various scholars of the earlier centuries who wrote directly or indirectly on the Science of Reasoning. Most of these scholars were unknown to us before these references could be traced and verified. The scholars are really indebted to Professor A. L. Thakur for his strenuous efforts in editing the works and placing them before the scholarly world. It will not be, however, out of place to make a few remarks here in connection with the Preface, Introduction and also the arrangement of the treatises.

The *Nibandhas* as printed in the volume do not bear any reference to the *Tantra-Śāstra*, nor have the topics discussed therein any connection whatsoever with the Tāntrika practices and other problems of the Śāstra. I do not understand how the Preface-writer is justified to say—"The impression left by the Nibandhas of Ratnakīrti tends to show

that he was a Tāntrika of the first variety". If he understands that the word "नमस्तारायै" written at the top of some of the Nibandhas are indications of his being a Tāntrika, he should know that the manuscripts from which the press copy of these Nibandhas has been made were not the original manuscripts. It might have been written by the scribe of those manuscripts. Even if it were so, there was no occasion to discuss unnecessarily in the Preface Ratnakīrti's Tāntrika attitude which has no bearing on the subject. Coming to the arrangement of the *Nibandhas*, it may be pointed out that as the *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* is referred to by the author in his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (p. 84), it should have been placed before the latter and similarly, as the *Īśvaradūṣaṇa* was written earlier than the *Sarvajñasiddhi* (vide p. 16), the former should have been placed earlier. Again, as the *Citrādvaitasiddhi* was written earlier than the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (vide p. 85), it should have been placed earlier. Lastly, as the *Apohasiddhi* was written earlier than the *Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa* (vide p. 115), it should have been placed earlier than the latter. Thus, for the sake of critical study of these works, they should have been chronologically arranged as far as it is known to us. Thus, the arrangement should have been something like—

ईश्वरसिद्धिदूषणम्, सर्वज्ञसिद्धिः, अपोहसिद्धिः, स्थिरसिद्धिदूषणम्, चित्राद्वैतप्रकाशवादः, क्षणभङ्गसिद्धिद्वयम्, प्रमाणान्तर्भावप्रकरणम्, व्याप्तिनिर्णयः, सन्तानान्तरदूषणम् ।

As to the remark "Particular references to the Buddhist views are traceable in his (Vātsyāyana's) work" (Introduction p. 16), it may be pointed out that recent researches have shown that the various views found in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* were older than the advent of the Buddha and his followers, and so it is not correct to attribute them to the later Buddhist *vādas*. It is a fact that some of those earlier views came to be associated with the later Buddhist *vādas*, but that cannot prove that Vātsyāyana borrowed them from the later Buddhists. Morever, nowhere either Akṣapāda, or Vātsyāyana or even

Uddyotakara attributes any of the views to the known recent *Vādas* by name. Hence, the above remark of Professor Thakur is not in keeping with the advanced researches in Nyāya thought.


However, the edition is very useful and gives us enough information about a period which has been really very luminous, though ordinarily known to be dark. We congratulate the editor for his illuminating Introduction and achievement.

Bharata Ratna Dr. Bhagavan Das, M.A., D.Litt.

Born—January 12, 1869; Death—September 18, 1958.

[illegible]

[illegible]



BHĀRATA RATNA DR. BHAGWAN DAS, M.A., D.LITT.
Born—January 29, 1869 ; Death—September 18, 1958.
President of the Ganganatha Jha, Research Institute from 9th April, 1949 to 18th September, 1958.

OBITUARY

LATE BHARATA RATNA DR. BHAGVĀN DĀS* :

A STUDY OF LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY

By DR. M. HAFIZ SYED

BHARATA RATNA DR. BHAGVĀN DĀS was born on the 29th January 1869, in the holy city of Kāśī. He showed signs of his brilliance at his early age. At the tender age of twelve years he passed his Matriculation Examination and obtained his Master of Arts Degree in Western Philosophy at a comparatively young age of eighteen. He did not take long to wait for a suitable job. The then United Provinces Government recognising his extraordinary merits straightaway appointed him as a Tahsildar and a year later he was promoted to the post of Deputy Collector, the duties of which he discharged with great distinction and served various districts of the Uttar Pradesh (the old United Provinces). In response to the call of some of his most esteemed friends more especially of late Dr. Annie Besant, he severed his connexion with the Government in 1898 and occupied himself wholeheartedly in the service of the Central Hindu College for quite a number of years. He served the Central Hindu College in various capacities and finally as a Secretary of the Board of Trustees. Later on, he served the Municipal Board, Banaras, as its Chairman for three years and the Kashi Vidyapith as its *Kulapati* from the time it was founded.

He took keen and active interest in the struggle for freedom of India. For some years he identified himself

*I am very much thankful to Śrī ŚrīPrakāshji, Governor of Bombay, who has kindly sent, at my request, the Photograph accompanying this article, of his father, the late Bhārata Ratna Dr. Bhagwān Dās—who was the President of our Institute till the last day of his life, 18th September, 1958.—EDITOR

with the Congress Politics and had to undergo incarceration perhaps for six months or more. He was elected by the seven cities of the Uttar Pradesh (then called United Provinces) to the Central Legislative Assembly and remained in office for two or three years. Due to his advancing age and his deeper interest in the cultivation of higher purpose, he resigned his membership of the Central Legislature and fully occupied himself in the pursuit of philosophic learning and interpretation of Indian Thought. In his own inimitable manner and original way of thinking he expounded ancient Indian wisdom according to modern methods.

Publications

During all the days of Government service and later the service of his own people he quietly and devotedly pursued his studies of the deeper problems of life. It was in 1904 that he published the *Science of Peace* which was recognised by eminent thinkers of India and Western countries as a monumental work of original speculation based upon his deeper insight into Eastern and Western Thought. It is a treatise on metaphysics which brings peace and certainty to every open-minded and genuine enquirer into the why and wherefore of many subtle and complex problems of life.

The second edition of this book in an enlarged and revised form was published in 1921. The second and great work of his was the *Science of Emotions* which has won the appreciation of modern psychologists who have acclaimed it as a solid contribution of Indian thought to human psychology. His another outstanding contribution has been the *Science of Social Organisation*, a wonderful interpretation of the ancient laws of Manu and their comparison with the modern development of social science.

Besides these original and by far the most thought-provoking philosophical works, his three volumes of "*Praṇava-Vāda*" deserve special mention. During his stay in Bara Banki as a Deputy Magistrate he came in contact with Pt. Dhanarāja who possessed colossal memory and who remembered by heart quite a large number of Sanskrit books up till that time unknown to the world. One of the books dictated by Pt. Dhanarāja was '*Praṇava-Vāda*' over which Dr. Bhagwan Das took immense pains, wrote out most carefully all that Pandit Dhanarāja dictated to him, corrected and revised it most meticulously and translated them into English and interpreted them in a most lucid manner. This service of his can never be forgotten, because, but for him and his labour of love, all that has come to us as an exposition of the philosophy of "*Praṇava*" would have been lost to the world of learning. In his later days he published several other books such as *Krishna*, *Mystic Experiences*, *Annie Besant and the Changing World*, *World-War and its Only Cure—World Order and World Religion*, *Communalism and its Cure by Theosophy*, *the Philosophy of Non-Co-operation*, *Ancient Solutions of Modern Problems*, *Social Reconstruction* and the *Science of Religion*, besides numerous pamphlets and articles which have been very much appreciated in various parts of India.

Faith in the Unity of Religions

There is another service to the cause of Religions of the World which Dr. Bhagwan Das has rendered in a most scholarly and most convincing manner. His now famous book on the *Essential Unity of all Religions* which has already undergone several editions, is too well-known to need further mention. By publishing this book he has proved categorically that all the religions of the world have sprung from a common stock and bear unity of thought and aims in essential principles. This volume has done

not a little in emphasizing the fact that the underlying principle of all the religions is one and the same. Coming as we do from a common source we all have a common destiny and a fairly common method of spiritual realization.

Ātma-Vidyā

Dr. Bhagwan Das's system of philosophical thought is perhaps all his own. He bases his philosophy on *Ātma-Vidyā*, or the *Science of the Self*. His point of view may be stated, in his own words :

He is a believer in infinitely countless individual selves or souls; (2) in their rebirths, evolution and involution in and through evolving and involving, integrating and disintegrating, forming and dissolving, material bodies and surroundings : the passing of each self, through all possible experiences, in infinite time, space and motion; (3) in cycles and circles of time and space on all possible scales of duration and extent, in which the process of rhythmic evolution and involution manifest themselves : (4) in one all-including, all-pervading, ever complete timeless, spaceless, universal soul of self, whose eternally changeless, and yet also ever changing Ideation, the entire world process of all souls and bodies is.

According to him the science of self can help the orderly conduct of the individual life, within the social life and vouchsafe earthly and spiritual well-being within the reach of all.

Applicability of Indian Philosophy

It is said in certain quarters that philosophy is merely speculative and theoretical; it cannot be applied in the scientific manner to the solution of social, political and economical problems. It has no use in every day human life. Its intellectual advantages are admitted but it is

wrongly supposed that it is of no use in ameliorating the condition of human society. This view of philosophy may be true in regard to Western system of philosophy; but the same cannot be asserted in regard to Indian systems of philosophy.

According to the Indian philosophical tradition the object of the study of philosophy is to put an end to pain and to ensure human happiness exempt from decay. From the Indian point of view, Western philosophy is barren and does not lead us anywhere beyond helping us to develop the power of thought but Indian philosophy leads us somewhere and gives us some insight into the why and wherefore of life's questions. It also vouchsafes us certain amount of certainty in our search for truth.

During the last fifty years and more efforts have been made to study Indian philosophy critically and systematically. Several eminent scholars have worked zealously in this field and have produced works of great merit; but they have mostly confined themselves in interpretation of ancient Indian philosophy in terms of Modern Thought. There, they have stopped. They have made no serious attempt to apply the fundamental basic principle of India's ancient wisdom to the solution of current social, political and other human problems. It may be safely asserted that unlike other Indian philosophers of the present day Dr. Bhagwan Das holds his own and has done his very best in expounding and solving some of the current Indian problems in the light of ancient wisdom.

What is True Democracy?

In his well-known book "*Ancient Solutions of Modern Problems*" page 48, he says, "As things are, today, most of the so-called self-governments of the world are, not governments of the people, by the (higher self, the select and elect best, of the) people, for the (welfare of the)

people, but "of the people, by the (lower self, the push-ful, cunning, scheming, self-seeking, intriguing, worst of the) people, for the (aggrandisement of cliques of bureau-crats and handfuls of capitalists and militarists, and against) people."

Truly democratic spirit is revealed in the following statement (page 65) :—

" Aryan culture says that if a hundred men of the people complain against any public servant he shall be dismissed forthwith."

In his wonderful treatise on the *Science of Religion* (p. 127), we read, "that no birth not even learning, but conduct is the supreme test of the regeneracy."

Value of Bhagwan Das's Works

Some Hindu leaders have begun taking interest in the revival of what they call Hindu Culture without taking the least trouble to find out what is stands for and what its spiritual basis is. It was left to Dr. Bhagwan Das alone to expound and prove what was and what should be the philosophic basis of Hindu Culture and how it could not be brought on the level of modern requirements in order to preserve its true spirit in the amidst of conflicting ideologies existing in our country. In short, Dr. Bhagwan Das's services to the cause of Indian Thought, Indian Culture, Indian Religion, Indian Society and Indian Politics are too great and too all-embracing to be adequately ex-pressed in the limited space of a short article.

Sincere workers in various fields of human welfare would do well to study his truly inspiring and constructive original suggestions conveyed in his variety of books in order to fit themselves for the acquisition of right understanding and right form of activity which may help them to reorga-nise their various institutions in the light of ancient wisdom the like of which the world has not yet seen and found.

Ganganatha Jha
Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha

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